





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































people,	 activities,	 interests,	 and	 thoughts	 of	 all	 kinds—that	 is	 to	 say,	 everything	 we	 have	 lived	
through—makes	 part	 of	 ourselves	 and	 goes	 to	 build	 up	 our	 personalities.	 If	 some	 of	 our	 past	
relationships,	with	all	the	associated	memories,	with	the	wealth	of	feelings	they	called	forth,	could	be	
suddenly	wiped	out	of	our	lives,	how	impoverished	and	empty	we	should	feel!	How	much	love,	trust,	
gratification,	comfort	and	gratitude,	which	we	experienced	and	returned	would	be	 lost!	Many	of	us	
would	not	even	want	to	have	missed	some	of	our	painful	experiences,	for	they	have	also	contributed	
to	the	enrichment	of	our	personalities.	
	
—Melanie	Klein,	1936		
	
The	practice	of	psychoanalysis,	developed	by	Freud	during	the	height	of	Victorian-
era	liberalism,	both	upholds	and	challenges	a	foundational	assumption	of	liberal	theory—
the	belief	in	the	individual	as	the	natural	and	ideal	expression	of	selfhood.	Psychoanalysis	
undermines	liberalism’s	faith	in	the	pre-given	atomistic	self	by	suggesting	that	individuals	
are	not	born	but	made.	In	attending	to	the	relations	that	comprise	and	shape	the	self,	
psychoanalysis	presses	against	liberal	beliefs	about	the	naturalness	of	the	individuated	
subject.	Rather	than	envisioning	selfhood	as	of	only	one	nature,	psychoanalysis,	in	its	
various	forms,	looks	to	the	social	and	cultural	conditions	that	foster	or	discourage	the	
emergence	and	endurance	of	particular	types	of	selves.	Because	psychoanalysis	examines	
the	context	in	which	the	self	develops	or	fails	to	develop,	according	to	our	normative	
beliefs,	it	provides	insight	into	how	we	might	rethink	the	feasibility	and	desirability	of	
these	beliefs,	beliefs	that	often	assert	the	positive	value	of	autonomy	understood	as	non-
dependence.		
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While	I	emphasize	the	political	worth	of	a	notion	of	autonomy,	a	concept	very	often	
linked	to	individualism	and	self-determination,	I	continue,	in	this	chapter,	to	reevaluate	
how	we	understand	autonomy	by	enriching	my	account	of	receptive	autonomy—a	
comportment	of	autonomy	enabled	by	an	affirmative	approach	to	relationality.	In	what	
follows,	I	turn	to	Freudian	psychoanalysis	to	show	how	liberal	principles	that	assume	and	
idealize	self-sovereignty	normalize	a	resistant	and	defensive	psychic	structure	that	creates	
a	social	environment	that	actually	discourages	a	receptive	autonomous	comportment.		
I	propose	that	the	commonplace	liberal	understanding	of	autonomy,	as	a	faculty	of	
rational,	non-dependent,	and	self-standing	subjects,	originates	from	a	fear	of	otherness	and	
vulnerability,	and	that	this	liberal	ideal	of	autonomy	actually	results	in	a	society-wide	
denial	of	dependence	that	prevents	receptive	autonomy.	Feminist	Freudians	Jessica	
Benjamin	and	Elizabeth	Young-Bruehl	attest	to	this	negative	assessment	of	liberal	
autonomy,	as	they	contend	that	receptiveness	to	dependency	enables	the	taking-in	of	
nourishment	and	thus	allows	for	conditions	of	growth,	reciprocal	care,	and	vitalization—
the	conditions	I	describe	as	productive	of	autonomous	capacity.	While	relationality	entails	
risk	and	even	the	potential	for	violence	at	the	hands	of	others,	avoidance	of	intertwinement	
robs	the	self	of	growth-potential,	as	this	avoidance	means	turning	away	from	otherness,	
from	the	currents	of	love	and	loss	that	foster	powers	of	self-direction.		
Receptive	autonomy	requires	a	willingness	to	engage	with	otherness,	to	respond	to	
difference,	loss,	and	uncertainty,	to	all	that	we	cannot	explain	about	our	world,	in	a	non-
defensive	manner.	Only	in	opening	to	the	presence	of	our	world,	to	what	legal	scholar	
Robert	Cover	calls	our	“nomos,”	our	“normative	universe”	(1983,	4),	do	we	truly	gain	the	
capacity	to	resist,	rework,	and	rewrite	the	laws	that	comprise	our	nomos.	Our	nomos	
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encompasses	much	more	than	the	laws	enforced	by	state	institutions.	As	Cover	suggests,	
such	state	laws	stand	or	fall	in	relation	to	the	social	narratives	that	either	buttress	or	
destroy	their	force	and	authority	(1983,	11).	Accordingly,	“the	creation	of	legal	meaning—	
‘jurisgenisis’—takes	place	always	through	an	essentially	cultural	medium”	(Cover	1983,	
11).	In	this	sense,	receptive	“auto”	“nomy”	(derived	from	auto-self/nomos-law)	denotes	a	
receptive	approach	to	the	world	that	allows	the	self,	the	“auto,”	to	create	its	own	“nomos,”	
its	own	laws—the	narratives	and	meanings	that	constitute	its	world.		
This	normative	world	comes	into	being	through	enculturated	responses	to	
otherness.	Cover	explains,	“just	as	the	development	of	increasingly	complex	responses	to	
the	physical	attributes	of	our	world	begins	with	birth	itself,	so	does	the	parallel	
development	of	the	responses	to	personal	otherness	that	define	the	normative	world”	
(1983,	5).	The	very	manner	in	which	one	learns	to	approach	otherness,	to	approach	the	
world,	determines	the	very	qualities	and	meanings	that	this	world	holds.	Consequently,	the	
ways	in	which	we	learn	to	engage	with	the	world	directly	relate	to	our	ability	to	create	our	
nomos,	to	write	our	social-self	laws,	to	express	an	autonomous	comportment.	
In	the	following,	I	look	to	how	specific	psychic-social	patterns	shape	the	manner	in	
which	we	approach	the	uncertainty	and	dependence	that	relationality	entails.	I	continue	to	
show	that	the	ability	to	respond	non-defensively	and	non-violently	to	vulnerability	enables	
autonomous	capacity,	while	resistance	to	dependence	weakens	capacities	for	creative	
action	and	thought.	Psychoanalysis	reveals	the	self-contradictory	nature	of	autonomy	as	
self-determination—how	resistance	to	human	interdependence	actually	dampens	the	
possibility	of	critical	awareness	and	creativity,	the	very	capacities	I	associate	with	receptive	
autonomy.	
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In	this	sense,	I	depart	from	feminist	thinkers	who	reject	the	idea	of	autonomy	tout	
court	for	its	ties	to	a	liberal	conception	of	subjectivity	as	self-determined.	Instead,	I	
continue	to	develop	my	claim	that	autonomy	retains	political	value	as	a	mode	of	social	
critique—the	capacity	to	think	and	move	against	the	current	of	social	norms—and	
creativity—the	capacity	to	think	and	move	beyond	the	bounds	of	the	possible.		
While	the	previous	chapter	portrayed	the	autonomous	capacities	engendered	by	a	
receptive	and	loving	self	willing	to	risk	its	social	cohesion,	this	chapter	turns	to	the	
conditions	that	foster	such	a	posture	of	openness	and	self-direction.	Not	denying	the	
critical	worth	of	the	foregoing	chapter’s	insistence	on	the	autonomy-enabling	potential	in	
erotic	self-disruption,	this	chapter	emphasizes	the	important	role	of	nourishment	in	
determining	the	self’s	potential	to	embody	a	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy.	I	also	
discuss	the	impediments	to	the	growth	of	selves	capable	of	a	loving	and	autonomous	mode	
of	being.		
I	first	provide	an	overview	of	liberal	autonomy	and	its	social	implications.	I	start	by	
illustrating	how	the	predominate	understanding	of	autonomy,	presented	in	liberal	theory	
and	idealized	in	American	society,	normalizes	independence	(and	those	posed	to	act	in	a	
self-determined	manner)	and	devalues	dependence	(and	those	associated	with	
dependency).	I	then	trace	the	social	and	psychic	costs	of	this	normative	ideal	of	autonomy.	
Against	this	liberal	notion	of	autonomy,	I	turn	to	suggest	that	receptive	autonomy	
relies	upon	an	open	stance	toward	relationality	and	dependency—precisely	those	
conditions	mostly	devalued	in	liberal	society.	Elizabeth	Young-Bruehl	offers	an	account	of	
the	self	as	composed	of	otherness.	Her	vision	of	the	self	as	a	being	comprised	of	relations	
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supports	my	contention	that	the	self’s	autonomous	capacity	requires	an	affirmation	of	
relationality.		
Next,	I	look	to	philosopher	Jonathon	Lear’s	reading	of	Freud’s	vision	of	love	to	
qualify	that	the	self,	and	thus	the	self	capable	of	autonomous	comportment,	must	face	
negativity,	as	the	self	is	formed	in	a	frictive	yet	loving	relationship	with	loss	and	otherness.	
Dissonance	enables	but	might	also	disable	the	self.	This	negative	aspect	of	selfhood	
accounts	for	the	trepidation	with	which	the	self	tends	to	approach	autonomous	capacity,	
especially	in	societies	that	disavow	the	loss	at	the	heart	of	selfhood—the	fragility	of	social	
being.	Young-Bruehl	and	Marxist	Freudian	Erich	Fromm	form	an	unlikely	pair	in	the	
discussion	that	follows.	Together	they	describe	our	tendency	to	fear	freedom;	yet,	only	
Young-Bruehl	delves	into	why	this	might	be	so.	She	and	psychoanalyst	Takeo	Doi	suggest	
that	fearful	reactions	to	dependence	are	neither	intrinsic,	nor	fundamental,	but	rather	are	
the	result	of	social	practices	and	cultural	values.	This	insight	supports	my	consideration	of	
the	qualities	and	consequences	of	liberal	American	beliefs,	which,	I	argue	invoke	just	such	a	
fearful	response	to	interdependence.		
In	resisting	the	very	basis	of	selfhood—the	very	‘otherness’	of	the	self,	liberalism	
engenders	an	environment	inimical	to	the	development	of	peoples’	actual	capacity	for	
autonomy.	Liberalism,	in	practice,	creates	a	heightened	sense	of	insecurity,	as	it	materially	
denies	the	universality	of	dependency	by	turning	over	social	support	services	to	the	free	
market,	an	economic	system	that	appears	justifiable	only	under	the	assumption	that	people	
exist	as	independent	entities	who	deserve	to	stand	or	fall	according	to	the	merit	of	their	
individual	efforts.	When	such	a	system	fails	to	meet	the	needs	of	those	who	are	not	already	
posed	to	benefit	from	it,	it	is	these	losers	of	this	system,	not	the	system	itself,	who	receive	
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the	blame.	They	have	not	lived	up	to	the	ideal	of	independence	proffered	by	liberal	society.	
Liberal	culture	encourages	an	atmosphere	of	competition	and	fear.	The	anxiety	brought	
about	by	a	lack	of	public	substructure	causes	people	to	resist	further	challenges	to	their	
sense	of	psychic	integrity.	They	are	more	likely	to	repel	the	otherness	that	inspires	creative	
thought	and	action	and	more	likely	to	search	for	safe-harbor	in	accustomed	ways	of	being.		
I	explore,	in	depth,	how	liberalism	inspires	a	number	of	such	social	psychic	
defenses.	Some	of	these	defenses	rely	on	a	gendered	distribution	of	vulnerability—the	
projection	of	dependency	onto	a	feminized	other.	Jessica	Benjamin	and	Janine	Chasseguet-
Smirgel	explain	how	this	deflection	of	vulnerability	occurs	through	gender	socialization.	
This	flight	from	dependence	leads	to	a	deficit	in	both	masculine	and	feminine	subjects’	
abilities	to	express	autonomy.	The	result	of	the	disavowal	and	projection	of	vulnerability	
attests	to	the	less	than	ideal	outcome	of	socialized	psychic	defenses.	While	such	defenses	
are	meant	to	protect	the	self’s	ability	to	exist	as	an	independent	entity,	they	actually	
weaken	the	self	and	dampen	its	capacity	for	autonomy.		
Defenses	cause	the	self	to	turn	away	from	nourishment,	from	otherness,	and	
succumb	to	the	false	security	of	living	according	to	a	ready-made	belief	system.	This	belief	
structure	might	be	provided	in	dominate	social	norms	or	in	the	ideals	of	popular	political	
parties	and	leaders.	In	this	way,	while	liberalism	purports	to	sincerely	value	autonomy,	it	
lays	the	groundwork	for	a	society	quite	incapacitated	in	its	ability	for	self-directed	thought	
and	action.	Lastly,	taking	the	gendered	and	affective	facets	of	liberal	autonomy	into	
account,	I	turn	to	recommend	a	reevaluation	of	the	assumed	antithesis	between	autonomy	
and	dependency.	
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Autonomy	as	Freedom	from	Others	
	
Liberal	theory	tends	to	conceive	of	autonomy	primarily	as	a	state	of	freedom	from	
others	and	otherness	and	only	secondarily	as	a	faculty	of	rational	self-rule.	Whether	such	
otherness	is	portrayed	as	interior,	as	in	the	influence	of	the	passions	or	unconscious	
thoughts,	or	as	exterior,	as	in	interference	from	the	actions,	decrees,	or	mores	of	others,	
liberalism	establishes	its	doctrine	of	liberation	as	liberation	from.	Arguably,	liberalism’s	
foremost	concern	is	the	creation	of	a	society	in	which	one	can	readily	protect	oneself	from	
intrusion	by	otherness	in	all	its	forms.	This	requires	that	liberalism	presuppose	the	analytic	
and	empirical	possibility	of	differentiating	individuals	from	others,	from	their	relationships	
with	others,	and	from	the	psychic	life	of	such	entwinements	within	the	self.		
Liberalism,	as	an	ideology	promoting	the	importance	of	negative	liberty,100,	101	
envisions	humans	as	discreet	units,	who,	although	interconnected,	retain	the	ability	to	
stand	apart	from	the	tides	of	social	custom	and	thus	resist	collective	determination.	
Liberalism	values	the	individual’s	ability	to	exist	at	a	remove	from	the	influence	of	others	
and	aims	to	preserve,	for	the	individual,	a	domain	free	from	otherness.	George	Kateb	
describes	liberalism’s	commitment	to	the	preservation	of	individual	rights	as	an	obligation	
to	remain	wary	of	the	reach	and	influence	of	state	power	and	of	“politics”	and	communal	
conventions	in	general	(1992,	25).	Accordingly,	Kateb	describes	autonomy	as	wary	self-
																																																																				
100	Isaiah	Berlin’s	Four	Essays	on	Liberty	(1992)	is	the	text	most	readily	associated	with	this	concept	of	negative	freedom.	
Berlin	defines	negative	freedom	as	freedom	from	interference	and	differentiates	it	from	positive	freedom	as	freedom	to	
express	one’s	own	will.	In	liberal	accounts	of	autonomy,	both	concepts	usually	come	into	play,	but	negative	liberty	is	
typically	understood	as	the	apriori	ground	for	the	expression	of	positive	freedom.				
	
101	Thomas	L.	Dumm	turns	to	Foucault	to	conceptualize	freedom	in	an	effort	to	counter	the	prevalent	conception	of	
freedom	as	requiring	a	zone	free	from	politics,	an	enclosure	protected	from	incursion	by	others	(1996,	4-5).	
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direction,	as	“acting	on	one’s	own,	making	one’s	life	one’s	own,	freely	making	
commitments,	accepting	conventions	known	to	be	conventions,	and	straining	to	construct	
the	architecture	of	one’s	soul”	(1992,	39).	Kateb	voices	liberalism’s	general	contention	that	
“autonomy	consists	in	significant	differentiation	achieved	through	some	distance	between	
one	and	the	world,	and	between	one	and	oneself”	(1992,	40).	Liberalism	expounds	a	
discourse	of	individual	detachment	and	distance	from	others	and	from	communal	
conventions	while	not	necessarily	discounting	the	role	human	relations	play	in	the	lives	of	
individuals.			
Other	liberal	theorists	express	an	explicit	commitment	to	privileging	individual	
freedom	over	collective	expediencies.	Martha	Nussbaum	states,	“liberalism	holds	that	the	
flourishing	of	human	beings	taken	one	by	one	is	both	analytically	and	normatively	prior	to	
the	flourishing	of	the	state	or	nation	or	the	religious	group…”	(1997,	11).	Similarly,	Alan	
Wolfe,	in	his	extensive	defense	of	liberalism,	The	Future	of	Liberalism	(2009),	describes	
liberalism	as	a	system	of	beliefs	and	a	manner	of	governing	that	expresses	a	deep	
commitment	to	individual	autonomy	and	thus	a	strong	distrust	of	dependency.	He	states:		
Dependency,	for	liberals,	cripples.	Human	beings	have	minds,	bodies,	and	both,	
liberals	believe,	should	be	free	to	exercise	their	full	capacities:	minds,	though	open	
societies	that	allow	everyone	to	develop	their	intellect,	and	bodies,	through	societies	
that	guarantee	sufficient	economic	security	to	individuals	so	that	they	are	not	
dependent	on	the	arbitrary	will	of	others…	(Wolfe	2009,	10).		
	
In	his	open	critique	of	dependency,	Alan	affirms	what	other	liberal	theorists	tend	to	
express	only	indirectly,	that	at	the	heart	of	liberalism	lies	a	distrust	of	the	vulnerability	
occasioned	by	interpersonal	dependence.	This	underlying	wariness	sustains	the	now	
conventional	belief	that	individual	autonomy	exists	in	opposition	to	dependence	and	
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receptivity.	This	presentation	of	autonomy	as	incompatible	with	a	state	of	dependence	has	
become	so	commonplace	that	few	would	question	its	validity.		
Liberalism	tends	to	define	autonomy	as	the	capacity	to	choose	one’s	values,	free	
from	the	undue	influence	of	others,	by	means	of	a	process	of	rational	self-reflection.	Liberal	
theories	start	with	an	image	of	the	self	as	analytically	and	ideally	detached	from	the	social	
and	propagate	ideals	such	as	individualism	and	non-dependence.	Feminist	critics	of	
liberalism	assert	that	in	idealizing	a	self-standing	and	enclosed	subject,	free	from	
dependence	on,	and	interference	from,	others	as	well	as	from	interior	otherness—from	the	
influence	of	emotions	and	desire—,	liberalism	works	to	denigrate	the	feminized	conditions	
of	dependence	and	emotionality.		
I	contend	that	liberal	theory’s	concern	for	self-sovereignty,	a	state	of	freedom	from	
the	other,	conveys	a	deep-seated	fear	of	otherness.	The	ideal	liberal	agent	must	protect	
himself	from	incursions	on	all	sides.102	Both	political	theorist	Judith	Shklar	and	feminist	
philosopher	Alison	Jaggar	assert	that	the	central	tenets	of	liberalism	imply	fear	and	a	
concern	for	protection	against	intrusion.	Jaggar	states	“liberals	have	inferred	that	the	good	
society	should	allow	each	individual	the	maximum	freedom	from	interference	by	others.	
Unfortunately,	however,	liberals	believe,	interference	from	others	and	even	attack	from	
others	is	a	permanent	probability	in	the	human	condition”	(1983,	33).	Shklar,	from	a	
position	more	amicable	to	liberalism,	also	conveys	liberalism’s	basis	in	apprehension.	
Liberal	societies	aim	to	lesson	this	apprehension	through	the	protection	of	individual	
rights.	Shklar	asserts	that	liberalism	exists	“to	restrain	potential	abusers	of	power	in	order	
																																																																				
102	Gerald	F.	Gaus	states	that	liberalism	is	based	on	one	fundamental	principle:	“that	all	interferences	with	action	stand	in	
need	of	justification”	(2005,	272).		
	
147	
	
to	lift	the	burden	of	fear	and	favor	from	the	shoulders	of	adult	women	and	men,	who	can	
then	conduct	their	lives	in	accordance	with	their	own	beliefs	and	preferences,	as	long	as	
they	do	not	prevent	others	from	doing	so	as	well”	(1989,	31).	With	the	expressed	aim	of	
establishing	for	individuals	a	personal	domain	free	from	the	undue	influence	of	others,	
liberalism	inspires	a	cautious	approach	to	that	which	might	disrupt	the	integrity	of	the	self-
determined	subject.	
This	aspirational	freedom	from	others	manifests	in	liberal	ideology	as	a	distrust	and	
aversion	to	dependence.	Dependence	would	imply	attachment;	one	would	be	at	the	mercy	
of,	and	beholden	to,	another.	Accordingly,	dependence	retains	a	negative	signification	in	
liberal	societies.	As	much	feminist	work	contests,	liberalism	cherishes	autonomy,	
understood	as	self-sovereignty,	at	the	expense	of	valuing,	or	even	recognizing,	human	
interdependence.	Liberal	societies’	distaste	for	dependence	materializes	as	a	societal	
disregard	for	those	deemed	“dependent,”	those	unable	to	feign	a	rags	to	riches	progression	
to	full	autonomy	without	manifest	social	support	(Fineman	2004;	Fraser	and	Gordon	1994;	
Toronto	1993;	Young	1990).		
A	liberal	idealization	of	independence	and	distrust	of	dependency	reflects	and	
informs	the	prevailing	understanding	of	selfhood	in	contemporary	American	society.	
Political	theorist	Stephen	K.	White	describes	this	conceptual	bearing	as	“the	world	of	
disconnected,	individual	selves	imagined	by	dominant	modern	ontology”	(2000,	22).	
Americans	assume	this	is	“how	we	are”	and	the	seeming	naturalness	of	the	self-determined	
individual	means	that	all	who	express	dependency	or	vulnerability	appear	deviant.	
Psychotherapist	and	historian	Philip	Cushman	explains	how	this	normative	liberal	picture	
of	the	self	lives	on	through	a	continual	iteration	of	modes	of	being	that	aim	to	express	such	
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an	ideal	of	individualism.	He	states,	“when	we	act	masterful	and	bounded…when	we	
experience	ourselves	as	self-contained,	autonomous,	expressive,	assertive,	and	powerful,	
when	we	desire	certain	commodities,	activities,	or	individuals	that	have	been	culturally	
proscribed,	we	experience	an	emotional	affirmation	of	our	way	of	being—we	embody	the	
anticipated	approval	of	our	culture”	(Cushman	1995,	298).	As	I	will	show,	this	liberal	mode	
of	thinking	about	the	self	and	its	relations	and	the	manner	in	which	this	way	of	thinking	
manifests	in	our	very	ways	of	being	leads	to	a	number	of	social-psychic	defense	
mechanisms.	Such	psychic	defenses	thwart	the	self’s	ability	to	embody	a	comportment	of	
receptive	autonomy.	Liberal	societies	normalize	the	avoidance	of	deep	engagement	with	
others	and	otherness	(that	which	doesn’t	readily	submit	to	established	ways	of	
understanding)	to	evade	the	attendant	risks	these	interrelations	bring.	However,	as	I	
continue	to	argue,	it	is	receptivity	to	these	relational	contingencies	that	enables	
autonomous	comportment.		
	
The	Affectionate	Current	
	
	 While	liberal	accounts	of	autonomy	provide	very	few	reasons	as	to	how	or	even	why	
one	might	become	autonomous,	often	simply	assuming	the	existence	of	rational	subjects	
predisposed	to	autonomy,103	psychoanalysis	concerns	itself	with	precisely	these	issues	of	
manner	and	motive.	Elizabeth	Young-Bruehl’s	notion	of	the	“affectionate	current”	helps	to	
																																																																				
103	Kathryn	Abrams	notes	that	liberal	theories	of	autonomy	often	assume	the	subject’s	pre-given	faculty	for	autonomy	
(Abrams	1999).		
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explain	why	autonomous	capacity	requires	a	receptive	posture	toward	otherness	and	how	
social	conditions	and	attitudes	can	encourage	or	discourage	such	openness.		
	 Young-Bruehl	contends	that	the	ego,	which	she	defines	as	the	seat	of	human	agency,	
far	from	being	a	self-sovereign	homogeneous	entity,	consists	of	currents	of	affection	
produced	in	relationships	with	others.	She	develops	her	notion	of	the	receptive	ego	by	
drawing	on	Freud’s	early	theory	of	ego	instincts.	Young-Bruehl	returns	to	Freud’s	pre-1920	
distinction	between	the	ego	instincts	and	libidinal	instincts	to	explore	the	implications	of	
assuming	the	existence	of	an	affectionate	current	not	reducible	to	aim-inhibited	libidinal	
instincts.		
Before	Freud	posited	the	existence	of	the	Death	Instinct	and	united	the	ego	and	the	
libidinal	instincts	under	the	notion	of	Eros	(the	Life	Instinct),	he	had	theorized	that	“it	was	
the	self-preservative	instinct,	or	the	ego	instinct”	“that	contrasted	to	the	sexual	instinct	
with	its	species	preservative	or	reproductive	goal”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	27).	In	this	
original	dual	theory	of	the	instincts,	Freud	maintained	that	the	self-preservative	ego	
instincts	were	united	under	the	“affectionate	current”	and	that	this	current	was	directed	
toward	the	infant’s	caregivers.	This	ego	instinctual	drive	existed	to	insure	the	self’s	
survival,	its	necessary	attachment	to	caregivers	during	a	time	of	infantile	helplessness.	In	
Freud’s	original	instinct	theory,	“there	was	an	instinct	underlying	affection”	and	a	more	or	
less	separate	“instinct	underlying	sensual	or	sexual	love”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	27).	
Libidinal	(sexual)	instincts	were	secondary	and	were	supported	by	this	original	self-
preservative	affectionate	current.	This	notion	of	support	would	become	central	to	Freud’s	
transition	from	his	first	theory	of	the	instincts	to	his	second.	Freud	found	that	“’sexual	
instincts	find	their	first	objects	by	attaching	themselves	to	the	evaluations	made	by	the	ego	
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instincts,	precisely	in	the	way	in	which	the	first	sexual	satisfactions	are	experienced	in	
attachment	to	bodily	functions	necessary	for	the	preservation	of	life’”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	
27).	Foreshadowing	the	dissolution	of	this	division	between	affection	and	erotic	love,	Freud	
took	note	of	the	fact	that	the	affectionate	current	served,	from	the	beginning,	to	guide	the	
erotic	libidinal	current,	the	two	often	mixing	and	coalescing	on	a	beloved	family	member	
(Freud	1922).		
As	Young-Bruehl	laments,	Freud	eventually	leaves	behind	the	idea	of	an	affectionate	
current	and	posits	a	new	dual	theory	of	the	instincts	as	the	struggle	between	the	Life	and	
the	Death	instincts.	Tracing	this	change	in	his	thought,	Freud	proposed	that	the	decisive	
step	forward	was	his	discovery	of	narcissism,	“the	discovery	that	the	ego	itself	is	cathected	
with	libido,	that	the	ego,	indeed,	is	the	libido’s	original	home”	(Freud	2010,	105).		In	his	
finding	of	the	libidinal	nature	of	ego-instincts,	the	fact	that	libido	was	initially	directed	
inward,	rather	than	in	an	outward	direction,	Freud’s	previous	assumption	of	a	division	
between	the	affectionate	current	and	the	always	outwardly	directed	libidinal	current	had	
to	be	revised.	The	love	of	the	self,	its	longing	for	survival,	could	no	longer	be	figured	as	
solely	ego-instinctual.	Hence,	Freud	arrived	at	the	conclusion	that	the	drive	that	strives	for	
the	preservation	of	the	self	and	the	drive	that	strives	for	the	preservation	of	the	species	
must	be	of	one	nature.	He	called	this	new	instinctual	concept	Eros.		
However,	unwilling	to	accept	the	conclusion	that	all	instincts	must	be	of	the	same	
kind,	Freud	would	come	to	pose	a	negative	complement	to	Eros.	Freud	claimed	“besides	the	
instinct	to	preserve	living	substance	and	to	join	it	into	ever	larger	units,	there	must	exist	
another	contrary	instinct	seeking	to	dissolve	those	units	and	bring	them	back	to	their	
primeval,	inorganic	state”	(2010,	106).”	Freud	concluded	that	in	addition	to	Eros,	there	
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must	be	an	instinct	of	death	opposed	to	the	erotic	forces	of	unification	and	growth.	In	the	
construction	of	this	new	theory,	Freud	would	set	the	stage	for	a	prolonged	theoretical	
neglect	of	the	affectionate	current	and	a	heightened	philosophical	interest	in	the	battling	
forces	of	Life	and	Death.			
In	presenting	this	second	manifestation	of	instinct	theory,	Freud	strove	to	neatly	do	
away	with	the	notion	of	a	separate	current	of	affection.	Accordingly,	he	described	affection	
“not	as	an	originary	ego	instinctual	current	but	only	as	a	result—rarely	attained—of	aim-
inhibited	sexuality”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	28).	Young-Bruehl	claims	that	in	making	this	
move	from	ego	instinctual	love	to	aim-inhibited	libidinal	love,	Freud	loses	a	socially	
important	thread	present	in	his	original	theory.	This	move	eclipses	the	significant	
distinction	to	be	made	between	libidinal	instincts,	that	are	primarily	narcissistic,	and	ego	
instincts,	that	are	primarily	relational	(Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	2000,	57).		
The	great	insight	of	Freud’s	original	theory	of	the	instincts	was	his	affirmation	of	the	
primary	relationality	of	the	ego,	the	notion	that	the	self	exists	and	survives	through	
nourishing	affection.	In	turning	away	from	this	conclusion,	Freud	leaves	behind	his	
innovative	philosophical	notion	of	relational-selfhood	for	an	understanding	of	the	self	as	
comprised	of	possessive	tendencies	(desiring	the	other	or	the	self	as	an	object)	and	
destructive	tendencies	(desiring	to	destroy	the	other	or	the	self).		
Freud’s	turn	to	define	affection	as	aim-inhibited	sexuality	also	serves	to	establish	his	
notorious	theory	concerning	the	inherent	antagonism	between	the	individual	and	
civilization.	Freud	argues	that	for	aim-inhibited	sexual	affection	to	exist,	which	it	must	in	
order	for	friendships	and	social	bonds	to	occur,	civilization	must	impose	restrictions	and	
taboos	upon	sexual	love.	Social	bonding	through	aim-inhibited	libido	is	thus,	only	possible	
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in	a	civilization	that	demands	the	repression	and	redirection	of	the	sexual	instincts	(Freud	
2010).	Young-Bruehl	finds	that	Freud’s	rather	myopic	focus	on	sexual	instincts	in	
Civilization	and	its	Discontents	obscures	the	potentially	reparative	relationship	between	
sociality	and	the	ego	instincts.	She	suggests	that	had	Freud	maintained	the	trajectory	
established	by	his	early	theory	of	the	instincts,	he	may	have	concluded	“that	the	ego	
instincts	might	not	be	antagonistic	to	civilization	as	the	sexual	instincts	are”	(Young-Bruehl	
2003,	27).	In	effect,	Young-Bruehl	claims	that	Freud’s	move	away	from	love	as	an	ego	
instinct	and	toward	love	as	a	libidinal	instinct	disavows	the	complimentary	coexistence	
between	a	resilient	ego	and	sociality.		
It	is	precisely	this	coexistence	of	a	strong	self	and	an	openness	to	relationality	that	
characterizes	my	notion	of	receptive	autonomy.	Neither	resistant	to	sociality,	nor	utterly	
acquiescent	to	societal	customs,	the	self	with	a	capacity	for	receptive	autonomy	affirms	
receptivity	to	otherness,	while	also	possessing	the	strength	to	critically	reject	social	
customs	found	to	be	detrimental	or	unjust.	As	I	will	convey,	the	receptive	autonomous	
position	requires	an	openness	to	the	risks	of	sociality,	because	it	is	in	such	experiences	of	
peril	that	the	self	first	realizes	its	existence	as	an	entity	and	thus	its	capacity	to	create,	
resist,	and	receive	the	world.		
Young-Bruehl	further	explains	how	the	self	thrives	only	in	a	receptive	relationship	
with	otherness.	She	develops	her	understanding	of	the	affectionate	current	and	of	the	
primary	receptive	ego	by	turning	to	Freud’s	early	theories,	which	I	discuss	above,	and	to	
psychologist	Takeo	Doi’s	notion	of	“amae,”	“to	wish	or	expect	to	be	loved”	(Young-Bruehl	
2000,	4-5).	Young-Bruehl	translates	amae	roughly	as	“cherishment.”	Doi	suggests	that	the	
infant	“begins	in	a	condition	of	relatedness	that	is	predominantly	ego	instinctual,	not	
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predominantly	aggressive	or	libidinal”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	32).	From	the	first	moments	of	
life,	the	infant,	in	its	quest	to	survive,	desires	and	requires	cherishment,	and	if	adequate	
caregivers	are	present,	they	respond	by	nourishing	and	cherishing	the	infant.	This	primary	
symbiosis	persists	throughout	life.	As	Young-Bruehl	states:	“The	growth	principle	of	the	
ego”	ensures	that	“the	ego	aims	at	growth	and	is	met	by	cherishment	or	cherishment’s	
lack…the	ego	is	tropic—it	is	turned	to	what	nourishes	it”	(2003,	32-33).	The	ego	instincts,	
which	work	for	the	survival	and	growth	of	the	self,	are	themselves	a	relation	between	
cherishing	and	being	cherished.		
Young-Bruehl	expands	upon	this	connection	between	relationality	and	self-growth	
to	present	a	picture	of	the	ego	as	an	entity	of	otherness.	She	states,	“the	fundamental	aim	of	
the	ego	instincts	is	‘growing’	or	‘developing,’	which	not	only	requires	relatedness	rather	
than	aloneness,	but	is	relatedness”	(2003,	6).104	The	ego	is	not	simply	nourished	by	
affection;	it	is	a	reciprocal	current	of	cherishing	love.	The	ego	instincts,	deployed	to	insure	
the	preservation	of	the	self,	convey	that	the	self	is	always	imbued	by	otherness.	Young-
Bruehl	states,	“self	preservation	is	a	relational	concept	and	an	aim	not	satisfiable	in	
isolation”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	33).	In	other	words,	the	ego,	as	the	agential	aspect	of	
selfhood	in	Young-Bruehl’s	account,	thrives	only	in	nurturing	relations	with	others.		
In	her	focus	on	the	relational	nature	of	the	receptive	ego,	Young-Bruehl	deviates	
from	other	ego-centered	psychoanalysts,	like	Heinz	Hartman,	who	focus	on	ego-autonomy	
and	suggest	that	this	type	of	autonomy	requires	achieving	a	developmental	state	where	the	
ego	is	free	from	the	influence	of	the	instincts	and	the	instabilities	they	bring	(Here,	the	ego	
																																																																				
104	This	argument	is	similar	to	Judith	Butler’s	ontology	of	the	“primacy	of	relationality”	as	presented	in	Samuel	Chambers	
and	Terrell	Carver’s	Judith	Butler	and	Political	Theory:	Troubling	Politics	(2008).		However,	I	take	from	Young-Bruehl’s	
notion	of	relatedness	more	of	a	sense	of	mutual	nurturance	and	withholding	rather	than	a	Butlerian	sense	of	
“undoneness.”		
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achieves	autonomy	in	its	freedom	from	otherness)	(Hartmann	1964).	In	contrast	to	this	
understanding	of	ego	development,	Young-Bruehl	sees	the	ego	as	an	entity	of	relations	and	
the	emotions	they	imply.	Thus,	she	contends	that	the	ego	thrives	only	through	an	
engagement	with	relational	vicissitudes.	As	I	will	explain,	in	her	recognition	of	the	ego’s	
otherness,	Young-Bruehl’s	work	avoids	what	Lacan	criticizes	as	adaptive	ego-focused	
analysis.	While	Young-Bruehl’s	ego-centered	vision	of	the	self	does	differ	from	Lacan’s	
understanding	of	the	ego	as	an	illusory	misrecognition	of	the	self	as	sovereign	(as	a	socially	
adaptive	element	of	the	subject)	(Lacan	1966,	80),	her	notion	of	the	ego	does	not	disavow	
the	ego’s	internal	“otherness,”	but	rather	emphasizes	this	“otherness”	as	the	primary	
means	by	which	the	self	might	grow	in	its	abilities	to	resist	the	pressure	to	adapt	to	social	
norms.	
While	the	conditions	under	which	the	self	grows	in	its	capacity	to	resist	adaptation	
to	normative	life	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	following	pages,	Takeo	Doi	alludes	
to	the	problems	faced	in	establishing	such	conditions.	Doi	describes	nourishing	
relationality	as	emotion,	the	emotion	amae.	All	emotions,	Doi	claims	“demonstrate	a	
relationship	between	the	one	who	feels	the	emotion	and	his	surroundings”	(1973,	167).	
Emotions	never	remain	confined	within	the	self,	nor	do	they	spring	from	the	psyche	
unbidden	and	unprompted.	Emotionality	entails	otherness,	interruption,	and	interchange,	
the	very	aspects	of	relationality	that	both	harm	and	soothe.	The	particular	nature	of	the	
amae	relationship,	the	amae	emotion,	expresses	“an	attempt	to	draw	close	to	the	other	
person”	(Doi	1973,	167).	The	emotion	of	amae	thus	entails	a	particular	type	of	relationship	
with	otherness.	Doi	reminds	us	that	“Amae,	in	short	can	only	exist	when	amae	is	permitted”	
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(1973,	168).	The	urge	to	draw	close	to	another	entails	risk,	and	only	under	certain	
circumstances	will	the	self	be	inclined	to	face	this	danger.		
A	liberal	understanding	of	the	autonomous	self	as	free	from	otherness,	as	non-
dependent	and	self-determined,	prevents	the	establishment	of	an	environment	that	would	
encourage	drawing	close	to	others.	Because	receptive	autonomy,	a	capacity	for	creative	and	
critical	thought	and	action,	requires	a	willingness	to	face	the	risks	of	relationality,	
autonomy,	as	it	is	commonly	understood,	is	a	self-defeating	ideal,	and,	as	will	be	shown,	is	
assured	to	lead	to	fearfulness	and	compliance.			
	
Oceanic	Feeling	
	
While	Young-Bruehl	suggests	that	most	of	Freud’s	later	work	departs	from	the	
notion	of	ego	receptivity,	in	Civilization	and	its	Discontents,	Freud	actually	describes	the	
condition	of	infancy	in	a	way	that	expresses	a	surprising	acknowledgement	of	the	open	and	
loving	nature	of	the	ego.	Freud’s	account	of	the	“oceanic	feeling”	suggests	that	the	ego	
retains	a	sense	of	its	initial	oneness	with	the	world.	In	his	interpretation	of	this	feeling,	one	
discerns	the	manner	in	which	Freud’s	thought	vacillates	between	a	reinforcement	of	liberal	
individualism	and	a	more	subversive	account	of	the	self	as	divided,	multifaceted,	and	only	
contingently	and	porously	differentiated	from	the	world	and	the	relationships	from	which	
it	develops.		
Freud’s	explanation	of	the	oceanic	feeling	challenges	the	liberal	presumption	that	
human	beings	enter	the	world	as	individuals.	Freud	begins	Civilization	and	its	Discontents	
with	an	explanation	of	the	origin	of	“the	religious	feeling”	experienced	by	some	as	“a	feeling	
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of	an	indissoluble	bond,	of	a	being	one	with	the	external	world	as	a	whole”	(2010,	25).	The	
ego,	Freud	clarifies,	does	not	begin	as	something	distinct	and	separate	from	the	
surrounding	environment.	The	infant	does	not	initially	possess	a	sense	of	self,	a	sense	of	
separateness	from	the	rest	of	the	world.	The	ego,	as	a	demarcation	from	the	outside,	
emerges	only	after	the	infant	learns	that	she	cannot	access	the	mother’s	breast	without	an	
outwardly	directed	cry	for	nourishment.	The	infant’s	recognition	of	an	“outside”	coincides	
with	her	recognition	of	an	external	object,	the	mother’s	breast	in	this	case,	“which	is	only	
forced	to	appear	by	a	special	action”	(Freud	2010,	28).	Thus	the	ego	evolves	from	its	
primary	all-encompassing	state	into	something	that	appears	“marked	off	distinctly	from	
everything	else”	(Freud	2010,	26).	Freud	claims	that	the	“present	ego-feeling	is…only	a	
shrunken	residue	of	a	much	more	inclusive…all	embracing…feeling	which	corresponded	to	
a	more	intimate	bond	between	the	ego	and	the	world	about	it”	(2010,	29).	In	some	
instances,	the	present	ego-feeling,	a	distinct	sense	of	self,	exists	alongside	a	preserved	
remnant	of	the	initial	ego-feeling.	This	conserved	primary	ego	sensation	of	being	one	with	
the	world	manifests	as	the	“oceanic”	or	“religious”	feeling.	While	Freud	presents	this	
narrative	principally	as	a	response	to	Romain	Rolland’s	notion	of	the	“oceanic	feeling,”	that	
is,	to	explain	the	psychological	roots	of	religious	sensation,	he	also	folds	in	an	indirect	
acknowledgement	of	the	self’s	primary	unity	with	its	environment.		
Here,	in	his	later	work,	Freud	continues	to	allude	to	the	variable	nature	of	the	ego’s	
boundaries	in	a	way	that	harkens	back	to	his	earlier	thoughts	on	love.	The	inconsistency	
and	permeability	of	ego	boundaries	appear	quite	plainly	in	this	particular	psychological	
state.	“At	the	height	of	being	in	love,”	Freud	claims,	“the	boundary	between	ego	and	object,	
threatens	to	melt	away”	(2010,	26).	Freud	explains	that	in	the	experience	of	love,	the	self	
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frequently	takes	in	the	beloved	object	and	sets	the	object	up	as	its	own	ego	ideal,	blurring	
the	boundaries	between	love	of	the	self	and	love	of	the	other	(Freud	1959).	While	Freud	
maintains	that	this	blurring	of	boundaries	can	be	dangerously	draining	as	a	deflection	of	
self-love	to	another,	he	suggests	that	being	loved	by	another	re-enriches	the	ego’s	sense	of	
self-love.	He	explains,	“a	person	who	loves	has,	so	to	speak,	forfeited	a	part	of	his	
narcissism,	and	it	can	only	be	replaced	by	his	being	loved”	(Freud	1914,	98).	Love,	in	its	
ideal	manifestation,	involves	both	giving	and	receiving.	Freud’s	account	of	the	primary-ego	
feeling	and	its	sister	sensation,	love,	portray	the	ego	as	strongly	receptive	and	derivative	of	
ontological	togetherness.		
Both	Kaja	Silverman	and	Jonathan	Lear	suggest	that	Freud’s	interest	in	the	oceanic	
feeling	is	indicative	of	his	attraction	to	the	idea	of	a	primary	interconnectivity	intrinsic	to	
human	existence.	In	her	investigation	of	Freud’s	attentiveness	to	sensations	of	unity	and	
interconnectivity,	Silverman	suggests	that	Freud,	at	times,	actually	provides	a	convincing	
alternative	to	the	common	understanding	of	the	Freudian	ego	as	possessive	and	
narcissistic	(Silverman	2009).	Reading	between	the	lines	of	Freud’s	account	of	the	
imperialistic	infant,	the	infant	who	believes	he	is	the	world	and	that	he	directs	the	
movements	of	the	breast	through	his	omnipotent	thoughts,	she	gleans	an	alternative	
account	of	emerging	selfhood.	Freud’s	reading	of	Rolland’s	“oceanic	feeling”	suggests	a	
profoundly	anti-egoistic	account	of	selfhood.	Rather	than	the	self	that	assumes	it	contains	
the	world,	this	oceanic	sensation	alludes	to	the	fact	that	the	world	births,	contains,	and	
nourishes	the	self.	Silverman	explains,	that	although	Freud’s	use	of	Rolland	evokes	a	
metaphor	of	limitless,	“he	is	not	talking	about	the	manic	pleasure	of	an	imperial	ego;	the	
oceanic	feeling	is	‘imposed’	upon	us	as	a	‘fact,’	it	is	a	‘sensation’	instead	of	a	thought—the	
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sensation	of	the	‘contact’	between	ourselves	and	other	beings”	(2009,	29).	Silverman	
accentuates	the	sense	of	ontological	relationality	implicit	in	Freud’s	notion	of	selfhood.	The	
self	experiences	this	unbidden	sensation	of	receptivity	throughout	life.	This	connectedness,	
although	at	times	denied	in	attempts	to	escape	feelings	of	vulnerability,	is	precisely	what	
enables	the	self	to	exist	as	an	entity	capable	of	receiving,	giving	to,	and	pushing	back	
against	others.		
This	sense	of	connectedness,	if	affirmed	rather	than	denied,	engenders	a	certain	
ethical	comportment	of	openness	and	responsiveness	toward	the	world,	a	comportment	
that	I	describe	as	receptive	autonomy.	Yet,	alongside	this	openness,	a	friction	exists	
between	the	world	and	the	self.	If	the	self	is	to	emerge	as	a	being	in	relationality,	that	is,	if	it	
is	to	become	aware	of	the	world,	of	the	other,	and	subsequently	of	its	existence	as	an	entity,	
it	must	learn	to	experience	otherness.	This	is	precisely	what	I	aim	to	suggest	in	describing	
autonomous	capacity	as	enabled	through	relationality.	In	my	account,	the	“auto,”	or	“self”	
aspect	of	autonomy	does	not	refer	to	a	pre-given	entity,	but	rather	to	an	entity	that	
potentially	emerges	through	a	relationship	with	what	the	self	comes	to	know	as	“other.”	It	
is	a	matter	of	no	small	significance	that	these	relationships	that	produce	the	self	are	
characterized	by	both	fortification	and	loss.		
	
The	Critical	Ego	
	
In	a	shared	recognition	of	the	ego’s	inherent	otherness	and	its	tendency	to	resist	the	
losses	this	otherness	brings,	there	is	a	thin	sense	of	continuity	between	Young-Bruehl’s	
idea	of	the	ego	and	the	Lacanian	ego.	Importantly,	however,	while	Lacan	stands	against	the	
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therapeutic	task	of	strengthening	the	ego,	as	he	sees	the	ego	as	a	defensive	measure	against	
the	vulnerability	of	the	self	as	well	as	a	source	of	conformism	(1966,	685),	Young-Bruehl	
believes	in	nourishing	the	ego,	as	she	views	the	ego	as	a	relational	entity	capable	of	both	
social	compliance	and	social	critique.		
Lacan	considers	the	production	of	the	ego	that	occurs	in	the	mirror	stage	to	amount	
to	a	primary	“misrecognition”	(méconnaissance).	In	Lacan’s	mirror	phase,	in	the	process	of	
ego	formation,	the	subject	emerges	as	a	product	of	internalized	otherness.	The	subject	
comes	into	being	as	an	entity	split	between	its	embodied	unruliness	and	a	vision	of	
coherent	subjectivity—the	vision	reflected	back	to	it	by	the	mirror	of	the	other	(Lacan	
1966).	Although	here	the	subject	exists	as	a	being	divided	between	embodiment	and	the	
reflection	of	this	embodiment	as	experienced	in	sociality,	the	subject	resists	its	birth	in	
primary	otherness.	The	subject	wrongly	identifies	with	what	it	“recognizes”	in	the	mirror,	
an	imaginary	capable	and	autonomous	self	without	need	for	care	and	nourishment	from	
others	(Lacan	1966,	80).	This	misrecognition	founds	the	ego,	the	subject’s	pivotal	point	of	
socially	informed	efficacy.	Because	the	subject	resists	the	otherness	at	its	core	as	a	
corollary	process	of	ego-formation,	the	ego	entails	a	lack	of	critical	knowledge	about	the	
subject’s	coming-into-being	through	the	social.	The	ego	remains	unaware	that	it	is	
comprised	of	otherness,	and	thus	unaware	of	any	possibility	of	disjoint	between	the	subject	
and	social	determination.	In	this	sense,	for	Lacan,	the	ego	remains	an	adaptive	alienated	
entity,	focused	on	the	impossible	task	of	conforming	to	the	world	of	the	other.		
In	contrast	to	Lacan’s	inherently	misguided	and	compliant	ego,	Young-Bruehl	
suggests	that	the	ego	can	operate	both	as	an	adaptive	force	and	as	a	critically	reflective	
force.	She	argues	that	an	ego	focused	on	lamenting	its	less	than	masterful	existence,	on	
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dwelling	on	the	loss	and	deprivation	it	has	experienced	in	relationality,	tends	to	submit	
more	readily	to	commands	and	authoritarian	laws.	Unable	to	tolerate	the	uncertainty	of	
remaining	open	to	otherness,	given	the	vulnerability	such	openness	would	imply,	the	
lamenting	ego	withers	from	lack	of	nourishing	relationality,	and	in	its	weakened	state	
submits	readily	to	the	tyrannies	imposed	upon	it.		
This	type	of	adaptive	ego	develops	in	a	society	that	idealizes	independence	as	
freedom	from	others	and	does	not	recognize	the	need	for	cherishment,	the	significance	of	
loving	reciprocity.	In	such	a	society,	a	society	that	I	contend	follows	liberal	ideals	of	
selfhood,	one	can	expect	to	experience	the	frustration	of	one’s	needs	for	nourishing	
relationality.	This	frustration	understandably	inspires	a	turn	away	from	relationality,	away	
from	all	that	might	disturb	the	shelter	one	has	built	around	oneself	as	a	response	to	a	harsh	
world.	Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	suggest	that	Adolf	Eichmann’s	murderous,	yet	
“banal”	adherence	to	rule-following	expresses	just	this	pattern	of	frustration,	withdrawal,	
and	compliance	(2000,	230-31).	Turned	inward	and	focused	on	“cherishing	rule-obeying,	
staying	unrelated	to	people	by	this	means,	he	will	do	anything	that	keeps	his	inner	
arrangement	with	himself,	his	rule-cherishing	intact.	He	envies	and	attacks	any	sign	of	
relatedness	in	the	world,	anything	felt	as	an	impingement	on	his	insulation….”	(Young-
Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	2000,	230-31).	Such	a	man	“is	the	perfect	political	agent,	a	
dictator’s	dream,	because	he	cannot	judge	anyone	or	anything	outside	himself”	(Young-
Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	2000,	230-31).	Frustrated	by	and	fearful	of	otherness,	the	ego	
turns	inward	and	readily	adheres	to	patterns	and	rules	that	might	provide	a	sense	of	
regularity	and	self-sovereignty.		
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Conversely,	in	a	society	where	cherishment	is	recognized	and	relationality	and	
reciprocity	are	valued,	the	ego	is	much	less	likely	to	desperately	turn	inward	and	“become	
hardened	in	obstinacy”	(Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	2000,	210).	Instead,	an	ego	in	
this	position	would	be	more	“receptive	to	impressions	by	help	of	strict	and	continuous	self-
examination”	(Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	2000,	210).	When	otherness	does	not	
appear	as	only	threatening	and	harsh,	but	also	as	loving	and	enriching,	the	ego	resists	the	
tendency	to	deny	its	primary	entwinement	with	others	and	instead	lets	such	otherness	
inspire	deviations	from	old	patterns	and	taken-for-granted	beliefs.	In	this	state,	the	ego	
looks	quite	unlike	the	Lacanian	ego,	which	fails	to	embrace	its	otherness	and	instead	revels	
in	a	life-long	fantasy	of	self-sovereignty.	For	Lacan,	the	ego	entails	a	necessary	
misrecognition	of	selfhood	and	an	adaptive	relationship	to	society.	But,	for	Young-Bruehl	
the	ego	might	also	affirm	its	otherness,	and	thus	remain	open	to	growth	and	the	
reformation	of	the	sociality	of	which	it	is	a	part.	Young-Bruehl’s	vision	of	the	ego	supports	
my	claim	that	the	auto,	the	self,	withers	in	its	capacity	for	autonomy	when	it	is	compelled	to	
turn	inward,	to	reject	relationality,	and	to	feel	resentful	of	its	own	constitutive	otherness.		
Young-Bruehl’s	depiction	of	the	receptive	ego	clarifies	how	social-psychic	patterns	
inform	the	nature	of	the	self’s	relational	bearings	and	its	capacity	for	autonomy.	In	
diverging	from	Lacan	in	her	recognition	that	ego	formation	occurs	in	a	particular	
sociohistorical	context	and	thus	guarantees	no	pre-determined	type	of	ego,	Young-Bruehl’s	
work	points	to	the	ethical	significance	of	encouraging	certain	comportments	toward	loss,	
longing,	and	relationality.	Would	the	Lacanian	ego	tend	toward	the	same	deflection	of	
otherness	in	a	society	that	advocated	an	openness	toward	human	vulnerability	and	an	
affirmation	of	the	otherness	that	seems	to	always	resist	our	attempts	to	domesticate	it?			
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Young-Bruehl’s	and	Lacan’s	notions	of	the	ego	both	incorporate	a	sense	of	the	ego’s	
otherness,	its	primary	relatedness,	and	its	errant	tendency	to	assume	or	wish	for	
independence	from	this	otherness;	the	key	difference	between	their	two	articulations	of	
relationality	appears	to	lie	in	the	Lacanian	insistence	on	the	incomplete	and	negative	
character	of	desire—as	shaped	in	relation	to	the	other—and	Young-Bruehl	‘s	emphasis	on	
growth	and	repair—as	enabled	in	relation	to	others.	While	these	two	positions	seem	
incompatible,	the	inclination	toward	repair,	the	tendency	Melanie	Klein	characterizes	as	
love,	can	be	thought	of	as	a	necessary	response	to	primary	and	repeatedly	relived	
experiences	of	loss	(Klein	and	Riviere	1964).	
		Klein	suggests	that	love	derives	from	our	desire	to	make	reparations	to	our	loved	
ones	for	our	initial	resentment	of	their	difference	from	us,	their	inability	to	meet	our	every	
need	seamlessly.	Klein	explains	that	in	the	process	of	infantile	separation,	the	infant	comes	
to	feel	resentful	and	destructive	toward	the	mother	for	the	mother’s	failure	to	perfectly	
respond	to	the	infant’s	needs	for	affection	and	nourishment.	The	infant	aggressively	
phantasizes	about	destroying	the	mother,	but	then	finds	herself	terrified	at	the	prospect	
that	she	has	actually	destroyed	the	only	source	of	affection	and	sustenance	she	has	ever	
known.	Fear,	sorrow,	and	remorse	cause	the	infant	to	reach	out	and	give	love,	to	show	the	
mother	affection	in	attempt	to	repent	for	her	initial	phantasies	of	destruction.	This	cycle	of	
aggression	and	repair	operates	throughout	our	lives	and	informs	how	we	relate	to	those	to	
whom	we	are	most	deeply	attached.	(Klein	and	Riviere	1964).			
Loss	and	the	correlative	longing	for	repair	compel	the	self	to	turn	to	the	world	with	
an	expectation	to	be	loved	and	a	desire	to	give	love.	A	vision	of	the	subject	as	split	and	
alienated	retains	elements	of	longing	and	repair,	while	a	conceptualization	of	a	loving	and	
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reparative	self	retains	a	sense	of	loss	and	primal	separation.	As	suggested	in	the	previous	
chapter,	the	longing	that	results	from	loss,	if	acknowledged	rather	than	resisted,	might	
compel	the	self	to	seek	something	beyond	the	given,	to	move	toward	a	creative	reformation	
of	the	world	in	which	the	self	is	a	part.	It	is	precisely	desire	that	results	from	loss	that	
permits	the	self	to	embody	a	comportment	of	autonomy,	the	capacity	to	think	and	move	in	
ways	misaligned	with	normative	social	patterns	and	beliefs.	In	the	following	section,	I	turn	
to	Jonathon	Lear	to	articulate	yet	another	manner	in	which	patterns	of	love	and	loss	enable	
the	self’s	potential	for	autonomy.	
	
Love	and	Loss	
	
Jonathon	Lear	suggests,	as	I	do,	that	there	are	insufficient	grounds	for	presupposing	
an	individuated	self	capable	of	self-directed	action	and	thought.	Lear	asserts	that	Freud	
uniquely	recognized,	contrary	to	the	somewhat	common	presumption	in	liberal	theory	that	
humans	are	born	as	individuated	entities,	that	“being	an	individual…is	a	psychological	
achievement,	it	is	not	a	given…”	(1990,	22-3).	Lear	connects	Freud’s	insight	into	the	
developmental	nature	of	individuality	with	the	importance	Freud	places	on	love.	For	Lear,	
love,	understood	in	Freudian	terms,	acts	as	the	central	force	for	individuation,	and	it	is	
through	particular	relations	of	love	and	the	lack	of	love	that	the	self	grows	or	fails	to	grow	
into	an	individual.	Lear’s	consideration	of	the	role	that	love	plays	in	individuation	supports	
my	examination	of	how	particular	modes	of	being	either	foster	or	forestall	the	
development	of	selves	capable	of	an	autonomous	comportment.	
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Lear	looks	specifically	to	the	intimate	link	between	love	and	loss	to	give	an	account	
of	how	love	acts	as	a	mutually	sustaining	source	of	vitality	for	the	self	and	for	the	world.	
While	maintaining	a	commitment	to	the	ideal	of	the	individual,	Lear	suggests	that	the	
growth	and	development	of	the	individual	necessitates	the	self’s	loving	investment	in	the	
world	and	the	reciprocal	internalization	of	a	loving	world.	In	this	sense,	as	I	will	show,	
Lear’s	understanding	of	the	individual	departs	from	any	notion	of	the	individual	as	self-
standing	or	separate	from	the	world	of	which	it	is	a	part.		
In	his	work	on	Freud’s	notion	of	love	as	a	force	enabling	individuality,	Lear	plays	up	
psychoanalysis’s	ambiguous	commitment	to	the	idea	of	the	individual.	Lear	wields	this	
inconsistency,	the	fact	that	psychoanalysis	is	both	an	expression	of	bourgeoisie	
individualism	and	a	project	inclined	to	unravel	its	own	ideological	commitment	to	the	
individual	(Lear	1990),	to	craft	a	novel	understanding	of	individuality.	Lear’s	turn	to	both	
disassemble	and	revive	the	idea	of	the	individual	echoes	my	own	aim	to	re-signify	
“autonomy,”	to	offer	an	account	of	receptive	autonomy	as	a	corrective	to	the	self-defeating	
liberal	ideal	of	autonomy.	Of	primary	concern	for	my	own	account	is	an	attentiveness	to	the	
conditions	that	enable	self-growth,	and	thus	the	capacity	for	critical	deflection	of	harmful	
social	patterns	and	tendencies,	as	well	as	the	creative	capacity	to	produce	novel	forms	of	
political	engagement.	Lear	focuses	precisely	on	the	variant	nature	of	the	libidinal	currents	
that	either	enliven	or	deaden	such	capacities	for	autonomy.		
Lear	notes	that	while	western	society	and	its	scientific	practices	express	a	
commitment	to	the	ideal	of	the	individual,	they	do	not	often	inquire	into	the	makings	of	the	
individual	(1990,	18).	Lear	observes:	“individualistic	political	philosophies,	while	paying	
great	attention	to	individual	rights	and	liberties,	tend	to	remain	silent	on	what	individuals	
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are”	(Lear	1990,	19).	Focusing	on	this	overlooked	aspect	of	an	ostensibly	individualistic	
society,	Lear	turns	to	Freud,	to	consider	the	particular	processes	that	comprise	the	
individual.	He	does	so,	because,	as	he	suggests,	from	its	inception,	psychoanalysis	has	been	
uniquely	concerned	with	precisely	this	issue.105			
Lear	identifies	the	conditions	required	for	the	emergence	of	the	individual	as	
environmental.	Akin	to	how	Young	Bruehl’s	work	emphasizes	the	necessity	of	affection	for	
the	growth	of	autonomously	enabled	selves,	Lear	suggests	that	capable	individuals	require	
cultivation	through	love.	Highlighting	psychoanalysis’s	distinctive	concern	for	the	context	
of	individual	growth,	Lear	notes	“psychoanalysis	has	discovered	that	individuals	are	not	
part	of	the	basic	fabric	of	the	world,	not	even	the	basic	fabric	of	human	society.	That	
individuals	exist	depends	on	the	social	world	nurturing	their	development,	and	this	is	a	
contingent	matter”	(1990,	25).	As	I	will	show	through	Lear’s	analysis,	the	existence	of	
individuals,	that	is,	of	selves	capable	of	a	critical	stance	toward	both	social	and	static	self-
laws,	depends	upon	a	lovable	and	nurturing	environment.	Lear	argues	that	this	type	of	
capable	individual	develops	through	a	process	of	identifying	with	a	loving,	yet	always	
disappointing	world.	
Rather	than	take	self-awareness	for	granted,	Lear	examines	the	processes	through	
which	a	sense	of	self	emerges.	As	I	discuss	in	a	previous	section	of	this	chapter,	in	the	
oceanic	bliss	of	undifferentiation,	the	infant	has	no	sense	of	self,	no	sense	of	a	distinction	
																																																																				
105	Winnicott	was	one	of	the	first	analysts	to	emphasize	the	profound	importance	of	the	environment	for	the	development	
of	the	individual.	He	too	declined	to	take	the	existence	of	individuals	for	granted.	He	developed	a	theory	concerning	the	
necessity	of	a	containing	nurturing	environment	for	the	development	of	healthy	individuality.	He	also	stressed	the	need	
for	such	an	environment	to	gradually	challenge	the	omnipotent	feelings	of	the	infant.	His	work	shows	how	it	is	only	
through	such	challenges	that	the	infant	learns	of	otherness,	the	difference	between	the	world	outside	and	the	world	
within	(Winnicott	2005).		
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between	her	own	being	and	that	of	the	world	around	her.	The	infant	exists,	without	an	
awareness	of	external	objects,	in	a	state	of	“libidinal	investment	that	permeates	a	
relationally	undifferentiated	field”	(Lear	1990,	136).	Only	gradually,	due	to	promptings	
from	the	external	world—the	disappointing	unavailability	of	the	breast	for	example—does	
the	infant	begin	to	sense	the	separateness	of	the	world	around	her.	Her	libidinal	
investment	in	nurturance	and	care	(in	the	breast	for	instance)	makes	the	infant	aware	of	
the	“otherness”	of	the	outside	world	and	the	“I-ness”	of	herself.		
	Lear	argues	that	only	in	realizing	the	nature	of	this	libidinal	investment,	did	Freud	
begin	to	articulate	the	emergence	of	the	“I”	as	dependent	on	the	external	world.	Freud’s	
focus	on	the	self	as	a	contextual	achievement	arises	through	this	insight.	Bound	together	
from	conception,	the	world	and	the	individual	engage	in	a	“single	process	by	which	an	I	and	
a	world	of	objects	come	to	be	differentiated	out	of	an	undifferentiated	psychic	field”	(Lear	
1990,	137).	Without	the	world’s	promptings,	without	a	world	worthy	of	libidinal	
investment,	the	self	never	fully	realizes	its	efficacy	and	strength	as	a	differentiated	being.		
In	this	manner,	Lear	argues	that	the	existence	of	individuals	is	contingent	on	the	
presence	of	a	nurturing	environment.	Without	a	responsive	world,	or	conversely,	a	
receptive	posture	toward	a	responsive	world,	the	self	fails	to	thrive.	Even	beyond	infancy,	
the	self	requires	a	reciprocal	relation	of	loving	receptivity	with	the	world.	Lear	argues,	“For	
expansion	to	take	place,	the	world	itself	must	maintain	a	certain	responsiveness	to	and	
reflecting	of	the	emerging	person.	It	must	respond	to	his	emerging	curiosity	and	interests,	
and,	in	so	responding,	reflect	them.”	(1990,	154).	The	world	must	in	this	sense	be,	“a	good-
enough	world…For	the	I,	Freud	says	‘living	means	the	same	as	being	loved’”	(Lear	1990,	
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154).	What	comprises	this	loving	world	remains	somewhat	undetermined.106	But,	surely,	
the	social	discouragement	of	acknowledging	vulnerability	and	of	experimenting	with	
comportments	of	empathy	deters	the	coming-into-being	of	such	a	world.	Nurture,	for	Lear,	
comes	in	the	form	of	love.	Without	love,	both	the	self	and	the	world	cease	to	fully	exist	for	
one	another.		
While	the	world	must	show	its	beneficence,	it	must	also	disappoint.	For	the	self	to	
emerge	and	realize	its	own	differentiated	capacities,	the	world	must	counter	its	sense	of	
omnipotence.	Here,	we	see	the	uncomfortable,	yet	necessary,	privation	element	of	
nourishment.	As	the	discussion	of	Copjec	and	Lacan	in	the	previous	chapter	indicates,	it	is	
only	through	a	sense	of	lack,	a	sense	of	disjuncture	between	the	self’s	embodied	existence	
and	the	terms	given	to	signify	and	experience	such	an	existence	that	the	self	emerges	as	a	
distinct	component	of	its	environment.	In	this	sense,	the	self	is	born	through	a	process	of	
differentiation	that	at	times	feels	like	alienation.	The	world	must	prove	its	existence	to	the	
self	to	enable	the	self	to	obtain	its	own	existence	as	a	distinctive	entity	(Lear	1990,	156-
159).	Lear	notes,	“it	is	from	the	disappointment	that	the	breast	cannot	forever	magically	
meet	the	infant’s	wishful	lips	that	the	infant	begins	to	differentiate	himself	from	the	world”	
(1990,	157).	Freud	discovered	that	these	very	disappointments	pave	the	way	to	the	
development	of	the	self’s	psychic	landscape	in	his	work	on	melancholia.		
In	cases	of	melancholia,	Freud	observed,	rather	than	acknowledge	a	loss	of	love,	
rather	than	mourn	the	loss	of	a	loved	entity,	the	patient	would	take	the	lost	loved	object	
																																																																				
106	Lear	brings	up	Rene	Spitz’s	work,	which	revealed	that	infants	deprived	of	loving	responsiveness	yet	given	the	
nutrients	typically	required	for	sustenance	often	died.	Spitz’s	work	highlights	the	fact	that	a	responsive	psychological	
world	cannot	be	sundered	from,	nor	deemed	less	crucial	for	human	survival,	than	a	materially	adequate	habitat	(Spitz	
1945).			
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into	himself.	This	process	of	love,	loss,	and	internalization	occurred,	as	“the	melancholic	
had	been	in	love	with	someone,	but	had	suffered	some	blow	or	loss.	Instead	of	displacing	
his	love	onto	another	person,	the	melancholic	withdrew	his	love	and	his	loved	one	into	
himself”	(Lear	1990,	159-60).	Thus,	Lear	explains,	“the	loved	one	was	now	part	of	the	
melancholic’s	own	I…Freud	called	this	identification,	and	he	explained	it	as	the	outcome	of	
disappointment	in	love”	(Lear	1990,	159).	While	initially	Freud	had	discovered	
identification	through	his	researches	into	deviations	of	mourning,	he	came	to	appreciate	it	
as	“normal	process	by	which	an	I	comes	to	be”	(Lear	1990,	160).		All	of	psychoanalysis	
expands	upon	this	realization,	that	“psychic	structure…is	created	by	a	dialectic	of	love	and	
loss.	The	structure	of	the	mind	is	an	inner	recreation	of	the	structure	of	the	loved	world”	
(Lear	1990,	160).	Selfhood	occurs	only	through	the	experience	of	disappointed	love.107	The	
world	comes	into	being	for	the	infant,	as	a	site	of	disappointed	libidinal	investment,	in	the	
same	instance	that	a	sense	of	self	occurs.	Through	this	process	of	love	and	loss,	the	“I,”	as	
an	internalization	of	the	loving,	yet	disappointing	world,	is	born.		
Lear	argues,	that	it	is	the	quality	of	the	relationship	between	the	self	and	the	world	
that	enables	a	loving	posture	of	selfhood.	The	self	must	experience	the	world	as	loveable	
enough,	and	the	degree	to	which	the	world	is	lovable	determines	the	strength	of	the	self’s	
loving	attachment	to	the	world.	In	turn,	the	very	nature	of	the	world	that	is	internalized	
determines	the	self’s	capacity	for	love.	If	the	world	loves	enough,	the	self	internalizes	a	
loving	posture.	Yet,	if	the	world	is	cold	and	unreceptive,	the	self	only	weakly	experiences	its	
																																																																				
107	Judith	Butler	famously	describes	the	emergence	of	gendered	subjects	as	a	process	of	melancholic	loss	and	
incorporation.	Because	we	are	socially	barred	from	loving	someone	of	the	same	sex,	the	possibility	of	homosexual	
attachment	is	lost	to	us.	Yet,	rather	than	detaching	from	this	potentially	loved	object	of	the	same	sex,	we	identify	with	it	
and	take	it	into	ourselves.	Thus,	women	become	women	and	men	become	men	(Butler	1990;	1997).		
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own	selfhood	and	internalizes	a	disinterested	posture	toward	otherness.	In	Lear’s	account,	
love	directly	links	the	development	of	individuality	to	relational	responsibility.		
Lear	specifically	ties	his	notion	of	individuation	to	the	emergence	of	an	autonomous	
self	by	insisting	on	the	importance	of	the	loss	of	love	that	occurs	in	the	process	of	
differentiation.	By	turning	to	the	place	of	loss	in	the	process	of	internalization,	Lear	helps	
clarify	how	the	self,	although	composed	of	otherness,	can	nevertheless	engage	in	
autonomous	thought	and	action.	Because	the	infant	inherently	experiences	
disappointment,	the	realization	that	total	self-sovereignty	is	illusory	in	a	world	of	
otherness,	what	the	infant	internalizes	is	not	exactly	identical	with	the	external	world.	
What	comprises	selfhood	is	both	a	sense	of	loss	and	of	identity,	a	sense	of	self-concern,	and	
of	concern	for	the	world.	The	relative	strength	of	these	concerns	is	dependent	on	the	level	
of	mutual	love	experienced	between	infant	and	world.		
Even	beyond	infancy,	Lear	argues,	the	self	internalizes	dictates	and	norms	of	society	
in	an	inexact	manner.	Lear	suggests,	that	this	disjoint	enables	self-guided	judgment.	He	
explains,	“the	super-I	is	not	merely	the	intra	psychic	manifestation	of	values,	ideals,	
prohibitions;	it	is	the	internalization	of	an	observer	of	self”	(Lear	1990,	208).	Rather	than	
an	exact	replication	of	social	dictates,	this	internal	observer	is	neither	completely	one’s	
own	nor	completely	other	than	one’s	own.	Lear	adds	that	this	whole	process	takes	place	
within	a	condition	of	love.	Critical	capacity	is	enriched	through	love.	Lear	explains	how	love	
encourages	self-concern,	the	capacity	for	reflection	on	one’s	own	values	through	a	self-
observing	agency	that	is	neither	entirely	self-identical	nor	entirely	other.	He	states:	
Self-concern	begins	with	an	internalization	of	the	loving	environment.	This	begins	a	
process	of	differentiation	from	the	environment	by	which	an	ever	more	complex	
human	being	is	able	to	differentiate	himself	still	more	from	a	loving	
environment…In	this	way,	love	promotes	autonomy.	For	the	successful	outcome	of	
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this	interactive	process	between	external	and	internalized	love	is	an	autonomous	
individual:	one	who	may	care	for	and	depend	on	his	environment,	but	one	who	has	
essentially	differentiated	himself	from	it”	(1990	209).		
	
In	experiencing	a	challenge	to	its	omnipotence,	the	self	learns	of	otherness.	This	
otherness,	once	experienced	as	something	different	from	the	self,	as	something	that	is	
indeed	at	times,	absent,	missing,	and	lost,	is	internalized.	Otherness,	in	being	experienced	
as	something	that	is	“not	me”	is	precisely	what	comprises	the	psyche	of	the	self.	The	self	is	
built	in	otherness	and	loss.	Yet,	it	is	exactly	because	the	self	internalizes	both	the	loss	and	
the	love	of	the	world	that	its	psyche	retains	a	dissident	relationship	with	the	world.	The	self	
is	not	a	socially	determined	being,	but	rather	a	folding	in	of	difference	and	loss.		
The	psyche,	rather	than	an	exact	internalized	replica	of	social	norms	is	the	
internalization	of	these	norms	along	with	their	inevitable	failure,	their	disjoint	with	the	
experience	of	infantile	omnipotence.	This	disjoint	might	inspire	a	sense	of	ill-fit	with	social	
custom	and	thus	enable	resistance	to	and	the	reformulation	of	social	meaning.	Yet,	this	
sense	of	ill-fit,	this	attentiveness	to	the	ways	that	the	world	is	not	the	self,	only	manifests	
when	one	inhabits	a	position	of	ethical	openness	to	others,	to	otherness.		
Surely,	a	liberal	society,	which	values	an	atomistic	and	self-determined	state	of	
being,	works	to	discourage	the	acceptance	of	the	relationality	so	crucial	to	the	self’s	
potential	for	autonomy.	As	I	will	explain	in	the	next	section,	the	liberal	vision	of	autonomy	
does	indeed	encourage	a	deflection	of	the	loss	and	otherness	at	the	heart	of	the	potentially	
receptive	autonomous	self.		
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Flight	from	Freedom	
	
The	self	emerges	into	relations	where	it	repeatedly	experiences	disappointment,	
loss,	and	uncertainty.	Assuming	a	posture	of	openness	to	relationality	means	to	some	
extent	claiming	these	vulnerabilities	and	dependencies	and	relinquishing	any	illusion	of	
self-sovereignty.	A	society	that	disparages	dependency,	that	does	not	significantly	value	
forms	of	collective	social	support,	and	also	lacks	a	general	concern	for	maternal	and	child	
welfare	is	unlikely	to	foster	an	environment	conducive	to	the	self’s	affirmation	of	
vulnerability.	Liberal	values	of	individualism	and	self-sufficiency,	as	well	as	this	parallel	
lack	of	concern	for	communal	well-being,	create	an	environment	of	insecurity	and	fear,	an	
environment	more	conducive	to	the	denial	of	interdependence	than	to	its	acceptance.		
Experiencing	the	world	as	a	place	bereft	of	nourishing	relationality	compels	the	self	
to	employ	defenses	that	actually	weaken	its	capacities	to	resist	and	reformulate	the	very	
social	patterns	that	have	led	it	into	this	trap	of	defensiveness.	Caught	in	a	cycle	of	fear,	
enclosure,	and	enervation,	the	defensive	self	loses	its	capacity	for	self-direction.	In	order	to	
gather	its	bearings,	the	fearful	self	submits	to	the	imagined	power	found	in	identifying	with	
influential	personas	and	ideals,	deflects	vulnerability	onto	otherness,	and	turns	further	
away	from	relationality.		
Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	elaborate	on	the	psychic	processes	that	lead	to	
this	deflection	of	relationality.	Unfulfilled	desires	to	experience	loving	responsiveness	
result	in	the	self’s	expectation	to	be	rejected	and	abandoned.	As	a	defense	against	what	it	
perceives	as	a	dangerous	and	risky	relationality,	the	self	becomes	unreceptive,	cut	off,	and	
turns	away	from	that	which	might	nourish	it.	Bethelard	elaborates	on	the	submissive	
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tendencies	she	sees	produced	by	a	societal	resistance	to	interdependence	and	
vulnerability.	With	a	Hegelian	turn	of	phrase,	Bethelard	states,	“In	therapy,	most	people	
come	in	speaking	a	language	of	expectation	of	rejection,	words	they	feel	hard-hearted	
inside	of—and	this	is	rather	like	speaking	the	language	of	dominant	culture,	speaking	like	a	
slave.	Or	like	someone	enslaved	to	acting	like	a	master”	(Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard,	
2000,	48).	In	a	state	of	hard-heartedness,	the	stifled	self	is	cut	off	from	the	ability	to	both	
give	and	receive	cherishment.	Expecting	disappointment	and	rejection,	given	the	
dangerous	and	risky	terms	of	relationality,	the	self	flees	from	the	very	conditions	that	
enable	a	self-directed	mode	of	being.	In	this	way,	Young	Bruehl	and	Bethelard	explain	what	
Erich	Fromm	will	merely	assume:	that	the	self	fears,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	degree,	freedom.	
Because	the	ability	to	question	and	resist	established	ways	of	being,	the	way	the	world	
appears	to	carry	on,	requires	“being	able	to	be	receptive	and	open	to	the	world	even	when	
it	is	dangerous	and	threatening”	(Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard,	2000,	249),	societies	
that	dismiss	the	need	for	nourishment	and	thus	heighten	feelings	of	groundlessness	and	
insecurity	rarely	foster	the	growth	of	independent-minded	selves.	
In	a	society	such	as	ours,	which	celebrates	the	possibilities	and	profits	associated	
with	late	capitalism	and	underplays	the	outsourcing	of	economic	contingencies	onto	
marginal	populations,	responsibility	for	personal	risk	and	the	idea	of	self-sufficiency	rule	
all	aspects	of	political,	economic,	and	social	life.	Vulnerability	has	increased,	while	
acknowledgement	of	human	interdependence	has	become	increasingly	rare.	From	the	
decline	of	the	welfare	state	to	the	transformation	of	the	individual	into	an	entrepreneurial	
being,	solely	accountable	for	all	failures	and	successes,	contemporary	neo-liberal	
principles,	as	well	as	more	passé,	but	still	potent	beliefs	in	hardened	individualism,	work	to	
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discourage	ties	of	solidarity	and	mutual	responsibility.	In	this	condition	of	heightened	
exposure	and	decreased	social	support,	fear	(often	unacknowledged)	and	uncertainly	
compel	the	self	to	seek	defensive	shelter	in	any	relation	that	might	provide	even	a	modicum	
of	stability	and	assurance.		
In	its	search	for	security,	the	self	finds,	not	palliative	and	loving	social	support,	but,	
the	opportunity	to	align	with	the	prevailing	values	of	individualism	and	wealth-
accumulation	and	the	authoritative	personas	that	flaunt	these	principles.	Adorno	describes	
these	two	seemingly	opposed	qualities—independence	and	conformity—as	existing	side-
by-side	in	American	society.	“In	the	dominant	American	ideology,”	he	states,	“we	find	cheek	
by	jowl	the	demand	for	a	rugged	individualism,	that	is	to	say,	the	energetic,	unruly	
individual	who	is	not	afraid	to	use	his	elbows,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	insistence	on	
adjustment,	in	other	words,	on	the	conforming	individual”	(Adorno	2006,	212).	Far	from	
unrelated,	these	ideals	sustain	one	another.	As	the	self	suffers	in	an	individualistic	society	
hostile	to	its	needs	to	nourish	and	be	nourished,	it	turns	away	from	others.	As	it	turns	away	
from	others,	it	receives	ideological	validation	in	acting	in	accordance	with	the	societal	
idealization	of	individualism.	In	this	manner,	the	self	flees	from	freedom	in	the	pursuit	of	
the	false	freedom	purchased	in	conformism.	Thus,	a	defensive	flight	from	otherness	comes	
at	the	cost	of	the	self’s	potential	for	autonomy.		
Donald	Trump’s	success	as	a	Republican	presidential	candidate	attests	to	the	
pervasiveness	of	fear	and	parallel	lack	of	autonomous	capacity	in	our	society.	Appealing	to	
the	great	anxieties	of	white	working	and	middle-class	Americans—brought	about	by	
economic	instability	and	demographic	threats	to	white	masculinity—Trump	has	styled	
himself	as	a	proxy	for	security	and	authority.	In	his	denigration	of	women	and	people	of	
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color	of	all	genders,	he	ideologically	severs	himself	from	the	“weak,”	who	are	in	reality	just	
the	people	saddled	with	his	followers’	deflected	vulnerability.	Pointedly,	Trump	acts	as	an	
identificatory	figure	of	triumphant	masculinity	to	ease	his	supporters’	fears	about	the	
imagined	potency	and	prowess	of	the	other—the	“rapist”	Mexican,	the	Black	gangbanger,	
and	the	big	man	with	a	big	stick,	the	United	States	Government.	Trump’s	bigoted	attitude	
increases	his	attractiveness	as	a	figure	of	unconditional	power	in	which	people	might	find	
relief	from	the	anxieties	produced	by	a	culture	that	values	autonomy—encourages	it	and	
finds	dependency	pathological—but	precludes	autonomy’s	realization	through	an	
enculturation	of	fear	and	a	normalization	of	inequity.	Rather	than	face	the	ambiguities	that	
accompany	the	responsibility	of	free-thought	and	action,	Trump	offers	a	place	of	security	
and	reassurance	where	one	can	discard	these	burdens—made	harder	to	bear	by	a	culture	
that	denies	their	existence—	and	submit	to	a	figure	of	self-confident	tenacity.	In	Trump,	we	
see	groundlessness	coupled	with	an	ideology	of	self-determination	transformed	into	the	
abnegation	of	free	thought	and	an	embrace	of	illusory	self-sovereignty.		
In	Escape	from	Freedom,	Erich	Fromm	details	precisely	how	a	specific	social-
historical	trajectory	has	led	to	this	societal	flight	from	freedom.	For	Fromm,	individuation,	
which	he	sees	as	a	prerequisite	for	mature	individuality,	is	inescapably	accompanied	by	
feelings	of	vulnerability	and	insecurity.108	While	Fromm,	in	my	opinion,	erroneously	
contrasts	infantile	attachment	with	a	later	state	of	developmental	independence	(which	he	
portrays	as	inherently	individualistic)	(1941,	29-35),	he	does	provide	insight	into	how	
																																																																				
108	Fromm,	a	social	psychologist	and	psychoanalyst	associated	with	the	Frankfurt	School,	shows	a	surprising	commitment	
to	individualism	given	his	theoretical	basis	in	Marxist	thought.	Some,	including	Cushman,	criticize	him	for	his	focus	on	
individuality	and	suggest	that	this	bias	toward	individualism	points	to	his	unacknowledged	compliance	with	liberal	ideals.	
(Cushman	1995,	180).	However,	I	find	that	his	notion	of	the	individual,	while	problematic	in	some	ways,	is	not	wholly	
aligned	with	the	liberal	vision	of	the	individual	as	self-determined	and	ahistorical.			
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social	patterns	brought	about	by	capitalism	have	led	to	increasing	isolation	and	
consequently	to	conformism.		
Fromm	argues	that	legacies	of	Protestantism,	and	later	capitalism,	have	molded	the	
general	western	character	into	one	that	seeks	to	always	serve	“a	purpose	outside	of	
himself,”	(Fromm	1941,	110)	first	in	submission	to	God	and	later	in	submission	to	capitalist	
expediencies.	Fromm	claims	that	because	the	capitalist	system	makes	the	accumulation	of	
capital	the	aim,	the	end	goal,	of	all	economic	enterprise,	“it	has	become	man’s	fate	to	
contribute	to	the	growth	of	the	economic	system,	to	amass	capital,	not	for	the	purposes	of	
his	own	happiness	or	salvation,	but	as	an	end	in	itself”	(Fromm	1941,	110).	Capitalism,	
Fromm	suggests,	“has	made	man	work	for	extrapersonal	ends,	made	him	a	servant	to	the	
very	machine	he	built,	and	thereby	has	given	him	a	feeling	of	insignificance	and	
powerlessness”	(Fromm	1941,	112).	Accustomed	to	submission	and	isolated	by	growing	
inequality	and	increasing	economic	insecurity,	in	our	“aloneness	and	powerlessness,	we	
are	ready	to	get	rid	of	our	individual	self	either	by	submission	to	new	forms	of	authority	or	
by	a	compulsive	conforming	to	accepted	patterns”	(Fromm	1941,	134).	This	submission	to	
authority	and	custom	is	the	masochistic	path	of	avoiding	freedom.	
Fromm	expresses	the	dependent	nature	of	both	masochistic	and	sadistic	tendencies	
and	claims	that	hierarchies	of	submission	and	domination	deprive	all	parties	of	freedom.	
Just	as	the	masochist	seeks	to	dissolve	the	self	through	submission	to	prevailing	customs	
and	beliefs,	so	too	does	the	sadist	compromise	his	selfhood	by	swallowing	the	empty	
submissiveness	of	others,	eventually	completely	losing	any	sense	of	the	himself	outside	of	
this	vampiric	form	of	sustenance.	Fromm	states,	“the	sadistic	person	needs	his	object	as	
much	as	the	masochist	needs	his.	Only	instead	of	seeking	security	by	being	swallowed,	he	
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gains	it	by	swallowing	somebody	else.	In	both	cases	the	integrity	of	the	individual	self	is	
lost”	(Fromm	1941,	157).	In	fleeing	from	the	anxiety	that	comes	with	living	in	world	hostile	
to	the	self’s	ability	to	thrive,	the	self	loses	its	potential	for	truly	self-directed	thought	and	
action,	if,	in	the	end,	it	does	not	dissolve	entirely.		
While	Fromm,	like	Young-Bruehl,	recognizes	the	falsity	of	equating	love	and	
relationality	with	weakness	rather	than	self-growth,	he	neglects	the	indispensable	value	of	
receptivity.	Fromm	affirms	that	individuals	need	communal	ties	to	survive,	that	man	“has	
no	choice	but	to	unite	himself	with	the	world	in	the	spontaneity	of	love	and	productive	
work	or	else	seek	a	kind	of	security	by	such	ties	with	the	world	as	destroy	his	freedom	and	
the	integrity	of	his	individual	self	(Fromm	1941,	21).	Fromm	recognizes	that	individuality	
requires	loving	interconnection;	yet,	he	fails	to	appreciate	the	full	scope	of	love	as	
dependent	on	that	which	is	taken	in	and	that	which	is	given	back.	He	claims,	“love	is	an	
activity,	not	a	passive	affect;	it	is	a	‘standing	in,’	not	a	falling	for…love	is	primarily	giving,	
not	receiving”	(Fromm	1956,	21).	In	his	move	to	declare	love	as	“standing,	not	falling,”	as	
intentional,	not	contingent,	and	as	mono-directional,	not	reciprocal,	Fromm	accedes	to	a	
gendered	understanding	of	love’s	power.		
Ironically	presenting	a	mother’s	giving	of	herself	as	the	pinnacle	of	loving	conduct,	
in	that	such	giving	expresses	richness	and	potency	(Fromm	1956,	21-22),	Fromm	idealizes	
the	masculine	coded	trait	of	activeness	and	devalues	the	feminine	coded	trait	of	
receptiveness—a	position	between	passivity	and	activity.	In	missing	the	indispensability	of	
a	receptive	approach	to	relationality	for	self-growth,	Fromm	fails	to	fully	develop	his	
concern	for	the	common	“fear	of	freedom.”	While	he	recognizes	that	this	fear	stems	from	
the	dread	of	vulnerability,	he	fails	to	see	this	heightened	sense	of	fear	as	a	consequence	of	
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the	continued	denial	of	the	human	condition	of	dependency.	Insisting	that	love	
presupposes	the	attainment	of	a	predominantly	“productive	orientation”	in	which	a	
“person	has	overcome	dependency”	(1956,	24),	Fromm	continues	the	tradition	of	the	“hard	
heart,”	the	rejection	of	dependence	and	the	refusal	of	the	relationality	that	enables	the	
expression	of	both	love	and	freedom.		
Contrary	to	Fromm’s	understanding	of	love	as	a	purely	active	capacity	of	the	ego,	
Young-Bruehl’s	notion	of	love	suggests	that	relational	encounters,	receptivity,	and	circular	
currents	of	affection	build	and	enrich	the	ego.	Of	course,	her	notion	of	the	ego	as	primarily	
receptive	appears	alien	in	a	society	ruled	by	a	normatively	utilitarian	and	economic	
understanding	of	humanity.	Young-Bruehl	argues	that	modern	civilization	encourages	
ceaseless	activity,	hyper-communication,	and	a	generally	frenzied	existence.	In	this	
environment,	“reflective,	unhectic,	receptive	thought”	(Young-Bruehl	2003,	38)	becomes	
nearly	impossible	and	meaningful	connections	and	ego-enhancing	relationships	suffer.			
This	single-minded	focus	on	productivity,	on	accumulating	various	kinds	of	capital,	
feeds	ideologies	of	self-focus	and	self-improvement.	In	its	normative	view	of	the	self	as	a	
rather	atomistic	completely	malleable	entity,	such	a	culture	drains	away	the	psychic	space	
necessary	for	the	contemplation	of	others,	otherness,	other	ways	of	being.	A	veneration	of	
self-determination	habitually	leads	to	a	disavowal	or	projection	of	dependence	or	arouses	a	
sense	of	deep	shame	if	dependence	is	acknowledged.	All	such	attitudes	lead	to	a	
competitive	and	individualizing	environment	evocative	of	feelings	of	suspicion	and	distrust	
toward	otherness.			
Takeo	Doi	claims	that	dismissive	attitudes	about	relationality	coevolve	with	a	socio-
linguistic	tendency	to	deny	dependency.	Unlike	Americans,	Doi	states,	the	Japanese	have	a	
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word	“amae”	to	designate	the	expectation	to	be	indulged	and	cherished	sweetly.	
Accordingly,	“whereas	in	Japan	human	relations	of	a	dependent	nature	are	worked	into	the	
social	norm,	in	the	West	they	are	excluded”	(Doi	1973,	169).	Yet,	“even	in	Western	societies	
where	there	is	no	convenient	word	corresponding	to	amae	and	feelings	of	amae	would	
seem	not	to	exist,	a	surprising	amount	of	similar	kind	of	feeling	can	be	observed	if	one	
looks	at	the	phenomenon	with	Japanese	eyes….	Amae	here	is	not	an	experienced	emotion,	
but	a	hidden	wish…”	(Doi	1973,	169).	The	very	absence	of	a	word	for	the	amae	emotion	in	
English	indicates	the	English-speaking	world’s	desire	to	disavow	dependency.	
When	the	word	“dependence”	does	appear	in	American	and	British	psychoanalytic	
parlance,	it	carries	negative	and	pathologizing	connotations	of	neediness	and	weakness.	
The	anxiety	concerning	vulnerability	shows,	as	“independence	is	valued.	‘Autonomy’	is	a	
plus.	‘Vulnerability’	only	means	danger,	it	does	not	imply	receptivity.’	Prolonged	
dependency	equals	being	spoiled,	being	entrapped,	no	matter	what	the	dependency	is	
actually	like;	the	judgment	is	tout	court”	(Young-Bruehl	and	Faith	Bethelard	2000,	50).	In	
such	an	atmosphere	of	denial,	both	children	and	adults	learn	to	feel	ashamed	of	their	
expectations	to	be	loved.	The	denial	of	the	need	for	cherishment	or	amae	engenders	a	
number	of	psychopathologies	of	the	ego.		
In	being	discouraged	to	affirm	the	need	for	love,	we	remain	restricted	in	our	abilities	
to	both	give	and	receive	cherishment	and,	therefore,	deprived	of	the	conditions	required	
for	a	true	sense	of	self.	In	a	society	that	denies	the	existence	of	amae,	a	person’s	“pursuit	of	
amae	tends	to	become	self-centered,	and	he	seeks	fulfilment	by	becoming	one	with	some	
object	or	other	that	he	has	fixed	on	by	himself.	There	develops	in	him	a	pronounced	
tendency	to	cling	to	something”	(Doi	1973,	132).	The	unfulfilled	desire	for	relational	
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support	encourages	a	flight	from	freedom,	a	desperate	clinging	to	the	ways	of	others	in	
compensation	for	a	lack	of	self.	In	this	manner,	the	denial	of	the	need	for	nurturance,	
produced	by	a	liberal	capitalist	system	that	functions	through	an	idealization	of	non-
dependence,	leads	to	weakened,	restricted,	and	compliant	selves.	
	
Self	as	a	Citadel	
	
The	social	rejection	of	human	need	and	fragility	reveals	itself	in	collective	social	
defense	mechanisms	that	work	to	dispel	the	vulnerability	intrinsic	to	relationality	and	to	
outsource	this	vulnerability	onto	those	communities	and	individuals	deemed	“other.”	The	
weakened	self	feels	the	need	for	security	all	the	more	strongly;	deprived	of	the	ability	to	
engage	in	nourishing	and	strengthening	relations	with	others,	it	tends	to	fortify	its	
boundaries	to	avoid	the	dangerous	world	of	relationality.	Unfortunately,	as	Freud	
recognized	long	ago,	these	defenses	most	often	compromise	the	vital	integrity	of	the	self.	
Political	theorist	Wendy	Brown	describes	how	a	global	preoccupation	with	wall-
building	functions	in	contemporary	societies	as	a	counterproductive	form	of	social-psychic	
defense.	She	suggests	that	the	myth	of	state	sovereignty	has	faced	further	unraveling	in	the	
presence	of	heightened	transnational	exposure	to	the	contingencies	produced	by	late	
capitalism.	In	response	to	such	challenges	to	state-boundaries,	many	western	states	have	
engaged	in	frantic	and	episodic	wall	building	and	surveillance	projects	aimed	to	deflect	
insecurity	onto	the	“outsider,”	the	alien	other.	These	practices,	Brown	suggests,	seek	to	
provide	a	fantasy	of	containment,	“in	the	face	of	an	increasingly	unbounded	and	
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uncontrolled	global	order”	(2010,	118).	Brown	goes	on	to	argue,	through	Freud,	that	such	
defenses,	in	reality,	serve	to	decrease	the	vibrancy	and	resilience	of	the	entities	they	are	
meant	to	protect.	Rather	than	shoring	up	state	sovereignty,	newly	built	walls	further	
weaken	state	power.	Citing	Israeli	and	American	border	fortifications,	Brown	argues	that	
walls	“codify	the	conflicts	to	which	they	respond	as	permeant	and	unwinnable”	(2010,	84)	
and	increase	vigilantism	and	criminality	at	the	sites	on	which	they	are	built.	Here,	she	
brings	to	light	the	great	paradox	of	the	defensive	reaction—that	it	harms	that	which	was	to	
be	saved	from	harm.		
The	historical	situation	in	which	we	find	ourselves,	a	world	of	increasingly	unequal	
distributions	of	survivability,	certainly	produces	defensive	reactions.	Yet,	focusing	solely	on	
the	macro-political	context	in	which	these	provocations	to	defensiveness	occur	partially	
overlooks	the	psychic	tendencies	that	underlie	these	trends.	In	returning	to	the	way	in	
which	the	historical-social	environment	births	and	lives	within	the	self,	I	highlight	the	
micro-political	practices	that	feed	into	society-wide	patterns	that	encourage	the	deflection	
of	vulnerability	onto	otherness.	This	deflection	not	only	weakens	those	it	is	meant	to	
protect;	it	also	robs	those	constructed	as	marginal	of	the	social	nourishment	necessary	for	
agential	capacity.		
The	intricacies	of	psychic	defenses	suggest	that	these	practices	profoundly	affect	
one’s	capacity	for	autonomy—that	is,	the	ability	to	resist	and	reconfigure	destructive	
elements	of	the	social	environment.	Freud	indicates	that	the	difficulties	produced	by	
psychic	defenses	stem	from	these	defenses’	potentially	counterproductive	nature.	He	
defines	ego	defense	mechanisms,	in	broad	terms,	as	the	self’s	efforts	to	ward	off	unpleasant	
sensations,	emotions,	or	thoughts	(Freud,	1912).	The	self	engages	in	a	variety	of	defense	
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mechanisms,	including	repression,	denial,	projection,	displacement,	and	sublimation,	in	its	
efforts	to	avoid	displeasure	or	psychic	harm.	With	the	exception	of	sublimation,	Freud	
maintains	that	these	defense	mechanisms	actually	have	an	enervative	effect	on	the	self.	109	
This	is	the	paradox	of	defense	mechanisms.	Whereas	the	self	cannot	help	but	employ	some	
degree	of	resistance	to	harm,	and	indeed	this	is	necessary	for	the	self’s	survival,	particular	
manifestations	of	defense	have	an	especially	costly	effect	on	the	self’s	energetic	reserves	
(Freud	1937).110	These	defenses	often	persist,	past	their	period	of	usefulness,	“bringing	
about	an	ever	more	extensive	alienation	from	the	external	world	and	a	permanent	
weakening	of	the	ego”	(Freud	1937,	238).	In	a	state	of	heightened	defensiveness,	the	self	
remains	trapped	in	a	type	of	egoistic	infantilism.	It	becomes	drained	of	energy,	resistant	to	
otherness,	and	disinclined	to	give	care.	Not	only	does	the	excessively	defensive	self	lose	the	
ability	to	take	in	nourishment,	it	concedes	the	ability	to	offer	it	back	to	the	world.	
Specifically,	the	defense	mechanisms	of	denial	and	projection	work	on	a	wider	social	level	
to	vastly	impair	the	overall	development	of	autonomous	capacities.		
Feminist	psychoanalysts	Jessica	Benjamin	and	Janine	Chasseguet-Smirgel	explain	
how	the	defenses	of	denial	and	projection	work	through	a	sexed	distribution	of	social	
vulnerability,	that	is,	how	the	denial	of	vulnerability	works	in	tandem	with	the	projection	of	
such	vulnerability	onto	the	feminine	character.	Their	work	alludes	to	how	a	socially	
encouraged	gendered	denial	of	dependency	shrinks	the	self’s	capacity	for	agency.	They	
expose	how	the	rejection	of	dependence,	in	this	case,	imagined	as	dependence	upon	the	all-
																																																																				
109	Anna	Freud	further	develops	this	theory	of	ego	defenses	in	The	Ego	and	the	Mechanisms	of	Defense	(1993).		
	
110	Wilhelm	Reich	argues	that	defensiveness,	as	character	resistance,	is	encouraged	by	a	historically	authoritarian	and	
non-receptive	society	that	seeks	to	repress	instincts.	He	notes	how	such	a	society	prevents	self-growth	and	thus	the	
capacity	for	critical	agency	(Reich	1972).		
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powerful	maternal	character,	while	it	is	an	effort	to	efface	infantile	helplessness,	actually	
weakens	the	subject’s	sense	of	self.	I	read	both	theorists’	construction	of	this	rejection	of	
dependency,	not	as	a	way	to	naturalize	the	position	of	the	mother	or	the	feminine,	but	as	a	
way	to	elucidate	how	a	patriarchal	culture	that	values	and	genders	certain	traits	as	
feminine,	continues	to	socially	disseminate	and	perpetuate	hierarchies	of	gender	and	
agency	at	the	psychic	level.		
Chasseguet-Smirgel	conveys	how	the	masculine	position,	in	its	defensive	rejection	of	
vulnerability	and	projection	of	such	vulnerability	onto	the	feminine	position,	deprives	
feminized	subjects	of	social	and	cultural	power.	She	locates	these	very	moves	of	refusal	and	
projection	in	Freud’s	theory	of	femininity.	Freud’s	theory	of	phallic	monism,	his	assumption	
that	children	of	all	genders	recognize	only	the	penis	or	the	absence	of	the	penis,	while	
having	no	knowledge	of	the	vagina	as	an	entirely	other	genital	structure,	partakes	in	this	
masculine	tendency	of	defensiveness.		
Chasseguet-Smirgel	states	that	Freud’s	theory	of	phallic	monism	persists,	despite	
countless	clinical	and	theoretical	evidence	to	suggest	children	are	aware	of	the	vagina,	
because	this	theory	operates	as	a	powerful	defensive	measure	for	both	boy	and	girl	
children	against	the	formidable	and	feared	mother-figure.111	The	denial	of	childhood	
knowledge	of	the	vagina	serves	to	privilege	the	penis	as	phallus	and	construct	the	feminine	
position	as	castrated	(Chasseguet-Smirgel	1976).	This	construction	of	the	feminine	position	
depicts	the	mother	as	wounded	and	lacking,	thus	denying	maternal	agency	and	offering	a	
reprieve	from	the	neediness	and	vulnerability	that	is	experienced	in	infancy	and	continues	
throughout	life.	Chasseguet-Smirgel	finds	that	Freud’s	“blind	spots”	with	respect	to	
																																																																				
111	Karen	Horney	developed	an	early	version	of	the	theory	of	masculine	defensiveness	(Horney	1973).	
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femininity	serve	a	defensive	purpose.	She	states,	“the	theory	of	sexual	phallic	monism	(and	
its	derivatives)	seems	to	me	to	eradicate	the	narcissistic	wound	which	is	common	to	all	
humanity	and	springs	from	the	child’s	helplessness,	a	helplessness	which	makes	him	
completely	dependent	on	his	mother”	(Chasseguet-Smirgel	1976,	281).	This	dependent	
position,	this	necessity	for	the	other,	need	not	only	be	imagined	with	respect	to	the	actual	
mother.	Care-taking	positions,	culturally	understood	as	maternal,	including	social	welfare	
programs,	universal	healthcare,	and	domestic	work,	might	also	be	seen	as	threatening	and	
thus	defensively	interpreted	as	insignificant	in	a	society	that	fears	dependency	and	
vulnerability.	While	Chasseguet-Smirgel	alludes	to	the	dangers	of	this	gendered	flight	from	
dependence	and	its	negative	implications	for	women,	she	does	not	fully	delve	into	the	
detrimental	effects	of	disavowals	of	vulnerability	on	agential	capacity	in	general.		
Benjamin	refers	to	the	early	insights	of	Chasseguet-Smirgel	regarding	the	gendered	
denial	of	vulnerability,	while	also	exploring	this	denial’s	costly	effects	on	the	self’s	efficacy	
and	potential	for	growth.	Benjamin	articulates	this	problem	as	it	is	presented	in	the	boy’s	
Oedipal	phase	when	he	is	led	by	a	heteronormative	society	to	disidentify	with	the	ideal	
nurturing	mother	and	identify	with	the	ideal	agential	father.	In	this	process,	the	boy	must	
project	all	aspects	of	dependency	and	vulnerability	onto	womankind,	in	an	effort	to	shore	
up	a	sense	of	masculinity,	his	sense	of	self-determined	autonomy	and	freedom	from	
vulnerability	(Benjamin	1998,	30-31).	Fearing	the	all-powerful	agency	of	the	nurturing	or	
denying	mother,	the	boy	is	compelled	to	identify	with	the	father,	while	turning	the	mother	
figure	and	then	all	women	into	passive	entities	of	object	love.	The	boy	child’s	fear	of	the	
mother	is	socially	embedded;	“she	stands	as	the	prototype	of	the	undifferentiated	object.	
She	serves	as	their	other,	their	counterpart,	the	side	of	themselves	they	repress”	(Benjamin	
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1988,	77).112,	113	Thus,	the	position	of	the	feminine	as	passive	and	weak	“may	be	seen…as	
the	effect	of	a	male	construction	of	culture	in	accord	with	the	Oedipal	boy’s	anxieties”	
(Benjamin,	1998,	57).	This	forced	heteronormative	choice	between	identification	and	
object	love	hinders	the	boy’s	capacity	to	identify	as	a	containing	and	nurturing	lover	and	
simultaneously	burdens	the	girl	child	with	his	deflected	vulnerability	(Benjamin	1998,	51).		
The	boy	child	remains	lacking	in	a	sense	of	containment.	He	will	fail	to	sense	his	
actions	and	thoughts	as	originating	from	his	own	being.	He	will	lack	the	sensation	of	truly	
authoring	the	movements	of	his	life.	Benjamin	explains,	without	an	identification	with	
receptive	capacities	“active	subjectivity	is	thinned	to	a	defensive	construct”	(Benjamin	
1998,	77).	If	lacking	in	an	identification	with	the	liminal	space	between	freedom	from	and	
freedom	to,	that	is	a	sense	of	containment,	the	self	fails	to	grow	into	a	truly	agential	
being.114,	115	The	defensive	self	suffers	from	a	deficit	of	self-holding,	a	sense	of	protection,	
and	from	a	sense	of	disjoint	between	its	being	and	its	doing.	In	this	state	the	self	lacks	
confidence	and	agency—the	very	ability	to	respond	to	and	encounter	the	other.	In	an	effort	
to	repel	the	resulting	feeling	of	helplessness,	the	defensive	self	unproductively	tries	to	
project	and	deflect	its	condition	of	dependency.	As	we	have	seen,	this	process	leaves	
																																																																				
112	Kristeva	similarly	argues	that	the	masculine	subject	position	is	achieved	through	the	abjection	of	the	maternal,	the	
feminine	(Kristeva	1982).		
	
113	Elizabeth	Grosz	also	points	out	that	bodily	fluids	associated	with	the	feminine	are	considered	abject	because	they	
attest	to	the	porousness	and	the	dependency	of	the	subject,	bodily	aspects	which	threaten	the	masculine	subject’s	
“aspiration	toward	autonomy	and	self-identity”	(Grosz	1994,	193-4).		
	
114	Similarly,	Winnicott	argues	that	the	indispensable	transitional	move	toward	self-containment	stems	from	a	nurturing	
relationship	with	a	maternal	figure.	He	also	suggests	that	the	analytic	environment	can	serve	as	a	transitional	space	to	
facilitate	a	greater	capacity	for	self-containment	and	personal	efficacy	(Winnicott	2005).		
	
115	Nancy	Luxon	discusses	this	environment	of	containment	in	reference	to	the	potentially	empowering	nature	of	the	
analytic	relationship	(Luxon	2013).	
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subjects	in	the	masculine	position	without	a	receptive	space	of	nurturance,	and	conversely,	
subjects	in	the	feminine	position	as	holders	of	disavowed	dependence.		
In	the	Hegelian	sense,	the	Oedipal	phase	leaves	only	two,	un-free	categories	of	
subjects,	masters	and	servants.	This	process,	Benjamin	notes,	dramatizes	how	“the	denial	
of	the	need	for	nurturance	takes	a	tremendous	toll	on	those	who	live	by	it,	as	well	as	on	
those	who	cannot	or	will	not	live	up	to	it”	(1988,	178).	The	continued	overvaluation	of	self-
determination	in	ideologically	liberal	societies	requires	a	hierarchy	of	difference	in	order	to	
deflect	dependency	onto	an	“other.”	The	result	is	a	social	pattern	of	denial	and	projection—
ironically	predicated	on	the	normalization	of	autonomy	as	freedom	from	dependence—	
that	deteriorates	the	capacity	for	critical	autonomy	of	all	selves	embedded	in	such	an	
environment.		
When	the	ideal	of	autonomy	signifies	non-dependence,	as	it	does	in	most	strains	of	
liberal	political	thought,	it	operates	paradoxically	as	an	ideological	support	for	conditions	
that	inspire	obedience	and	compliance.	Ideals	that	venerate	the	self-standing	subject	work	
to	create	an	environment	of	fear,	uncertainty,	and	denial,	an	environment	that	discourages	
openness	to	nurture	and	thus	enfeebles	capacities	for	self-directed	action	and	thought.	In	
contrast	to	such	ideals,	I	have	detailed	the	value	of	a	psychoanalytic	account	that	depicts	
the	self	as	necessarily	vulnerable,	but	also	efficacious	in	remaining	open	to	this	very	
vulnerability.	Only	under	conditions	of	adequate	nourishment	and	care	does	the	self	tend	
to	open	to	the	relationality	that	enables	and	strengthens	its	ability	to	challenge	the	norms	
of	the	society	from	which	it	emerges.	The	establishment	of	networks	of	nourishment	in	all	
forms,	including	universal	access	to	healthcare,	child	care,	and	housing,	as	well	as	a	general	
cultural	willingness	to	recognize	the	incredible	specificity	of	such	values	of	nourishment	
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must	underlie	any	commitment	we	profess	to	have	to	the	creation	of	a	society	of	
autonomously	enabled	citizens.		
Psychoanalysis,	as	a	practice	that	interrogates	processes	of	self-formation,	reveals	
how	social	distributions	of	nourishment	determine	the	very	characteristics	of	selfhood,	the	
self’s	potential	abilities	and	capacities.	The	self’s	capacity	for	autonomy	depends	upon	the	
creation	of	social	practices	and	forms	of	governance	that	work	to	rectify	unequal	
distributions	of	social	nourishment.	The	roots	of	unjust	patterns	of	nourishment	derive	
from	a	cultural	celebration	of	self-determination	and	a	devaluation	of	interdependence.	
Such	paradigms	of	individualism	cannot	adequately	be	challenged	or	remedied	without	a	
parallel	consideration	of	the	gendered	nature	of	our	ideals	of	care	and	autonomy.	Until	
receptivity	and	autonomy	are	recognized	as	mutually	enabling,	self-defeating	models	of	
autonomy	will	continue	to	work	against	the	proliferation	of	selves	actually	capable	of	
critiquing	and	creatively	reworking	dominant	cultural	beliefs.				
The	promise	of	critical	capacity	and	creative	agency	lies	behind	my	interest	in	
reworking	the	notion	of	autonomy.	A	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy	would	entail	the	
ability	to	challenge	established	ways	of	thinking	and	living	that	cause	us	to	remain	
dependent	upon	what	is	and	unable	to	work	toward	what	we	hope	for	ourselves	and	for	
others.	As	I	show	in	the	following	chapter,	an	ethical	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy	
frees	us	from	the	constraints	of	the	socially	possible	and	allows	us	to	create	new	modes	of	
being	hitherto	thought	to	be	impossible.		
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Chapter	Four:	Love:	An	Unsettling	Comportment	of	Receptive	Autonomy	
	
Drawing	from	feminist,	queer,	and	psychoanalytic	theory,	the	preceding	chapters	
sketch	the	contours	of	a	relational	self	and	present	the	ways	in	which	such	a	self	might	
come	to	embody	a	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy.	In	this	chapter,	I	elaborate	further	
on	the	pathways	that	lead	to	this	comportment	of	autonomy	and	consider	the	political	
implications	of	this	ethical	approach	to	otherness.	To	bring	these	reflections	to	life,	I	look	to	
a	specific	historical	event	that	bears	the	marks	of	this	ethical	comportment	of	autonomy.	I	
read	the	recent	uprising	in	West	Baltimore,	following	the	death	of	Freddie	Gray,	a	Black	
man	killed	while	in	police	custody,	as	an	enactment	of	an	ethics	of	receptive	autonomy.		
Against	a	liberal	understanding	of	autonomy	as	self-sovereignty,	I	argue	that	
disruptions	to	illusions	of	self-sovereignty,	brought	about	by	the	disintegrative	and	
unifying	effects	of	relationality,	actually	create	the	conditions	for	receptive	autonomy.	As	I	
will	continue	to	explain,	the	felt	presence	of	otherness	enables	one	to	resist,	remake,	and	
create	the	social	laws	that	constitute	one’s	political	world.	
In	this	chapter,	I	show	how	receptivity	to	otherness	engenders	both	sensations	of	
interrelation	and	differentiation.	These	seemingly	conflicting	sensations	come	together	in	
the	psychoanalytic	characterization	of	love—a	vision	of	love	as	both	a	self-integrative	and	a	
self-disintegrative	force.	Opposing	an	idealization	of	love	as	a	solely	unifying	force	as	well	
as	an	understanding	of	autonomy	as	self-determination,	I	further	develop	my	notion	of	
receptive	autonomy	as	stimulated	by	the	influence	of	love.			
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Drawing	from	the	work	of	theorists	not	known	for	their	articulations	of	
individuality,	but	for	their	emphasis	on	social	dissent,	desire,	and	the	erotic,	I	suggest	that	it	
is	openness	to	the	risk	and	negativity	characteristic	of	disruptions	to	the	self’s	integrity	that	
enables	the	adoption	of	an	ethical	autonomous	comportment.	Encounters	that	shake	the	
self	from	its	sense	of	enclosure	and	security	create	the	conditions	that	allow	the	self	to	
approach	harmful	social	directives116	as	foreign	to	the	self,	and	thus	as	injunctions	to	be	
disregarded	or	refigured.	Looking	to	the	uprising	in	West	Baltimore	following	the	death	of	
Freddie	Gray117	as	an	exemplar	of	an	ethics	of	receptive	autonomy,	I	articulate	how	this	
comportment	of	autonomy	enables	actions	that	can	produce	radical	social	change.	
I	begin	with	an	elaboration	of	an	anti-adaptation	theorization	of	social	change,	as	
presented	in	Lacan’s	understanding	of	the	ethical	intent	of	psychoanalysis.	Through	the	
work	of	Lacanian	Alenka	Zupančič,	I	depict	the	analytic	encounter—an	encounter	that	aims	
to	allow	in	otherness,	disruption,	and	facilitate	change—as	a	prototype	for	a	comportment	
of	receptive	autonomy.	I	develop	this	picture	of	receptive	autonomy,	as	allied	with	
psychoanalysis,	by	reading	the	actions	of	the	Baltimore	rioters	as	similar	to	the	
psychoanalytic	work	that	enables	analysands	to	express	autonomy—to	reject	the	social	
																																																																				
116	In	chapter	two,	I	discuss	the	Lacanian	approach	to	the	creation	of	social	beings,	which	differs	from	Foucault’s	theory	of	
subjects	as	produced	by	techniques	of	power.	Foucault	discusses	his	account	of	the	subject	in	“The	Subject	and	Power”	
(1982).	While	Lacan,	like	Foucault,	does	claim	that	subjects	are	shaped	by	existence	in	the	social,	he	expresses	the	highly	
significant	caveat	that	this	construction	always	misses	its	mark.	While	subjects	submit	to	the	social-symbolic	discourse	of	
the	“Other,”	part	of	their	being	fails	to	obey	the	rules.	Part	of	the	self	remains	incoherent	within	the	social-historical	
situation	into	which	the	subject	is	born.	Žižek	summarizes	his	Lacanian	opposition	to	Foucault’s	account	of	the	subject	in	
The	Sublime	Object	of	Ideology	(1989).	I	discuss	the	subject’s	incoherence	with	respect	to	social	meaning	as	a	site	for	the	
subject’s	freedom.	
	
117	Freddie	Gray	was	an	African	American	man	who	died	of	spinal	cord	injuries	on	April	19,	2015,	while	in	police	custody.	
The	suspicious	circumstances	of	his	death	have	since	led	to	the	six	officers	involved	in	his	arrest	and	containment	to	face	
charges	ranging	from	second-degree	murder	to	manslaughter	and	criminal	negligence.		
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scripts	provided	to	them	and	to	rewrite	and	create	their	own	interpretations	and	
narratives.		
Developing	this	account	of	the	uprising	as	both	disruptive	and	productive,	I	suggest	
that	the	conditions	that	led	up	to	the	Baltimore	uprising,	and	the	uprising	itself	can	be	read	
as	instances	of	“creative	maladjustment.”	Borrowing	the	phrase	“creative	maladjustment”	
from	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.’s	1967	address	to	the	American	Psychological	Association,	I	
contend	that	the	riots	of	April	2015,	like	the	riots	discussed	by	King,	express	a	productive	
refusal	to	adapt	to	a	pathological	social	system.	The	Baltimore	riots	convey	both	refusal	
and	creativity.	The	creative	element	appears	in	the	rioters	and	protesters’	determination	to	
autonomously	write	new	codes	of	social	meaning	through	the	dissemination	of	self-created	
narratives	about	the	riots,	the	general	uprising,	and	life	in	West	Baltimore.		
A	Lacanian	understanding	of	ethical	action	as	necessarily	self-disruptive,	as	
necessarily	“pathological”	in	the	eyes	of	normative	society,	helps	account	for	the	media’s	
depiction	of	the	riots	as	unwarranted	and	unproductive.	I	counter	the	media	portrayals	of	
the	riots	as	purely	self-destructive	and	devoid	of	positive	affect	by	suggesting	that	the	riots	
and	the	events	surrounding	them	actually	express	a	kind	of	love,	a	willingness	to	
experience	the	type	of	self-disruption	and	self-empowerment	that	love	brings.	In	
conclusion,	I	contend	that	my	notion	of	receptive	autonomy,	while	invoking	a	stance	of	
dissidence,	a	mode	of	contestation	toward	accustomed	ways	of	being,	is	also	a	summons	to	
love,	a	summons	to	allow	otherness	to	startle	us	and	shift	us	away	from	what	is	and	has	
been.	I	end	by	considering	the	significant	political	consequences	of	receptive	autonomy	as	a	
comportment	created	in	openness	to	both	pleasurable	and	unsettling	self-disruptions	and	
as	a	comportment	productive	of	dissent	and	social	change.			
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A	Refusal	
	
The	Baltimore	uprising	of	April	2015	began	just	days	following	the	death	of	Freddie	
Gray,	a	Black	man	killed	while	in	the	custody	of	the	Baltimore	Police	Department.	
Protesters	gathered	from	across	Baltimore	to	express	exasperation	and	sorrow	over	Gray’s	
death	at	the	hands	of	the	police.	Many	involved	in	the	protests	voiced	a	deep	awareness	of	
the	structural	violence	and	racism	that	had	led	to	Gray’s	arrest,	detainment,	and	ultimately,	
to	his	death	(Coates	2015b;	Hazzard	2015).	In	this	state	of	heightened	consciousness	
concerning	systemic	injustice,	frustration	grew,	and	citizens	in	West	Baltimore,	where	Gray	
lived	and	was	later	arrested,	began	to	destroy	property	and	take	items	from	nearby	stores	
and	a	local	mall.		
In	what	follows,	I	will	refer	to	these	specific	events	as	riots,	as	incidents	forming	
part	of	a	larger	collective	uprising	disruptive	of	routine	social	functioning.118	Designating	
these	actions	as	riots,	I	intend	to	stress	their	impassioned,	disruptive,	and	warranted	nature.	
Diverging	from	a	paradigm	that	would	evacuate	emotionality	from	the	realm	of	the	
political,	I	read	such	actions	as	both	emotionally-charged	and	politically	significant	
performances	of	refusal.	The	actions	of	the	rioters	can	be	read	as	an	ardent	“No!”	to	the	
demands	of	a	society	dependent	upon	the	exploitation	and	incarceration	of	Black	citizens.	
In	forsaking	calls	to	continue	protesting	in	“acceptable”	and	“non-violent”	ways,	rioters	
enacted	a	refusal	to	adapt	to	the	system	responsible	for	the	deprivation	and	incarceration	
of	so	many	members	of	their	communities.		
																																																																				
118	The	riots	do	not	account	for	entirety	or	even	most	of	the	uprising.	The	uprising	included	protests	and	marches	that	did	
not	involve	the	destruction	of	property.	As	part	of	the	general	sensationalizing	of	the	uprising,	the	mainstream	media	
failed	to	highlight	these	non-destructive	actions	of	political	protest	(Aminata	2015).			
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Such	a	refusal	to	adjust	to	an	injurious	social	system	characterizes	the	ethical	act,	as	
it	is	theorized	in	radical	forms	of	psychoanalysis.	A	defiant	“No”	is	deeply	embedded	in	the	
principles	of	Lacanian	psychoanalysis,	a	practice	that	encourages	a	rejection	of	adjustment	
and	adaptation.119	Turning	to	the	work	of	Lacanians	Alenka	Zupančič	and	Yannis	
Stavrakakis,	I	will	show	how	this	bold	anti-adaptive	stance	depends	upon	a	willingness	to	
encounter	disruptions	that	free	the	self	from	social	constraints	that	deaden	its	ability	to	
thrive.	The	analytic	encounter,	as	a	situation	meant	to	bring	to	the	surface	the	unsettling	
and	the	disruptive,	in	an	effort	to	shift	the	analysand	away	from	accustomed	modes	of	
acting	and	thinking,	guides	my	interpretation	of	the	Baltimore	rioters’	actions	as	
productive	of	social	change.	In	the	conclusion	to	the	following	section,	I	draw	a	parallel	
between	the	autonomy-generating	character	of	analysis—that	it	allows	the	analysand	a	
degree	of	authorship	over	the	terms	of	her	existence—and	the	authorship	taken	by	the	
rioters	in	their	creation	and	dissemination	of	new	self-created	social	scripts.		
	
Psychoanalysis:	A	Practice	of	Discontent	
	
In	an	interview	with	an	Italian	magazine	in	1974,	Lacan	publicly	decried	the	
therapeutic	trends	he	saw	developing	in	American	psychoanalytic	circles.	He	warned	of	the	
dangers	of	conceiving	of	psychoanalysis	as	adaptive	therapy,	as	a	means	to	adjust	the	self	
to	an	imagined	normal	sociality,	claiming	that	such	practices	were	far	from	what	Freud	had	
																																																																				
119	Philippe	Van	Haute’s	Against	Adaptation:	Lacan’s	‘Subversion	of	the	Subject’	(2002)	explores	the	anti-adaptive	nature	of	
Lacanian	psychoanalysis	in	detail.		
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envisioned	for	the	practice	of	psychoanalysis.	Lacan	told	the	interviewer,	“After	his	
[Freud’s]	death	in	1939,	some	of	his	students	also	claimed	to	be	exercising	a	different	kind	
of	psychoanalysis	by	reducing	his	teachings	to	a	few	banal	formulas:	technique	as	a	ritual,	
practice	restricted	to	treating	people’s	behavior,	as	a	means	of	re-adapting	the	individual	to	
his	social	environment.	This	is	the	negation	of	Freud:	a	comforting	salon	psychoanalysis”	
(1974).120	Such	incarnations	of	the	practice	would	serve	only	to	dull	the	critical	edge	of	
psychoanalysis	and	thus	its	force	as	a	practice	aimed	at	cultivating	resistance	toward	
normative	circumscription.	
Lacan	criticized	American	ego	psychology’s	focus	on	enriching	the	self’s	capacity	to	
adapt	to	its	environment.	Perhaps	he	had	in	mind	analysts	like	Heinz	Hartmann	whose	
work	outlines	a	therapeutic	protocol	for	adjusting	the	self	and	the	environment	in	unison,	
to	achieve	a	greater	harmony	between	the	two	(Hartmann	1964).121	In	contrast,	Lacan	
proclaimed	that	to	become	well-adjusted	was	a	goal	antithetical	to	the	original	intentions	
of	Freudian	psychoanalysis.	In	opposition	to	therapeutic	practices	that	focus	on	an	
accommodating	stance	toward	social	norms,	Lacan	and	his	followers	pursue	a	form	of	
psychoanalysis	based	on	a	continual	attentiveness	to	the	aspects	of	social	existence	that	the	
self	consciously	or	unconsciously	rebels	against.	This	form	of	analysis	highlights	the	ways	
																																																																				
120	George	Makari	gives	a	detailed	account	of	psychoanalysis’s	shift	toward	systemization,	therapeutics,	and	
medicalization.	In	this	process,	Freud’s	belief	that	anyone	could	become	an	analyst	was	replaced	by	requirements	of	a	
medical	degree	and	institutionalized	training.	This	shift	checked	psychoanalysis’s	previous	incorporation	of	radicals,	
sexologists,	teachers,	and	social	scientists.	As	a	consequence,	psychoanalysis	edged	away	from	political	and	social	critique,	
and	the	goal	of	treatment	became	more	and	more	about	correcting	and	adjusting	the	maladjusted	to	the	norms	of	society	
(Makari	2008).		
	
121	Lewis	Aron	and	Karen	Starr	trace	Hartmann’s	emphasis	on	adaptation	to	the	increasing	importance	of	scientism,	
individualism,	and	autonomy	(figured	as	objective	judgment)	in	postwar	1950’s	American	society.	The	aim	of	ego-analysis	
was	to	help	the	ego	“achieve	autonomy,	not	only	from	the	drives,	but	also	from	the	environment;	this	double	autonomy	
provided	the	ego	with	the	capacity	for	adjustment	and	adaptation”	(2013,	121).		
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in	which	attentiveness	to	lack	and	discord	enables	the	amelioration	of	social-political	
injustice	by	encouraging	actors	to	resist	rather	than	adapt	to	harmful	social	structures.	
Lacanian	Alenka	Zupančič	adheres	to	a	critical	rather	than	adaptive	form	of	
psychoanalysis	in	her	study	of	comedy	as	a	potential	practice	of	insurrection.	Her	depiction	
of	comedy	as	endemic	to	the	analytic	situation—a	site	where	one	cultivates	critical	social	
awareness—helps	explain	how	anti-adaptive	forms	of	political	protest	can	foster	social	
change.	122	Zupančič	looks	to	Hegel’s	section	on	Religion	in	the	Phenomenology	of	Spirit	to	
discuss	the	shifts	that	comedy	produces	in	the	Other,123	in	the	social	practices	and	language	
of	everyday	life.		
In	his	section	on	religion,	Hegel	turns	his	focus	away	from	the	point	of	view	of	self-
consciousness	and	to	the	point	of	view	of	the	Absolute	(Zupančič	2008,	14).	He	shifts	from	
his	concern	with	self-consciousness—the	self’s	awareness	that	it	exists	as	an	entity	that	can	
reflect	on	and	create	change	in	the	outside	world	(Hegel,	1977	§	166-67)—to	a	concern	for	
how	the	world,	described	as	the	Absolute	(the	“absolute	Spirit	realized	in	the	plurality	of	
existent	consciousnesses”)	(Hegel,	1977	§	447)	comes	to	recognize	the	role	of	selves	in	its	
creation.	It	is	not	enough	for	self-consciousness	to	know	that	the	Absolute	does	not	exist	
without	it,	to	know	that	self-consciousness	partakes	and	contributes	to	the	world.	The	
Absolute	itself,	the	Other	(the	modes	of	being	that	express	who	we	are	in	society),	must	
also	come	to	realize	“that	it	does	not	exist	(outside	the	concrete	consciousness	of	people	
																																																																				
122	In	chapter	two,	I	outline	Zupančič’s	theorization	of	comedy	and	love	as	related	socially	subversive	modalities.		
	
123	I	use	the	Lacanian	term	“Other”	to	designate	the	world	of	language	and	culture,	as	well	as	that	which	the	subject	comes	
to	see	as	other	to	itself.	This	can	be	other	people,	as	well	as	feelings,	actions,	desires,	and	thoughts	that	may	emit	from	the	
self,	but	feel	alien	to	it.	This	use	of	the	term	“Other,”	slightly	deviates	from	the	typical	Lacanian	use	of	the	term	to	
designate	the	world	of	language/image.	For	a	more	nuanced	and	detailed	discussion	of	Lacan’s	term	“Other,”	see	chapter	
two.	
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and	of	the	world)”	(Zupančič	2008,	16).	The	social	self	and	the	modes	of	being,	
understanding,	and	acting	that	are	sanctioned	by	our	social	world	must	come	to	realize	that	
they	are	mutually	incomplete.	Zupančič	suggests	that,	starting	from	the	self-consciousness	
of	the	Absolute,	Hegel	articulates	a	form	of	freedom	dependent	not	upon	individual	
consciousness	and	its	fit	with	the	Absolute,	but	on	the	mutual	realization	of	their	shared	
incompleteness.124		
This	particular	reading	deepens	Hegel’s	better-known	understanding	of	freedom	as	
dependent	upon	the	“concrete	identity	of	the	good	with	the	subjective	will”	(Zupančič	
2008,	152).	For	Hegel,	such	an	identity	necessitates	the	self’s	robust	participation	in	the	
ethical	source	from	which	its	subjectivity	springs.	Free	agency	requires	participation	in	the	
conditions	that	enable	human	freedom,	that	is,	in	the	ethical	community	and	eventually	the	
state.	This	would	mean	self-consciousness	has	realized	its	role	in	the	creation	of	the	
Absolute,	in	the	world	of	the	Other.	In	this	reading	of	Hegelian	freedom,	the	emphasis	is	on	
how	self-consciousness	sees	the	Absolute,	on	how	self-consciousness	sees	its	role	in	
creating	the	conditions	of	its	freedom.		
Hegel	suggests	an	alternative	vision	of	freedom	in	his	section	on	Religion.	Here,	
Hegel	turns	to	focus	on	how	the	Absolute	(the	configurations	of	social	meaning	that	
comprise	the	Absolute)	comes	to	see	itself	as	incomplete	and	contingent	on	the	actions	of	
self-consciousness.	Zupančič	introduces	a	Lacanian	challenge	to	readings	of	the	Hegelian	
self	as	free	only	in	its	realization	of	unity	with	its	world.	Rather	than	reading	Hegel	as	
																																																																				
124	Žižek	ties	Lacanian	ethic’s	insistence	on	the	realization	of	mutual	lack	between	self	and	other	to	Hegel’s	notion	of	
Absolute	Knowledge.	Rather	than	reading	Absolute	Knowledge	as	a	realization	of	unity,	Žižek	stresses	that	this	concept	
echoes	the	Lacanian	realization	of	a	void	in	the	Other.	He	states,	“the	Hegelian	‘sublation	of	the	Other’	does	not	equate	
either	to	a	fusion	of	the	subject	with	its	Other,	or	to	the	appropriation,	on	the	part	of	the	subject,	of	any	substantial	
content;	it	is	rather	a	specifically	Hegelian	way	of	saying	that	‘the	Other	does	not	exist’	(Lacan),	in	other	words,	that	the	
Other	does	not	exist	as	the	Guarantor	of	Truth”	(2005,	49).		
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suggesting	that	freedom	requires	harmonization	between	the	self	and	its	world,	she	finds	
in	Hegel	an	assertion	of	the	importance	of	the	mutual	lack	in	both	entities,	their	sense	of	
alienation	from	each	other	but	also	their	absolute	dependence	upon	one	another.	It	is	
consciousness	of	mutual	lack	and	alienation	rather	than	an	idealization	of	harmony	that	
facilitates	free	action.		
This	crucial	alienation,	or	ill	fit,	the	defining	element	of	the	Lacanian	subject-world	
relation,	generates	movement.	For	Hegel,	this	dynamism	is	dialectical	movement,	and	for	
Lacan,	it	is	the	force	of	desire	that	engenders	a	shift	in	the	Other.	“This	is	why,”	Zupančič	
claims,	“for	both	Hegel	and	Lacan,	the	real	point	at	which	something	in	this	relationship	can	
be	effectively	shifted	is	not	the	abolition	of	Otherness,	or	its	absorption	into	the	subject,	but	
the	coincidence	of	the	lack	in	the	subject	with	the	lack	in	the	Other”	(2008,	17).	The	shift	
comes	from	the	“encounter	of	the	two	entities	at	a	very	precise	(or	precisely	right)	point	of	
their	topology.	This	is	a	short	circuit	of	internal	and	external,	not	an	elimination	of	the	one	
or	the	other”	(Zupančič	2008,	17).	Rather	than	the	realization	of	harmony	between	the	self	
and	the	world,	it	is	the	zeroing	in	on	their	mutual	deficiency	that	generates	a	shift	in	the	
social	matrix.	The	basis	of	social	change	lies	in	the	fractious	nature	of	the	self-world	
relationship.		
Yannis	Stavrakakis’s	study	of	the	political	implications	of	Lacan’s	theories	clarifies	
how	this	productive	point	of	contact	arises.	He	explains	that	the	parallel	lack	in	the	subject	
and	the	lack	in	the	social	exist	due	to	the	realities	of	signification.	Because	language	
ultimately	fails	to	depict	uniqueness,	given	that	it	can	only	exist	at	a	communicable	level	of	
abstraction,	social	significations	always	fall	short	of	portraying,	with	exact	precision,	what	
they	seek	to	represent.	In	this	sense,	the	world	of	social	meaning	expresses	a	lack	in	
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extensiveness	akin	to	the	lack	in	the	desiring	subject.125	While	the	subject	might	seek	to	
identify	with	a	collective	signification,	“the	lack	on	the	objective	level	means	that	every	
such	identification	is	only	reproducing	the	lack	in	the	subject,”	objective	meanings	“being	
incapable	of	providing	the	lost	real	fullness	of	the	individual	subject”	(Stavrakakis	1999,	
41).	Yet,	rather	than	ensuring	only	a	deficient	existence,	the	lacking	nature	of	both	the	
social-self	and	the	social-collective	actually	allows	the	subject	a	degree	of	freedom.	As	Žižek	
notes,	“without	this	lack	in	the	Other,	the	Other	would	be	a	closed	structure	and	the	only	
possibility	open	to	the	subject	would	be	his	radical	alienation	in	the	Other”	(1989,	137).	
However,	because	this	lack	does	exist,	the	social	is	an	open	system	capable	of	
transformation.		
This	crucial	space	of	interlocking	lack	endows	the	subject	with	the	ability	to	
transform	signification	at	the	social	and	subjective	level,	to	ethically	rewrite	the	terms	of	
social-selfhood.	This	space	of	lack,	as	I	have	previously	suggested,	allows	the	subject	to	
potentially	inhabit	an	ethical	comportment	of	autonomy—a	comportment	attentive	to	the	
inconsistencies	in	social	narratives	that	encourages	the	dismissal	or	revision	of	such	social	
scripts.	As	Zupančič	suggests,	“a	certain	inconsistency	or	incompleteness	of	the	Other	
(moral	law)	is	the	very	kernel	of	ethics”	(2000,	147).	It	is	precisely	by	identifying	with	this	
lack	in	the	Other	that	the	subject	acquires	“a	breathing	space”	which	“enables	him	to	avoid	
total	alienation	in	the	signifier”	(Žižek	1989,	137).	Alienation	remains	open	to	partial	
																																																																				
125	For	Lacan,	desire	drives	our	existence.	Desire	manifests	as	lack	introduced	by	language,	which	propels	being	in	its	
incessant	search	for	satisfaction.	Formed	in	the	gap	between	needs	and	the	articulation	of	these	needs,	the	demands	one	
addresses	to	the	other,	desire	emerges	from	the	very	otherness	of	language.	Because	language	comes	to	the	self	as	Other,	
the	demands	one	makes	always	introduce	a	disjoint	between	what	they	intend	and	what	they	say.	Desire	lives	in	this	
disjoint,	as	a	longing	for	a	satisfaction	consistent	with	what	is	inexpressible	in	language.	In	this	sense,	the	living	subject	
exists	as	a	lacking	being	(Lacan	1992,	294).	I	explain	Lacan’s	concept	of	the	lacking	subject	in	greater	detail	in	chapter	
two.		
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amelioration	through	shifts	in	the	social-self	relationship.	Awareness	and	identification	
with	this	“breathing	space”	thus	becomes	crucial	for	the	embodiment	of	an	ethical	
comportment	generative	of	radical	social	change.	Identifying	with	the	lack	in	the	social,	
staying	with	the	feeling	that	the	social	“hasn’t	got	it,	hasn’t	got	the	final	answer”	(Žižek	
1989,	137),	allows	the	subject	to	remain	open	to	its	incompleteness,	rather	than	
incessantly	searching	for	ways	to	disavow	its	lack	by	participating	in	social	fantasies	of	self-
sovereignty,	mastery,	and	harmony,	fantasies	that	quite	often	require	the	violent	expulsion	
of	otherness.126	Less	inclined	to	overlook	the	hypocrisies	and	inconsistences	of	social	
norms,	the	self	identified	with	lack	begins	to	see	these	norms	as	fantasies,	as	attempts	to	
deflect	otherness	and	loss.		
This	critical	awareness	frees	the	self	from	much	of	the	force	of	these	fantasies	and	
enables	it	to	inhabit	a	comportment	of	autonomy,	a	comportment	divergent	from	modes	of	
“normalcy”	and	productive	of	new	modes	of	being.	As	I	will	show,	some	participants	of	the	
Baltimore	riots	expressed	just	such	a	critical	awareness	of	the	fantastic	nature	of	normative	
American	ideals,	such	as	“legitimate”	state	violence,	racial	equality,	and	economic	
meritocracy,	as	well	as	a	parallel	unwillingness	to	carry	on	in	faithfulness	to	these	ideals.			
Zupančič	suggests	that	certain	practices	of	psychoanalysis	inspire	such	critical	
mindfulness	by	encouraging	subjects	to	embrace	their	shared	lack	with	the	social	and	to	
defer	tendencies	to	adjust	the	self	to	fit	within	a	perceived	“normal.”	Disposed	to	challenge	
																																																																				
126	Žižek	notes	that	“fantasy	is	precisely	an	attempt	to	fill	out	this	lack	in	the	Other,	i.e.	to	reconstitute	the	consistency	of	
the	big	Other”	(2005,	333).	Here,	he	has	in	mind	paranoid	fantasies	that	seek	to	revivify	the	authority	of	the	big	Other	by	
situating	an	agency	beyond	the	Other	that	could	account	for	disruptions	to	our	normal	social	order.	Such	paranoid	
fantasies	are	meant	to	protect	the	social	order	from	receiving	the	blame	for	its	own	hypocrisies	and	inconsistences.	For	
example,	Žižek	states,	we	might	imagine	that	“beneath	the	chaos	of	the	market,	the	degradation	of	morals,	etc.	there	is	the	
purposeful	strategy	of	say,	the	Jewish	Plot—or,	today,	more	fashionably,	the	Templars	plot”	(2005,	333).		
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the	notion	of	arelational	selfhood,	psychoanalysis	encourages	change	in	both	self	and	Other	
(the	Absolute)	at	the	point	of	their	overlapping	incompleteness.	In	psychoanalysis,	it	is	not	
enough	for	the	patient	to	come	to	know	how	her	unconscious	determines	her	actions	and	
to	attempt	“to	change	herself	and	her	perception	of	the	world”	(Zupančič	2008,	17).	Rather,	
the	main	goal	of	analysis	is	to	incite	a	change	in	both	subject	and	world,	“to	shift	and	
change	the	very	symbolic	and	imaginary	structures	in	which	this	unconscious	is	embodied	
outside	of	herself,	in	the	manner	and	rituals	of	her	conduct,	speech,	relations	to	others…”	
(Zupančič	2008,	16).	Psychoanalysis	encourages	a	change	in	the	material	conditions	of	the	
subject	by	means	of	“shifting	external	practices”	(Zupančič	2008,	16)	through	their	
repetition.		
In	analysis,	the	patient	repeatedly	recounts	her	actions	and	all	the	things	she	
perceives	as	“happening	to	her.”	The	analyst’s	role	is	not	to	point	out	that	she	is	in	fact	
unconsciously	responsible	for	these	occurrences,	but	rather	to	allow	her	to	encounter	these	
incidents	again	and	again.	As	the	subject	recalls	the	experiences	of	her	social	identity	
“functioning	outside	in	the	Other”	(Zupančič	2008,	18),	these	experiences	begin	to	shift	in	
meaning.	In	their	repetition,	they	begin	to	seem	more	alien	and	less	integral	to	the	patient’s	
selfhood	as	they	accrue	layers	of	meaning	that	diverge	from	the	patient’s	original	
experiences.	As	Deleuze	notes,	repetition	entails	a	positive	production	of	difference,	and	
indeed,	the	analysand	perceives	an	excess,	a	difference,	in	these	events	over	time	(Zupančič	
2008,	176).127	
																																																																				
127	Stephen	Mitchell	also	finds	this	dynamic	central	to	clinical	psychoanalysis.	He	states	“the	therapeutic	action	of	
psychoanalysis	is	the	emergence	of	something	new	from	something	old”	(Mitchell	2014,	59).	
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Zupančič	explains	the	significance	of	this	production	of	symbolic	excess	by	looking	
to	the	ways	in	which	comedy	weakens	the	authority	of	Master-Signifiers	through	their	
repetition.	Zx ižek	defines	the	Lacanian	term	“Master-Signifier”	as	an	“empty	signifier	of	
symbolic	authority”	(2005,	290).128	An	example	would	be	the	notion	of	“democracy”	or	
“equality.”	Both	exist	as	ideals	that	we	tend	to	accept	uncritically,	despite	their	diversity	in	
meaning	and	practice.	They	stand	on	the	authority	they	evoke	in	themselves,	rather	than	on	
their	fit	with	social	reality.	They	serve	to	tie	together	dissimilar	and	often	contradictory	
meanings;	yet,	we	rarely	interrogate	the	inconsistency	these	terms	suppress.	Even	if	such	
inconsistencies	are	recognized	and	understood	as	richness	in	meaning,	the	significance	and	
hallowedness	of	such	concepts	remains	largely	uncontested.	These	signifiers	are	taken	as	
emblematic	of	universal	truths.	Master-Signifiers	operate	to	hold	together	our	fantasies	of	
social	identity	and	cover	over	the	arbitrary	nature	of	their	authority	to	determine	our	
actions,	thoughts,	and	beliefs.					
Comedy	displays	Master-Signifiers	as	self-evident	truths	in	a	manner	that	ironically	
broadcasts	their	insincerities.	In	comedy,	“Master-Signifiers	enter	the	scene…not	to	have	
the	last	word,	but	in	order	to	be	repeated	there”	(Zupančič	2008,	177),	to	have	their	
inconsistencies	exposed.	An	example	of	a	comedic	and	subversive	repetition	of	Master-
Signifiers	would	be	comedian	Stephen	Colbert’s	repeated	displays	of	intense	American	
patriotism	on	the	show	The	Colbert	Report.	This	repetition	is	comedic	precisely	because	it	
threatens	the	stability	of	“America”	as	a	Master-Signifier.	Comedic	repetition,	like	the	
																																																																				
128	For	more	on	Lacan’s	explanation	of	the	term	“master–signifier,”	see:	The	Four	Fundamental	Concepts	of	Psychoanalysis	
(1981)	and	The	Other	Side	of	Psychoanalysis	(2007).		
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repetition	that	occurs	in	the	course	of	analysis,	produces	a	surprise	as	it	reveals	the	
ridiculous,	and	somewhat	empty	and	arbitrary	character	of	Master-Signifiers.		
Both	comedy	and	psychoanalysis	can	operate	to	lessen	the	hold	that	Master-
Signifiers	have	over	us	by	pushing	these	structural	points	until	they	reveal	the	
inconsistencies	and	excesses	that	our	systems	of	thought	inherently	generate	and	then	seek	
to	disavow.	Mindful	of	the	shifty	and	somewhat	arbitrary	nature	of	signification,	we	are	less	
inclined	to	adhere	so	forcefully	to	social	identities	and	socially	accepted	ways	of	being.	
Never	entirely	in	a	position	of	mastery	over	the	terms	of	her	selfhood,	the	self	begins	to	
realize	that	the	world	never	truly	masters	her.			
The	practice	of	analysis	aims	to	allow	the	analysand	a	perspective	from	which	to	
sense	the	presence	of	detrimental	social	fantasies	through	the	repetition	of	failed	
enactments	of	their	promises.	Analysis	exposes	the	inadequacies	of	common	beliefs—that	
they	might	not	serve	the	analysand—and	overtime,	through	their	repetition,	shows	that	
such	beliefs	might	be	highly	inconsistent	with	the	way	the	analysand	would	like	to	be.	In	
this	sense,	analysis	operates	as	a	practice	allied	with	a	comportment	of	receptive	
autonomy.	Both	analysis	and	receptive	autonomy	compel	an	openness	to	disruptions	to	
normative	ways	of	being	as	a	means	to	shift	the	ways	both	the	self	and	the	social	operate.	
Both	psychoanalysis	and	receptive	autonomy	aim	to	enhance	our	ability	to	write	our	own	
social	self-law	by	encouraging	a	refusal	of	the	laws	provided	and	by	stimulating	an	
awareness	that	things	could	be	otherwise	than	how	they	stand.		
Our	nomos,	the	field	of	meaning	that	determines	what	we	deem	desirable	or	even	
possible,	shifts	through	the	production	of	counternarratives.	As	legal	scholar	Robert	Cover	
suggests,	“the	codes	that	relate	our	normative	system	to	our	social	constructions	of	reality	
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and	to	our	visions	of	what	the	world	might	be	are	narrative”	(1983,	10).	We	write	our	laws,	
our	nomos,	or	narratives,	through	creative	dissidence,	“by	using	the	irony	of	jurisdiction,	
the	comedy	of	manners	that	is	malum	prohibitium,	the	surreal	epistemology	of	due	process”	
(Cover	1983,	8-9).	Just	as	analysis	and	comedy	align	with	a	comportment	of	receptive	
autonomy,	in	that	they	aim	to	produce	critical	awareness	and	stimulate	the	creation	of	new	
modes	of	being,	so	too	can	playing	with	the	inconsistences	and	hypocrisies	of	revered	
beliefs	and	legal	precedents	serve	as	a	means	to	autonomously	rewrite	the	terms	of	one’s	
existence.			
Dissent	in	Baltimore	
	
Similar	to	the	ways	in	which	psychoanalysis	reveals	the	potentially	detrimental	
qualities	of	deeply	held	beliefs	and	these	beliefs’	basis	in	social	fantasies,	so	too	do	the	
everyday	lives	of	many	West	Baltimoreans	expose	the	emptiness	of	the	fantasy	of	the	
American	Dream.	The	rioters,	in	a	practice	analogous	to	the	analytic	repetition	of	social	
fantasies—a	repetition	that	over	time	reveals	these	fantasies’	inadequacies	and	
inconsistences—revealed	the	pretense	of	prevailing	American	principles	by	living	these	
principles,	by	acting	as	if	such	principles	might	be	sincere,	as	if	these	principles	might	apply	
to	their	own	lives.	The	rioters	perversely	conformed	to	entrenched	American	ideals,	
exposing	these	ideals	as	insincere	and	as	dependent	upon	the	impoverishment,	
dispossession,	and	incarceration	of	Black	Americans.	
The	riots	of	April	2015	occurred	in	a	context	of	police	brutality	and	systemic	
dispossession	(Friedersdorf	2015).	They	signaled	a	refusal	on	the	part	of	West	
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Baltimoreans	to	adjust	to	police	violence,	mass-incarceration,	and	racist	regulatory	
policies—all	manifestations	of	a	system	that	works	to	maintain	a	high	quality	of	life	for	
white	Americans	(Coates	2014).	The	mainstream	media,	mostly	discounting	the	context	of	
the	riots,	portrayed	them	as	everything	from	acts	of	destruction,	slightly	justified	but	
overzealous	actions	of	protest,	to	actions	ruinous	to	the	cause	of	ending	police	violence	
against	Black	Americans.	Every	mainstream	news	source	highlighted	the	property	
destruction	involved	and	the	allegedly	self-destructive	nature	of	the	rioters’	actions	(Abdul-
Jabbar	2015;	Lewis	2015;	Myers	2015;	Gorman	2015).	Various	left-leaning	news	sources	
attempted	to	put	the	riots	into	context,	exploring	the	conditions	that	gave	rise	to	the	
uprising—police	violence	and	the	inaction	of	courts	to	prosecute	officers	in	cases	involving	
the	shooting	of	Black	citizens	(Patterson	2015;	Short	2015;	Gude	2015;	Johnston	2015).	
Yet,	the	overwhelming	response	from	the	media	was	to	report	endlessly	on	the	fires	and	
looting	that	took	place	during	the	riots.	The	news	coverage	wildly	emphasized	the	shocking	
and	allegedly	imprudent	nature	of	the	events,	but	failed	to	note	the	everyday	situations	that	
gave	rise	to	the	riots.		
The	paradigm	represented	in	the	media	narratives	that	portrayed	the	riots	as	
gratuitous	betrays	the	deep-rooted	denial	of	systemic	violence	that	perpetuates	systems	of	
racial	dispossession	in	American	cities.	Baltimore	born	writers	Ta-Nehisi	Coates	and	D.	
Watkins	describe	how	the	brutality	of	everyday	life	in	East	and	West	Baltimore	exists	as	a	
byproduct	of	the	social	continuation	and	obscuration	of	white	privilege.	Constantly	
harassed	by	police,	deprived	of	adequate	schools,	grocery	stores,	and	community	
resources,	many	Baltimoreans	struggle	on	a	daily	basis	just	to	survive	(Watkins	2015).	
Turning	to	Christopher	Doob’s	theory	of	“social	reproduction,”	Watkins	contends	that	poor	
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conditions	in	parts	of	Baltimore	exist	as	a	consequence	of	a	system	meant	to	sustain	a	high	
quality	of	life	for	the	privileged	at	the	expense	of	poor	Black	Baltimoreans	(Watkins	2015).	
Watkins	explains	that	theory	of	social	reproduction	“holds	that	we’ve	got	to	produce	a	
certain	number	of	minimum-wage	workers	and	inmates—a	general	collection	of	bottom-
feeders—for	capitalism	to	sustain,	and	so	we	build	the	social	structures	to	keep	that	level	
of	misery	going”	(54,	2015).	The	accumulation	of	white	wealth,	built	into	the	very	basis	of	
contemporary	American	life,	requires	the	continued	appropriation	of	Black	labor	and	the	
impoverishment	and	incarceration	of	Black	Americans.		
Those	involved	in	the	protests	and	in	the	riots	referred	to	these	injustices	as	the	
root	cause	of	the	rioting.	Many	protesters	who	did	not	take	part	in	the	riots	nevertheless	
saw	the	rioting	as	a	justified	response	to	systemic	injustice.	Tanay	Thrower,	one	of	the	
citizens	helping	to	clean	up	after	the	rioting,	described	the	riots	as	an	expression	of	
peoples’	frustration	over	the	neglect	of	their	communities.	Thrower	cites	lack,	“the	lack	of	
health	resources,	the	lack	of	mental	health	resources,	the	lack	of	a	education	system,	the	
lack	of	being	able	to	have	support…”	(Maté	2015),	as	the	endemic	cause	of	the	unrest.	
Coates	describes	how	a	continuous	turning	away	from	this	system	of	racial	injustice	
and	the	privation	it	perpetuates	keeps	the	dream	of	white	self-sovereignty	alive.	The	
adherents	of	the	dream	“must	not	just	believe	in	it	but	believe	that	it	is	just,	believe	that	
their	possession	of	the	Dream	is	the	natural	result	of	grit,	honor,	and	good	works”	(Coates	
2015a,	98).	Coates	recounts	how	this	process	of	turning	away	is	embedded	in	the	American	
way	of	life,	stating,	“the	mettle	that	it	takes	to	look	away	from	the	horror	of	our	prison	
system,	from	police	forces	transformed	into	armies,	from	the	long	war	against	the	Black	
body,	is	not	forged	overnight.	This	is	the	practiced	habit	of	jabbing	out	one’s	own	eyes	and	
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forgetting	the	work	of	one’s	hands”	(Coates	2015a,	98).	The	dream	of	white	self-sufficiency	
and	justified	entitlement,	a	dream	that	is	inseparable	from	the	American	Dream,	is	
sustained	by	practices	of	habitual	forgetting.	Steve	Martinot	and	Jared	Sexton	characterize	
this	repetitive	forgetting	as:	
…the	passive	apparatus	of	whiteness…that	actively	forgets	that	it	owes	its	existence	
to	the	killing	and	terrorizing	of	those	it	racializes…expelling	them	from	the	human	
fold	in	the	same	gesture	of	forgetting.	It	is	the	passivity	of	bad	faith	that	tacitly	
accepts	as	“what	goes	without	saying”	the	postulates	of	white	supremacy.	And	it	
must	do	so	passionately	since	“what	goes	without	saying”	is	empty	and	can	be	held	
as	a	“truth”	only	through	an	obsessiveness	(2003,	179).		
	
This	obsessive	forgetting	forms	the	psychic	veil	that	keeps	white	Baltimoreans	
comfortably	“unaware”	of	the	conditions	of	neighborhoods	in	East	and	West	Baltimore.	
Predictably,	from	this	amnesic	viewpoint,	a	viewpoint	rarely	aware	of	its	own	status	as	a	
particular	position,	the	rioting	in	Baltimore	appeared	as	an	unwarranted	outbreak	of	
property	destruction.		
However,	the	rioters	and	protesters	refused	to	consent	to	the	mainstream	depiction	
of	the	riots	as	unjustified	and	apolitical.	The	rioters	indirectly	countered	the	media	
narratives	of	their	actions	by	acting	out	the	ideals	of	mainstream	America	to	expose	their	
insincerities,	and	protesters	and	rioters	directly	countered	these	depictions	by	producing	
their	own	narratives	of	the	uprising.	The	rioters’	actions	revealed	the	inconsistencies	
behind	such	Empty-Signifiers	as	“violence”	and	“looting”	and	“non-violence”	and	
“ownership.”	Reports	on	the	violence	and	looting	that	occurred	during	the	riots	began	to	
sound	rather	insincere	when	accompanied	by	counternarratives	that	exposed	systemic	
police-violence	and	the	realities	of	a	consumer-culture	predicated	on	impoverishment.			
By	acting	as	if	the	promises	of	American	citizenship,	as	if	principles	of	meritocracy	
and	respect	for	bodily	integrity,	actually	applied	to	their	own	lives	rioters	revealed	the	
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hypocrisy	of	these	supposedly	universal	rights.	They	uprooted	the	notion	that	white	
privilege	has	nothing	to	do	with	Black	dispossession,	that	violence	in	Black	communities	
stems	from	internal	issues,	and	that	the	strength	of	one’s	work	ethic	determines	one’s	
access	to	material	sustenance.	In	perversely	repeating	normative	patterns	of	consumer	
culture	and	assuming	the	right	to	bodily	integrity,	rioters	exposed	the	emptiness	of	these	
ideals.			
I	read	the	rioters’	looting	as	a	form	of	practical	(not	necessarily	intentional)	social	
protest.	These	acts	of	taking	perversely	realize	the	rules	of	consumer	culture.	Work,	
according	to	a	capitalist	ethic,	should	be	remunerated.	When	work	is	not	close	to	
adequately	waged	or	does	not	even	exist,	only	the	second	command	of	consumer	capitalism	
can	be	followed.	Consume.	The	rioters,	in	taking	what	society	had	promised	in	exchange	for	
labor,	disclosed	the	insincerity	of	the	ideal	of	the	self-made	man.	Disrupting	the	rules	of	
consumption	by	following	them,	the	rioters	exposed	the	falsity	of	the	idea	of	equal	access.	
They	agreed	to	live	by	the	ideal	of	equal	access	through	the	only	means	accessible	to	them,	
in	the	process	uncovering	the	hollowness	of	any	guarantee	of	equality	through	market	
forces.		
The	rioters’	destruction	of	property	brought	to	light	the	sickness	of	a	society	that	
refuses	to	differentiate	between	the	destruction	of	property	and	the	destruction	of	life.	
While	mainstream	news	sources	continued	to	label	the	damaging	of	property	“violence,”	
the	idea	that	property	damage	should	be	equated	with	violence	began	to	sound	less	
convincing	when	joined	by	stories	about	the	everyday	violence	experienced	by	Black	
Americans	at	the	hands	of	police	and	the	violence	of	neglect	and	appropriation	experienced	
at	the	hands	of	more	affluent	members	of	society.	Miriam,	a	Baltimorean	involved	in	the	
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post-riot	cleanup,	grappled	with	the	cruel	logic	of	valuing	property	over	life.	She	stated,	
“yes,	property	is	damaged,	but	that’s—I	feel	like	you	can	replace	property.	You	can’t	
replace	a	life”	(Maté	2015).	Versions	of	this	message	spread,	through	social	media,	during	
and	after	the	riots.	Perhaps,	even	people	previously	uncritical	of	the	equation	of	property	
damage	with	violence	have	begun	to	question	the	language	of	violence	used	to	describe	the	
riots,	to	puzzle	over	this	equation	of	human	life	with	property.	In	damaging	property,	
rioters	revealed	the	troubling	hierarchy	of	American	values—the	priority	of	protection	for	
property	over	the	viability	of	Black	lives.	
In	perversely	acting	in	accordance	with	American	ideals,	the	norms	of	wealth	
accumulation	and	consumption,	as	well	as	the	expectation	of	freedom	from	bodily	harm,	
the	rioters	made	visible	to	others	what	they	likely	knew	through	experience.	The	American	
promise	of	equal	rights,	fairly	compensated	work,	and	respect	for	bodily	integrity,	life,	and	
liberty	lives	only	as	a	fantasy,	supporting	a	system	that	operates	to	sustain	great	
inequalities	of	social	nourishment.	The	ideal	of	the	self-made	man,	the	individual	shorn	of	
all	dependency,	hides	a	system	in	which	the	dispossession	of	those	deemed	“other”	sustains	
an	illusion	of	self-sovereignty	for	the	privileged	few	who	are,	in	fact,	quite	dependent	on	
their	capacity	to	exploit.	In	attending	to	and	prying	open	the	crack	in	these	fantasies,	the	
incoherence	between	this	social	promise	and	their	own	reality,	the	rioters	produced	an	
excess,	an	unintelligible	demand	that	society	would	be	forced	to	attempt	to	decipher.	In	this	
manner,	their	actions,	their	enactment	of	discontent,	stimulated	a	change	in	the	Other.		
The	rioters	shifted	the	social	narrative	surrounding	their	communities	by	replaying	
American	ideals	from	their	own	position.	They	played	back	to	mainstream	America	what	
the	idealization	of	property	and	wealth	and	a	lack	of	concern	for	Black	lives	truly	looks	
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likes	from	the	streets	of	West	Baltimore.	As	one	man	involved	in	the	cleanup	stated	about	
the	positive	effects	of	the	riots,	“now	we	have	their	attention.	Now	there’s	a	state	of	
emergency…if	this	has	to	happen	for	them	to	get	a	clue,	then	it	has	to	happen”	(Maté	2015).		
“Acting	out”129	the	fantasy	of	the	American	Dream	from	the	streets	of	Baltimore,	the	
rioters	exposed	the	nightmarish	underside	of	this	fantasy,	its	basis	in	systemic	racial	
injustice.	The	rioters	proceeded	to	challenge	the	sanctity	of	the	Dream,	through	a	perverse	
repetition	of	this	Dream,	forcing	a	change	in	many	Americans’	perception	of	racial	injustice.	
As	in	analysis,	the	rioters’	repetition	of	failed	fantastic	investments	revealed	the	
inadequacies	of	many	ideals	to	which	American	society	has	become	attached	and	lessened	
the	force	of	these	ideals’	hold	over	the	American	imaginary.	The	rioters	worked	to	shift	the	
conditions	of	their	own	lives	as	subjects	invested	in	and	contributing	to	a	social	imaginary.	
It	is	precisely	this	ability	to	recreate	one’s	own	landscape	of	meaning	through	an	
attentiveness	to	and	deployment	of	disruption	that	characterizes	a	comportment	of	
receptive	autonomy.		
This	affirmation	of	dissent	as	a	means	of	social	critique	and	social	change,	insisted	
upon	by	some	Lacanians	and	embodied	in	the	actions	of	the	protesters,	follows	directly	
from	Freud’s	own	conclusions	regarding	social-political	life.	Freud	recognized	that	
widespread	discontent,	rather	than	being	a	rare	or	absolutely	undesirable	condition,	
formed	the	very	basis	of	modern	society.	He	most	famously	claimed	that	civilization	itself	
emerged	through	a	process	of	growing	discontent	and	resulting	compensatory	measures.	
He	found	that	through	various	psychic	mechanisms,	the	sublimation	of	libido,	the	
																																																																				
129	The	psychoanalytic	concept	of	“acting	out”	means	to	perform	an	action,	usually	considered	self-destructive	or	anti-
social,	as	a	way	to	express	(often	unconsciously)	frustration	with	a	past	or	present	relational	dynamic	(Freud	1914).	
Lacan	describes	acting	out	as	a	means	of	indirect	communication	with	the	Other	(Lacan	2014,	123-4).					
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establishment	of	aim-inhibited	erotic	bonds,	and	the	repression	of	natural	aggressive	
inclinations,	civilization	grew	both	more	magnificent	and	more	oppressive	(Freud	2010).	
Freud	never	suggested	that	the	movement	generated	in	discontent	would	be	inherently	
progressive	or	desirable.	Even	the	seemingly	benevolent	“commandment	to	love	one’s	
neighbor”	(2010,	145),	could	in	time,	Freud	warned,	put	too	much	strain	on	a	humankind’s	
natural	aggressive	tendencies.	While	Freud	recognized	the	value	of	the	moral	commands	of	
society,	he	always	insisted	upon	their	alienating	character	and	the	resulting	necessity	for	
their	revision.	Freud	recognized	the	beneficial	power	of	discontent,	of	remaining	abnormal	
or	ill	adjusted	in	a	society	replete	with	detrimental	and	destructive	moralities.		
This	emphasis	on	discontent,	on	remaining	restless	with	respect	to	a	damaging	
environment,	produces	a	productive	dissonance	that	can	manifest	as	an	impetus	for	social	
change.	An	ethical	comportment	of	autonomy,	made	possible	by	remaining	receptive	to	
feelings	of	alienation	discernible	in	the	self’s	relation	to	normative	existence,	encourages	
the	rejection	of	social	mores	and	the	creation	of	new	ways	of	being.130	This	readiness	to	
reject	the	given	normative	order	and	a	parallel	willingness	to	demand	something	more	has	
incited	and	sustained	countless	movements	against	racist,	gendered,	and	heteronormative	
systems	of	injustice.		
	
																																																																				
130	My	assertion	concerning	the	necessary	affirmation	of	disharmony	echoes	Ernst	Bloch’s	notion	of	hope.	Bloch	suggests	
that	hope,	by	nature,	does	not	make	peace	with	the	existing	world	and	thus	it	is	always	disappointed.	The	fact	that	hope	
never	rests	and	never	finds	peace	affirms	its	value	(Bloch	1998).	
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Creative	Maladjustment	
	
Martin	Luther	King	Jr.’s	notion	of	“creative	maladjustment”	helps	develop	my	theory	
of	receptive	autonomy	as	an	anti-adaptive	creative	comportment	inspired	by	an	awareness	
of	hypocrisy.	In	his	1967	address	to	the	American	Psychological	Association,	King	called	
upon	the	creative	power	of	the	“maladjusted”	to	challenge	racist	systems	of	injustice	that	
had	been	established	by	white	society.	In	his	speech,	he	acknowledged	the	importance	of	
the	social	sciences	to	the	Civil	Rights	Movement	as	a	means	to	interrogate	the	ways	Black	
lives	could	be	bettered,	but	criticized	the	adaptively	focused	analysis	proffered	by	
psychologists	as	a	way	of	pathologizing	Black	people	in	their	actions	of	protest.		
Insisting	on	the	reasonable	and	practical	nature	of	such	actions	of	dissent,	given	the	
context	of	their	emergence,	King	claimed	that	riots,	specifically,	rather	than	acts	of	random	
violence,	were	intended	“to	shock	the	white	community”	(1967,	1).	He	stated	that	in	these	
actions,	the	Black	American,	“knowing	that	this	society	cherishes	property	above	people…is	
shocking	it	by	abusing	property	rights”	(King	1967,	1).	While	calling	these	shocking	actions	
crimes,	yet	only	in	so	much	as	“they	are	born	of	the	greater	crimes	of	white	society”	(1967,	
1),	King	also	alluded	to	their	productive	character,	how	such	actions	called	attention	to	the	
plight	of	Black	Americans.		
King’s	notion	of	“shock”	resonates	with	the	Lacanian	claim	that	analytic	encounters	
produce	a	startling	excess	that	facilitates	the	self’s	rejection	and	reevaluation	of	dominant	
social	patterns.	Such	a	notion	of	shock	retains	immense	value	for	our	own	era’s	resistances	
to	racial	injustice.	The	Baltimore	riots	produced	a	shock	to	illusions	of	white	self-
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sovereignty	that	stand	upon	the	dispossession	of	Black	Americans.	It	was	precisely	the	
disruption	of	business	as	usual	in	Baltimore	that	revealed	the	fictitious	nature	of	white	
society’s	claim	to	self-determination.	The	actions	of	the	rioters,	broadcasted	across	the	
world	in	the	days	following	Gray’s	death,	revealed	the	justified	anger	and	pain	of	many	
citizens	in	West	Baltimore,	who	have	suffered	for	generations	under	racist	systems	of	
injustice.	While	the	disruptive	force	of	this	shock,	its	ability	to	greatly	shift	a	societal	
approach	toward	racial	injustice,	has	yet	to	be	determined,	the	socially	acceptable	
disavowal	of	such	systems	of	injustice	has	surely	been	irreparably	jeopardized	(Taylor	
2016).	
Kathleen	Stewart	discerns	how	events	that	disrupt,	shock,	or	unsettle,	but	do	not	
necessarily	overthrow	normative	social	codes,	still	perform	the	important	work	of	
lessening	these	social	codes’	hold	over	our	collective	imagination.	Stewart	describes	how	
acts	of	effective	political	resistance	need	not	display	a	goal-oriented	or	intentional	
character	nor	act	to	overturn	a	symbolic	universe	in	one	go.	Rather,	such	resistances	work	
incrementally	to	unsettle	and	unseat	the	American	Dream,	to	exposed	its	malevolent	
underside.	She	states:		
Imagine	"resistance"	not	as	a	thing	of	clear	consciousness	and	purposive,	
instrumental	agency	but	as	something	more	diffuse	and	pervasive	and	fundamental.	
Picture	it	as	that	pregnant	and	potentially	portentous	moment	of	chafing.	It	registers	
a	haunting;	it	approaches	what	Lacan	calls	the	Real,	or	that	which	resists	
assimilation	to	the	symbolic	order	(such	as	the	American	Dream).	It	interrupts	the	
dream….	It	may	disappear	literally	“before	you	know	it”	but	remain	an	affecting	
presence	left	in	traces	and	symptoms.	Like	a	blot	on	the	lens	of	a	camera,	it	may	
become	an	irritant	that	lodges	itself	in	the	matter	of	things.	In	the	nervous	dance	of	
cultural	politics,	the	Real	embeds	itself	in	forms	of	pleasure	and	pain;	it	leaves	
structures	of	feeling	in	its	wake—at	once	palpable	and	elusive	(Stewart	2000,	251).		
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The	enactment	of	discontent,	as	seen	in	the	riots,	forced	a	dissemination	of	
contingency	throughout	Baltimore,	a	tremor	that	has	unsettled	the	city	and	possibly	the	
American	imaginary—its	complacent	heedlessness	of	racial	injustice	and	its	faith	in	the	
good	health	of	its	ideals.	The	rioters	and	protesters,	the	dissidents	and	the	“maladjusted,”	
have	acted	to	reveal	the	ill-health,	the	malignance,	of	the	social	world	in	which	they	exist.	
In	the	conclusion	of	his	address,	King	affirmed	the	power	of	a	“pathological”	refusal	
to	adjust	to	a	racist	society,	designating	this	refusal	“creative	maladjustment”	(1967,	3).	
Wielding	their	own	term	“maladjusted”	against	those	psychologists	who	would	use	it	to	
malign	the	character	and	actions	of	the	Black	community,	King	insisted	on	the	beneficent	
nature	of	remaining	at	odds	with	a	society	intent	on	the	exploitation	of	its	Black	population.	
He	expressed	his	intention	to	challenge	the	norm	of	adjustment,	stating	to	his	largely	white	
audience:	
There	are	some	things	concerning	which	we	must	always	be	maladjusted	if	we	are	
to	be	people	of	good	will.	We	must	never	adjust	ourselves	to	racial	discrimination	
and	racial	segregation.	We	must	never	adjust	ourselves	to	religious	bigotry.	We	
must	never	adjust	ourselves	to	economic	conditions	that	take	necessities	from	the	
many	to	give	luxuries	to	the	few.	We	must	never	adjust	ourselves	to	the	madness	of	
militarism,	and	the	self-defeating	effects	of	physical	violence	(King	1967,	3).		
	
The	recent	uprising	in	Baltimore	expresses	this	mode	of	creative	maladjustment.	
The	rioters	and	protesters	refused	to	adapt	to	the	damaging	laws	of	a	racist	society	and	the	
stories	such	a	society	told	about	their	lives.	The	riots,	which	were	a	point	of	focus	for	global	
news	media	for	weeks,	produced	a	simmering	awareness	that	despite	American’s	
willingness	to	declare	the	end	of	race	and	racism,	such	a	declaration	of	equality	achieved	
and	injustice	rectified	remained	an	anathema	to	the	majority	of	Black	citizens	in	
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Baltimore.131	A	key	component	of	white	privilege—the	denial	of	dependence	upon	the	
impoverishment	and	incarceration	of	Black	Americans—had	been	exposed	in	a	profound	
way.	By	challenging	the	integrity	of	the	American	Dream,	by	revealing	its	inconsistencies	
and	hypocrisies,	and	in	shifting	the	discourse	surrounding	their	communities,	participants	
in	the	uprising	lived	a	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy;	they	created	space	for	a	new	
Dream,	a	new	nomos,	a	new	set	of	self-created	social	laws.			
	
The	Impossible	
	
The	Baltimore	riots	express	a	disruptive	creativity	characteristic	of	a	comportment	
of	receptive	autonomy,	a	comportment	that	aligns	with	several	tenants	of	Lacan’s	notion	of	
ethics.	As	I	explain	in	chapter	one,	rupture	is	central	to	Lacan’s	understanding	of	ethics.	For	
Lacan,	the	ethical	act	necessarily	unsettles	standard	social	discourse	and	creates	a	space	for	
the	unknown	and	the	impossible.	Lacan	contends	that	the	ethical	break	with	the	given,	as	it	
occurs	in	analysis,	“opens	a	path”	and	leaves	us	“at	the	threshold”	(1992,	21).	
Psychoanalysis	proscribes	no	cure	or	palliative,	but	offers	the	possibility	of	transformation	
by	revealing	the	presence	of	social	scripts	and	habits	that	influence	our	ways	of	being.		
Ethical	acts	merely	break	open	an	established	social	horizon,	creating	space	for	
something	unforeseen	and	unimaginable.	This	unpredictability	of	the	ethical	act	attests	to	
the	danger	of	the	act—that	the	actor	refuses	to	promise	some	good	end	or	aim.	This	
volatility,	however,	is	precisely	what	marks	the	act	as	autonomous,	as	free	from	the	
																																																																				
131	Keeanga-Yamahatta	Taylor	notes	that,	despite	the	current	terror	and	violence	faced	by	Black	communities	at	the	hands	
of	the	state	and	mainstream	society,	“the	United	States	is	often	referred	to	these	days	as	a	‘colorblind’	or	‘postracial”	
society”	(2016,	4).	
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constraints	of	the	conceivable.	Describing	the	anti-adaptive	and	creative	character	of	
Lacan’s	notion	of	ethics,	Paul	Allen	Miller	states	that,	in	uprooting	the	bounds	of	the	
possible,	ethical	acts	express	“an	ethics	of	creation	as	opposed	to	conformity”	(2007a,	1).	
Frantz	Fanon	describes	his	struggle	to	usher	in	a	new	world	for	Black	humanity	in	similar	
terms.	Fanon	expresses	his	willingness	to	“risk	annihilation	so	that	two	or	three	truths	can	
cast	their	essential	light	on	the	world,”	truths	that	would	affirm	the	humanity	of	“the	black	
man”	(1967,	202).	Conveying	the	inventive	and	ardent	nature	his	revelatory	struggle,	
Fanon	asserts	“I	am	not	a	prisoner	of	History.	I	must	not	look	for	the	meaning	of	my	destiny	
in	that	direction.	I	must	constantly	remind	myself	that	the	real	leap	consists	of	introducing	
invention	into	life.	In	the	world	I	am	heading	for,	I	am	endlessly	creating	myself”	(Fanon	
1967,	204).	Fanon	expresses	an	ethos	of	struggle,	a	mode	of	obdurate	and	creative	
rebellion,	redolent	of	the	spirit	of	Lacanian	ethics.	In	the	interest	of	continual	self/world	
creation,	the	ethical	act	disregards	the	possible	and	instantiates	a	space	for	the	impossible.		
The	Baltimore	rioters	acted	ethically	in	refusing	to	play	along	with	the	narrative	that	
committing	to	hard	work	and	abiding	by	the	values	of	independence	and	self-
determination	would	ensure	them	an	equal	place	in	American	society.	In	rejecting	this	
fiction	and	declining	to	act	only	through	“respectable”	(normatively	sanctioned)	political	
channels	(voting,	policy	reformation,	etc.),	rioters	turned	away	from	the	politically	
possible,132	disentangling	themselves	from	social	laws	they	had	little	to	no	part	in	writing.	
The	rioters’	actions	opened	a	space	of	potentiality,	a	space	for	a	new	way	of	conceiving	of	
and	realizing	social	change.			
																																																																				
132	Lester	Spence	notes	that	“Baltimore	citizens	have	been	organizing	for	decades	for	better	police	policies	at	the	local	and	
state	level,	for	more	resources	to	combat	poverty	and	against	drug-related	violence—with	their	pleas	falling	on	deaf	ears,	
their	policy	proposals	consistently	ignored	by	political	officials”	(2015).		
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This	space	of	potentiality,	as	psychoanalysis	cautions,	may	not	always	lead	to	an	
improvement	in	peoples’	lives.	Baltimore	has	a	long	history	of	riots	instigated	by	racial	
injustice,	including	an	uprising	in	1968	that	broke	out	in	response	to	King’s	assassination	
only	months	after	his	address	to	the	A.P.A.	(Lewis	2015).	I	contend	that	the	riots	of	1968	
and	the	riots	of	2015	express	a	common	refusal	to	adjust	to	an	unjust	society.	However,	I	
am	not	suggesting	that	these	riots	lack	historical	particularity,	that	they	or	their	respective	
consequences	can	be	easily	equated	with	one	another.	In	fact,	some	historians	suggest	that	
the	riots	of	1968	had	a	mostly	negative	effect	on	the	lives	of	Black	Baltimoreans,	because	
they	contributed	to	mainstream	American	fears	about	inner-city	crime	that	bolstered	the	
rise	of	the	New	Right	(Elfenbein	et	al.	2011).	This	is	not	to	imply	that	the	1968	riots	did	not	
have	an	important	and	galvanizing	symbolic	effect	for	the	fight	against	anti-Black	racism.	
However,	the	uncertain	legacy	of	1968	does	point	to	the	unknowable	quality	of	the	
outcomes	of	disruptive	actions	of	refusal.	The	fact	that	such	actions	guarantee	no	certain	
end	or	outcome	is	the	basis	of	both	their	visionary	and	dangerous	nature.		
Lacanian	psychoanalysis’s	understanding	of	the	analytic	encounter	and	King’s	
notion	of	“creative	maladjustment”	capture	the	significance	of	the	West	Baltimore	uprising	
as	a	momentary	instantiation	of	an	ethics	of	refusal.	Negation	and	dissent	form	the	central	
ethical	factor	in	both	accounts.	Yet,	the	creative	element	of	the	rioters’	actions	cannot	be	
adequately	explained	by	a	theory	primarily	appreciative	of	dissent	and	anti-adaptation.	
While	King	alludes	to	“creativity,”	his	notion	of	“creative	maladjustment”	remains	open	for	
further	development.	Lacanian	ethics	edges	closer	to	an	understanding	of	the	potentially	
productive	outcomes	of	dissent	by	attending	to	the	self-disruptive	nature	of	ethical	action,	
to	the	fact	that	ethical	acts	break	with	what	is	and	create	space	for	something	unforeseen.	
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However,	as	the	aftermath	of	the	riots	shows,	neither	King’s	notion	of	creative	
maladjustment,	as	a	posture	of	refusal,	nor	Lacanian	ethic’s	emphasis	on	disruption,	can	
satisfactorily	account	for	the	forceful	counternarratives	produced	by	the	rioters.	The	rioters	
and	protesters	did	not	just	disrupt	standard	social	narratives;	they	wrote	new	ones.		
The	rioters	and	protesters	provided	counternarratives	to	the	media’s	accounts	of	
their	struggles	and	of	life	in	their	communities.	As	Cover	explains,	the	creation	and	
dissemination	of	counternarratives,	the	creation	of	a	new	world	of	meaning,	expresses	
autonomy.	He	states	“when	groups	generate	their	own	articulate	normative	orders	
concerning	the	world	as	they	transform	it,	as	well	as	the	mode	of	transformation	and	their	
own	place	within	the	world…a	new	nomos,	with	its	attendant	claims	to	autonomy	and	
respect,	is	created”	(Cover	1983,	34).	By	rejecting	given	social	laws	and	creating	new	laws,	
protesters	and	rioters	began	to	write	a	new	world	into	existence.			
Rioters	declined	to	merely	choose	from	a	selection	of	socially	acceptable	ways	to	
grieve,	express	anger,	and	engage	in	political	protest.	Many	refused	the	very	terms	of	such	a	
negotiation,	and	instead	contributed	to	the	creation	of	original	modes	of	political	action.	
Through	the	use	of	social	media,	through	Twitter,	Instagram,	and	Facebook,	Baltimoreans	
contradicted	the	media’s	depiction	of	the	riots	as	self-destructive	and	violent	and	acted	to	
raise	awareness	about	police	violence	against	Black	Americans.	
In	blog-based	interviews,	several	participants	in	the	riots	and	in	the	broader	
uprising	expressed	views	significantly	contrary	to	mainstream	media	accounts.	One	man	
joked	about	the	idea	of	looting	toilet	paper:	“I	saw	my	people	out	here	gettin’	toilet	paper.	
Toilet	Paper.	Because	they	need	toilet	paper	to	wipe	their	ass,	to	wipe	their	kid’s	ass.	You	
gon’	send	em	to	jail	over	toilet	paper?”	(Hazzard	2015).	He	spoke	of	the	context	of	the	
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looting,	its	roots	in	economic	deprivation,	presenting	a	counter	to	the	media’s	construal	of	
the	looting	as	opportunistic	and	unwarranted	and	the	rioters	as	uneducated	and	naïve.	As	
journalist	Dominique	Hazzard	points	out,	the	notion	that	the	riots	were	self-destructive	
seemed	completely	out	of	place	as	well.	She	recalls,	“Folks	straight	up	told	me,	‘we	don’t	
own	anything	here,’	and	it	was	crystal	clear	to	me	that	the	communities	had	already	been	
destroyed	by	poverty,	by	exploitation,	by	structural	racism	long	before	any	riots	connected	
to	the	murder	of	Freddie	Gray”	(2015).	In	addition	to	the	impressions	given	in	these	
interviews	during	the	uprising,	numerous	participants	expressed	similar	views	in	a	
collection	of	tweets	published	following	the	riots.		
The	zine,	The	2015	Baltimore	Uprising:	A	Teen	Epistolary,	contains	a	compilation	of	
tweets	from	Baltimore	teenagers	during	the	days	following	the	revelation	of	Freddie	Gray’s	
death.	The	thoughts	expressed	in	the	anthology	differ	in	their	assessments	of	the	reasons	
for	and	the	implications	of	Gray’s	death	and	the	ensuing	uprising,	but	many	emphasize	the	
political	importance	and	self-affirmative	nature	of	the	looting	and	rioting.	Writing	in	
opposition	to	the	portrayal	of	the	riots	as	“embarrassing”	or	counterproductive	for	the	
Black	community,	many	declared	the	need	for	what	they	variously	referred	to	as	“the	
uprising,”	“the	purge,”	or	“the	riot.”	One	woman	writes,	“let	them	ppl	protest	how	they	
please,	fuck	being	embarrassing,	it’s	about	getting	the	point	across	#NoJusticeNoPeace,”	
another	“For	2	weeks	we	have	held	peaceful	protest	still	no	answers!	remember	that.”	The	
news	media’s	portrayal	of	the	rioters’	actions	as	frightening	or	unwarranted	was	countered	
by	statements	like	“Being	an	African	American	in	America	is	scary!”	and	“If	you	from	
Baltimore	you	know	the	city	been	a	Volcano	waiting	to	erupt	for	a	while	now.”	In	response	
to	accusations	that	the	riot	was	ruining	the	city:	“RUIN	Baltimore???	Bitch	have	you	SEEN	
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the	city?????”	In	addition	to	offering	a	correction	to	the	media’s	misleading	coverage	of	the	
events	and	their	significance,	the	compilation	of	tweets	shows	that	citizens	used	Twitter	to	
share	news,	express	political	opinions,	and	check	in	on	one	another	during	the	riots.		
The	role	of	social	media	in	the	rioters’	creation	of	novel	forms	of	political	
engagement	extends	to	their	advancement	of	the	movement	Black	Lives	Matter.	This	
political	movement	was	created	following	the	acquittal	of	the	neighborhood	watch	
coordinator	responsible	for	the	shooting	death	of	Trayvon	Martin,	an	unarmed	Black	
teenager.	The	founders	of	Black	Lives	Matter,	Alicia	Garza,	Patrisse	Cullors,	and	Opal	
Tometi,	describe	the	movement	as	“an	ideological	and	political	intervention	in	a	world	
where	Black	lives	are	systematically	and	intentionally	targeted	for	demise.	It	is	an	
affirmation	of	Black	folks’	contributions	to	this	society,	our	humanity,	and	our	resilience	in	
the	face	of	deadly	oppression”	(#BlackLivesMatter	2015).	While	the	movement	began	with	
the	widespread	use	of	the	hashtag	#BlackLivesMatter	on	social	media,	it	has	expanded	to	
include	rallies,	teach-ins,	protests,	and	actions	to	raise	awareness	and	fight	against	anti-
Black	racism.	The	creators	of	Black	Lives	Matter	publicly	expressed	their	support	for	the	
uprising	in	Baltimore,	and	the	riots	themselves	brought	the	movement	more	public	
exposure	and	likely	more	supporters	(Workneh	2015).	
The	Baltimore	protesters	and	rioters’	political	use	of	social	media	during	and	after	
the	riots,	attests	to	the	creative	possibilities	that	ethical	acts	of	refusal	can	engender.	In	this	
framing,	one	perceives	how	the	rioters	inhabited	a	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy;	
they	acted	to	reject	rather	than	adapt	to	the	bounds	of	the	given	while	instantiating	a	new	
form	of	political	participation.	Through	the	reframing	of	their	actions	and	the	
dissemination	of	the	reality	of	the	conditions	in	West	Baltimore,	the	rioters	interrupted	the	
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societal	quietude	around	issues	of	structural	racism.	They	rewrote	the	terms	of	their	
existence.	
The	situation	in	Baltimore	testifies	to	the	political	and	ethical	worth	of	questioning	
normative	depictions	of	the	pathological	and	of	considering	actors	deemed	maladjusted	as	
symptomatic	of	a	pathological	social	system.133,	134	As	Lacanian	ethics	suggests,	such	actors	
might	indeed	be	ethically	deviating	from	the	norms	of	an	ailing	society	in	the	interest	of	
transforming	the	very	conditions	of	their	lives	within	it.	This	view	of	social	change	upends	
a	therapeutic	personal	approach	to	social	transformation,	an	approach	that	hails	from	the	
same	traditions	as	the	American	ego	psychology	that	Lacan	decried	as	conservative	and	
conformist.	Such	an	adaptively	focused	view,	often	expressed	in	a	“get	a	job”	ethos	or	in	a	
cultural	celebration	of	self-improvement,	places	the	onus	for	social	change	on	the	backs	of	
individuals,	while	insisting	upon	the	potential	harmony	between	the	self	and	its	social	
world.		
As	Lauren	Berlant	explains,	this	ideal	of	self-improvement	(improving	one’s	
suitability	for	one’s	social	environment)	follows	from	liberal	presuppositions.	Self-help	
culture	aligns	with	“liberal	political	culture,”	which	“posits	individual	autonomy	and	self-
development	at	the	center	of	value	in	social	life”	(Berlant	2012,	109).	Self-help	societies	
“implicitly	suggest	that	structures	and	institutions	of	power	can	always	be	overcome	by	
personal	feelings,	personal	choices”	(Berlant	2012,	108).	Berlant	contends	that	such	
																																																																				
133	The	famous	“Moynihan	Report”	(1965),	which	attributed	Black	poverty	to	a	“tangle	of	pathology”	based	in	the	
matriarchal	structure	of	some	black	families,	expresses	the	common	understanding	of	pathology	as	a	“maladaptive”	
response	to	given	social	conditions.	In	contrast,	the	notion	of	pathology	I	derive	from	King	and	Lacan	suggests	that	the	
maladapted	might	be	responding	in	a	productive	way	to	morbid	social	conditions.		
	
134	N.D.B	Connolly	highlights	the	fact	that	pathologizing	explanations	of	Black	poverty	align	with	racialized	explanations	of	
social	unrest.	He	discusses	this	directly	in	reference	to	the	Baltimore	uprising	(Connolly	2015).		
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societies	seek	to	overcome	difference	by	appealing	to	a	sameness	of	feeling.	She	explains	
that	“Romantic	ideology	participates	in	this	project	by	depicting	sentiment	or	feeling	as	the	
essential	and	universal	truth	of	persons.	Feeling	is	what	people	have	in	common	despite	
their	apparent	differences”	(Berlant	2012,	110).	This	same	culture,	as	Martinot	and	Sexton	
claim,	sees	individual	“improvement”	as	the	means	to	end	racial	injustice.	They	note	that	a	
“liberal	ethos	looks	at	racism	as	ignorance,	something	characteristic	of	the	individual	that	
can	be	solved	at	a	social	level	through	education	and	democratic	procedure”	(Martinot	and	
Sexton	2003,	178).	An	idealization	of	democratically	reached	consensus	matched	with	
individual	responsibility	results	in	a	strategy	of	social	adaptation	and	adjustment.	
Accordingly,	appeals	to	individual	reform	and	compromise	across	difference	tend	to	result	
in	only	miniscule	and	compensatory	modifications	to	systems	of	injustice.		
The	power	of	maladjustment	to	evoke	change	attests	to	psychoanalysis’s	claim	that	
adaptation	and	the	pursuit	of	social	consensus	and	harmony,	rather	than	being	the	grounds	
for	ethical	life,	bar	the	actualization	of	ethical	comportment.	As	Lacan	and	Lacanians	
suggest,	ethics	entails	forcing	a	change	in	the	Other,	at	the	points	where	the	self	feels	most	
estranged	from	its	world.	Copjec	suggests	that	ethics	means	breaking	with	the	collectively	
intelligible	to	such	a	degree	that	the	community	is	shaken	and	possibly	destroyed.	
Referring	to	Antigone’s	ethical	act	of	burying	her	enemy-of-the	state	brother,	Copjec	
explains	how	an	approach	of	compromise	and	accommodation	is	the	antithesis	of	
psychoanalytic	ethics.	She	states,	“it	will	not	be	for	Lacan	a	matter	of	setting	another	place	
at	the	table,	of	making	room	for	the	one	brother	who	was	formerly	excluded	from	the	
community,	but	of	destroying	the	community	in	the	name	of	what	is	impossible	in	it”	
(Copjec	2002,	41).	In	this	sense,	ethics	requires	the	destruction	of	what	is,	in	the	interest	of	
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the	socially	impossible.	The	Baltimore	dissidents	declined	to	accept	a	compensatory	seat	at	
the	symbolic	table	of	public	policy	formulation	(as	if	this	was	ever	even	guaranteed	to	
them),	and	instead	acted	to	destroy	the	integrity	of	the	ideological	supports	upon	which	
this	institutional	form	of	politics	rests.	The	rioters’	actions	demonstrate	the	potential	for	an	
ethics	of	refusal,	disruption,	and	destruction,	over	an	ethics	of	adaptation	and	
accommodation	to	facilitate	radical	social	change.	Yet,	the	force	required	to	produce	such	a	
societal	shift	necessarily	disrupts,	often	violently,	the	lives	of	those	engaged	in	social	
upheaval.		
The	mainstream	media	narrative	certainly	underscored	the	“self-destructive”	nature	
of	the	riots.	However,	the	media	failed	to	bring	to	light	the	deeper	meaning	behind,	and	the	
implications	of,	such	“self-destructive”	acts.	Lacan’s	notion	of	ethics	provides	a	way	of	
reading	what	could	be	considered	self-harm	as	a	necessary	corollary	of	true	ethical	action.	
Much	of	the	American	public	was	eventually	willing	to	admit	that	the	riots	positively	drew	
attention	to	the	plight	of	West	Baltimore	(Johnston	2015).	Yet,	almost	no	one	in	
mainstream	media	attempted	to	defend	or	to	even	consider	the	value	of	the	rioters’	
destruction	of	pharmacies	and	stores	in	their	own	communities.	Public	figures	hurried	to	
condemn	the	looting	of	stores,	burning	of	buildings,	and	smashing	of	windows.	Mayor	
Stephanie	Rawlings-Blake	called	the	actions	unwarranted	and	self-destructive,	claiming,	“I	
understand	anger,	but	what	we're	seeing	isn't	anger…	It's	disruption	of	a	community.	The	
same	community	they	say	they	care	about,	they're	destroying…”	(Myers	and	Foreman	
2015).	Cornell	William	Brooks,	president	of	the	NAACP,	called	for	an	end	to	the	rioting,	
declaring:	“burning	businesses	and	homes	and	buildings	in	your	own	community	is	like	
putting	a	gun	to	your	own	head”	(Gorman	2015).	While	some	did	defend	the	destructive	
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actions	as	productive	in	raising	awareness,	few	appeared	to	disagree	with	the	claim	that	
the	rioters	were	guilty	of	self-harm.	On	this	point,	these	criticisms	correctly	recognize	the	
nature	of	the	rioters’	actions	as	seen	from	a	particular	position.	The	riots	damaged	local	
small	businesses,	destroyed	needed	pharmacies,	and	temporarily	increased	the	crime-rate	
in	the	area	(Anderson	2015).	How	then	could	one	ever	defend	the	rioters’	actions	as	ethical	
or	productive?		
In	Lacan’s	account,	the	truly	ethical	act	possesses	a	self-disintegrative	quality	
(1992).135	This	rupture	with	self-interest,	with	the	self	normatively	defined	by	a	concern	
for	life,	safety,	and	shelter,	entails	a	break	with	the	terms	that	define	human	interest	in	
society.	In	allowing	a	breaking	away	from	normative	self-interest,	the	ethical	act	enables	a	
position	of	autonomy,	a	position	undetermined	by	an	interest	in	the	socially	possible.	While	
this	break	with	social	accords	is	perilous,	it	affords	the	opportunity	for	the	creation	of	new	
ways	of	engaging	in	social-political	relations.	
Because	it	defies	what	is,	the	act	appears	as	a	crime,	as	senseless,	and	as	self-
destructive.	The	act	is	“always	a	crime,	a	transgression—of	the	limits	of	the	symbolic	
community	to	which	I	belong”	(Zupančič	2000,	83).	The	truly	ethical	act,	which	Zupančič	
describes	as	“the	impossible	that	happens,”	(2000,	79),	might	appear	as	“evil”	to	those	
belonging	to	the	symbolic	community.	However,	“there	is	nothing	‘evil’	in	the	impossible;	
the	question	is	how	we	perceive	its	often	shattering	effect”	(Zupančič	2000,	79).	The	riots’	
disruptive	actions	did	appear	as	criminal	and	immoral	to	many.	Yet,	the	rioters,	in	their	
																																																																				
135	In	The	Psychic	Life	of	Power,	Judith	Butler	notes	that	attachment	to	submission	before	the	law	forms	the	subject	as	
such.	Thus,	she	too	suggests	that	a	certain	de-subjectivization—a	“willingness	not	to	be”—might	be	required	“to	expose	
the	law	as	less	powerful	than	it	seems”	(Butler	1997,	130).	In	this,	she	recognizes	the	link	between	risking	the	social	self	
and	the	enablement	of	critical	political	practices.	
	
	
222	
	
seemingly	unproductive	demolition	of	their	already	marginal	social	survivability,	have	
actually	expressed	a	willingness	to	face	the	risks	entailed	in	an	act	that	has	facilitated	their	
ability	to	autonomously	refigure	the	grounds	of	their	social	existence.			
The	rioters,	now	understood	as	ethical	and	agential,	might	still	be	understood	as	
determined	or	as	collectively	or	communally	agential.	This	understanding	of	the	riots,	
however,	stems	from	a	misunderstanding	of	autonomy	as	an	individual	state,	a	state-of-
being	free	from	otherness,	rather	than	as	a	comportment	(not	bound	within	the	individual)	
of	creative	capacity,	free	from	normative	social	constraints.	While	the	participants	did	not	
gain	access	to	a	state	of	freedom	from	the	influence	of	others,	their	refusal	to	follow	the	
incitement	to	adjust	created	a	space	of	creative	agency,	where	entirely	novel	forms	of	
sociality	and	justice	might	develop.		
In	breaking	with	the	given,	an	inherently	destructive	process	as	shown	in	the	
Lacanian	account	of	the	ethical	act,	the	rioters	moved	beyond	the	capacity	to	just	choose	
from	among	the	socially	acceptable	options	set	before	them.	Their	creative	actions	took	
place	in	a	context	of	rebirth,	a	place	where	they	had	removed	themselves	from	social	roles	
and	expectations,	even	to	the	point	of	endangering	their	social	integrity.	Action	taken	from	
this	space	beyond	circumscription	by	the	normatively	“possible”	indicates	agency,	yes,	but	
more	importantly,	it	points	to	an	agency	freed	from	the	restraints	of	what	has	been	deemed	
socially	feasible.	
Agency,	defined	as	the	ability	to	act,	does	not	necessarily	entail	the	ability	to	act	in	a	
manner	that	disregards	the	social	determinates	that	seek	to	limit	the	possibilities	of	action.	
The	rioters	reached	past	the	realm	of	actions	seen	as	possible.	They	refused	to	adjust	to	the	
standards	of	the	thinkable.	Their	radical	“No”	epitomizes	what	I	have	described	as	a	
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comportment	of	receptive	autonomy.	This	“No”	does	not	ensure	that	a	certain	path	or	
moral	stance	will	be	taken	individually	or	collectively.	Rather,	it	opens	up	the	possibility	of	
configuring	the	self	and	the	social	in	ways	radically	different	from	everything	previously	
thought	possible.	The	rioters	varied	in	their	goals,	in	their	reasons	for	participating,	and	in	
their	actions	and	attitudes.	Rather	than	a	uniform	adherence	to	a	guiding	principle	or	moral	
aim,	the	rioters	shared	only	their	enactment	of	refusal	in	a	context	of	collective	action.		
Critique,	sometimes	leading	to	a	refusal,	and	an	openness	to	relationality	
characterizes	the	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy	that	I	suggest	offers	an	ethical-
political	corrective	to	the	liberal	notion	of	autonomy	as	self-reliance	and	rational	social	
adaptation.	The	very	realization	that	masterful	self-sovereignty	is	an	unattainable	and	
detrimental	ideal	enables	those	who	ultimately	recognize	this	ideal	of	mastery	as	a	lie	to	
enter	into	a	receptive	autonomous	comportment.	The	ideal	of	the	self-made	man,	the	
individual	shorn	of	all	dependency,	hides	a	system	in	which	the	dispossession	of	those	
deemed	“other”	sustains	an	illusion	of	self-sovereignty	for	the	privileged	few	who	are,	in	
fact,	quite	dependent	on	their	capacity	to	exploit.		
The	rallying	cry	of	the	uprising,	“No	justice,	no	peace!”,	serves	as	a	testament	to	the	
resoluteness	of	the	developing	movement,	its	refusal	to	give	in	to	“the	way	things	are.”	The	
hazards	of	continuing	to	live	under	an	unjust	criminal	justice	system,	under	the	laws	of	a	
society	predicated	on	the	appropriation	of	Black	labor,	and	under	a	system	designed	to	
perpetuate	and	deepen	racial	inequality	appear	to	outweigh	the	risks	associated	with	civil	
unrest	as	a	means	of	social	protest.	The	rioters’	disruptive	acts	of	refusal	have	forced	
privileged	Americans	to	face	insecurity	and	to	question	the	great	social	costs	of	continuing	
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to	deny	the	unequal	distribution	of	insecurity	in	American	society.136	While	the	long-term	
effects	of	the	riots	and	their	potential	to	lead	to	significant	social	transformation	remain	to	
be	seen,	it	seems	expedient	to	consider	what	might	help	to	translate	these	acts	of	protest	
into	acts	of	political	change.	I	suggest	that	this	consideration	should	take	place	with	an	eye	
to	the	affective	dimensions	of	the	ethical	act	and	the	responses	it	provokes.		
	
The	Force	of	Love	
	
In	chapter	two,	I	clarify	the	central	importance	of	love	for	autonomous	
comportment.	I	argue	that	love	supports	autonomous	capacity	by	producing	a	sense	of	
excess,	a	sense	that	habituated	modes	of	being	might	be	inadequate	for	the	kind	of	ethos	
we	wish	to	express	toward	otherness.	Again,	in	this	chapter,	I	note	the	importance	of	love’s	
tendency	to	arouse	a	sense	of	excess.	Love’s	disruptiveness	calls	us	to	attend	to	that	within	
and	around	us	that	resists	capture	by	common	sense	or	conventional	logic.	In	this	
attentiveness,	we	become	aware	of	the	presence	of	the	inhuman	in	ourselves	and	in	others.	
137	In	love,	a	heightened	sense	of	both	lack	and	longing	compels	a	rejection	of	what	is	and	
the	desire	to	create	something	new.		
																																																																				
136	Juliet	Hooker	similarly	suggests	that	the	most	marginalized	Americans	have	been	expected	to	perform	the	greatest	
sacrifices	on	behalf	of	democratic	society.	Hooker	discusses	the	problematic	implications	of	conceiving	of	Black	political	
action	as	a	form	of	democratic	sacrifice.	She	suggests	that	such	a	framework	of	sacrifice,	often	invoked	to	explain	the	Civil	
Rights	Movement,	leads	to	the	“expectation	that	it	is	those	who	have	been	the	victims	of	racism	that	should	do	the	work	of	
democratic	repair,	that	they	should	make	further	sacrifices	on	behalf	of	the	polity”	(2016,	9).	Hooker	suggests	an	
alternative	framing	of	Black	politics	that	would	foreground	“instances	of	rioting	as	a	form	of	democratic	redress	for	black	
citizens…”	(2016,	17).	
	
137	Karen	Barad	portrays	the	ethical	implications	of	listening	to	and	touching	the	inhuman	within	and	around	us.	She	
states,	“what	if	it	is	only	in	facing	the	inhuman—the	indeterminate	non/being	non/becoming	of	mat-tering	and	not	
mattering—that	an	ethics	committed	to	the	rupture	of	indifference	can	arise?	What	if	it	is	only	in	the	encounter	with	the	
inhu-man—the	liminality	of	no/thingness—in	all	its	liveliness,	its	conditions	of	im/possibility,	that	we	can	truly	confront	
our	inhumanity,	that	is,	our	actions	lacking	compassion?	Perhaps	it	takes	facing	the	inhuman	within	us	before	com-
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I	will	show	how	love,	because	it	brings	about	an	attunement	to	disruption,	facilitates	
a	critical	and	creative	form	of	self-comportment.	This	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy	
has	appeared,	in	this	chapter,	in	my	interpretation	of	the	actions	of	the	Baltimore	rioters.	In	
the	following	section,	I	will	outline	how	the	rioters,	in	facing	the	risk	entailed	in	their	
actions,	have	conveyed	an	openness	that	expresses	love	and	through	love	how	some	
dissidents	have	expressed	a	sense	of	self-affirmation,	an	affirmation	of	self	dependent	upon	
a	responsiveness	to,	rather	than	a	rejection	of,	otherness.			
Joan	Copjec’s	account	of	the	subject’s	emergence	in	narcissism	elucidates	how	
embracing	self-rupture	and	opening	to	otherness	demonstrates	a	loving	exaltation	of	the	
self.	Copjec	begins	her	reading	of	Freud’s	essay	“On	Narcissism,”	by	noting	Freud’s	
distinction	between	autoeroticism	and	primary	narcissism.	In	its	initial	autoerotic	state,	the	
self	as	such,	does	not	yet	exist.	Originally	in	a	state	of	undifferentiated	sensations,	in	a	
condition	of	pure	pleasurable	diffusion,	the	infant-organism	is	not	yet	differentiated	from	
her	environment.	Some	action	must	occur	before	she	can	realize	her	position	as	an	entity	
distinct	from	an	unbounded	field	of	pleasure—a	field	with	no	outside	and	no	inside.	A	
certain	movement	must	take	place	before	the	infant	realizes	a	difference	between	her	own	
being	and	the	world	(Freud	1957).			
In	Copjec’s	view,	it	is	sublimation	that	introduces	the	infant	to	otherness,	to	the	
distinction	between	self	and	world,	between	self	and	other.	Sublimation,	as	the	process	that	
shifts	the	drive’s	aim	away	from	undifferentiated	pleasure	to	something	in	the	external	
world,	induces	the	move	from	autoeroticism	to	narcissism.	Only	after	sublimation	has	
																																																																				
passion—suffering	together	with,	participating	with,	feel-ing	with,	being	moved	by—can	be	lived.	How	would	we	feel	if	it	
is	by	way	of	the	inhuman	that	we	come	to	feel,	to	care,	to	respond?”	(2012b,	216).		
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occurred	can	there	be	a	“self,”	an	ego	that	can	then	become	the	focus	for	self-love	
(narcissism).	The	move	from	autoeroticism	to	narcissism,	that	is,	from	a	pre-self	to	an	
awareness	of	the	self	as	something	to	be	loved,	requires	sublimation,	a	redirection	of	the	
self-shattering	jouissance	that	sustains	the	undifferentiated	field	of	sensation	prior	to	the	
emergence	of	the	self.		
Copjec	draws	this	concept	of	self-shattering	jouissance	from	the	work	of	Leo	
Bersani,	who	suggests	that	all	sensations	that	overwhelm	the	self	pertain	to	sexuality	and	
thus	to	pleasure	(Copjec	2002,	58).	The	overwhelming	experience	of	existing	in	a	state	of	
oneness	with	one’s	surroundings	qualifies	as	a	sexual	experience	of	excitement	and	
stimulation	(Bersani	1986,	35-39).	Because	such	a	state	is	pleasurable,	the	organism	does	
not	readily	cease	its	continual	evasion	of	selfhood;	it	lingers	in	a	state	of	self-shattering,	
compelled	to	stave	off	a	cessation	of	this	pleasurable	experience.	The	disruption	of	this	
process	would	be	the	only	means	by	which	a	self	could	emerge	from	this	undifferentiated	
field	of	pleasure.				
Something	must	step	in	to	interrupt	and	cause	a	redirection	of	the	pleasurable	
disintegration	of	the	pre-self.	This	redirection	requires	an	act	of	sublimation—a	redirection	
of	the	drive	away	from	its	original	aim,	which	is	to	prevent	the	emergence	of	the	self	in	
order	to	retain	the	pleasurable	feeling	of	the	undifferentiated	state.	The	question	is	what	
causes	this	sublimation?		
The	self	emerges	precisely	through	love	as	an	act	of	sublimation,	through	the	
introduction	of	another	whom	I	can	love.	Copjec	clarifies	that	the	self	arises	“from	the	
shattering	jouissance	one	experiences	in	loving	another”	(2002,	66).	The	redirection	of	self-
shattering	that	allows	the	self	to	become	an	object	of	love	occurs	in	the	introduction	of	
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responsive	otherness.	In	other	words,	“‘I’	is	a	‘passionate	inference’…	an	experience	of	the	
body	that	comes	from	the	libidinal	cathexis138	of	objects.”(Copjec	2002,	66).	In	
encountering	a	responsive	form	of	otherness,	a	form	of	otherness	that	interrupts	the	
organism’s	oneness	with	the	world,	the	organism	redirects	its	libidinal	search	for	pleasure	
to	this	otherness,	to	this	something	now	experienced	as	outside	of	itself.	Through	this	
redirection	of	libido	to	another,	the	cycle	of	self-shattering	is	interrupted	and	the	self	
surfaces.	The	self	now	exists	as	an	object	of	its	own	love	(as	in	the	narcissism	common	to	all	
psychic	subjects)	and	as	a	subject	capable	of	loving	another.		
Loving	and	wanting	to	be	loved	remain	tied	together	from	the	very	start.	Without	a	
libidinal	investment	in	otherness,	the	self	would	not	exist.139	Copjec	explains	how	self-love	
emerges	only	in	coincidence	with	other-love	by	reading	into	Freud’s	assertion	that	
especially	beautiful	women	commonly	express	only	narcissistic	love,	that	they	desire	only	
to	be	loved	and	not	to	love	others.	Because	there	can	be	no	self,	no	“I”	before	a	love	of	
another,	narcissism,	or	self-love	must	coincide	with	love	for	the	other.	Women’s	alleged	
narcissism,	“their	wanting	to	be	loved	…is	not	opposed	to	loving,	but	is	expressible	only	
through	loving.	To	love	is	to	want	to	be	loved;	love	is	always	narcissistic”	(Copjec	2002,	66).	
This	is	why,	Copjec	asserts,	“...it	is	now	possible	to	see	that	the	woman…is	the	subject	par	
excellence.	For	it	is	the	subject,	the	‘I’	the	‘forger	of	new	passions’	that	appears	only	
indirectly	among	objects	of	the	world”	(2002,	67).	The	“I”	emerges	only	in	receptive	
																																																																				
138	Cathexis	(originally	“Besetzung”	in	Freud’s	German)	refers	to	an	investment	of	libidinal	energy.	The	term	“cathexis”	
derives	from	the	Greek	“retention.”	Peter	Gay	notes	that	“Freud	thought	a	good	translation	for	his	“Besetzung”	which	
means	occupation	(by	troops)	or	charge	(as	in	electrical	charge)	would	be	‘interest’,”	as	Freud	preferred	to	use	common	
words	over	scientific	Latin	or	Greek	derived	terms	(Freud	and	Gay	1989).		
OED	Online,	s.v.	“cathexis,”	accessed	August	1,	2015.	
	
139	In	chapter	three,	I	describe	how	the	self	emerges	through	an	incorporation	of	otherness	and	discuss	the	implications	of	
this	understanding	of	the	self	for	my	theory	of	autonomy.		
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porousness	to	otherness,	in	loving	investment	in	otherness,	in	openness	to	the	negativity	
and	potential	harm	done	to	the	self	by	facing	one’s	vulnerability	to	the	other.		
The	actions	taken	by	participants	in	the	Baltimore	uprising	can	be	read	as	ethical	
acts	of	love,	acts	of	loving	and	calls	to	be	loved,	an	opening	to	love	as	both	a	destructive	and	
self-affirming	force.	The	act	of	loving	and	wanting	to	be	loved,	while	it	might	appear	as	
passive	and	self-sacrificing	because	it	entails	taking	one’s	place	among	vulnerable	objects	
that	can	be	both	loved	and	destroyed	as	well	as	investing	the	self’s	libidinal	energy	in	
otherness,	actually	works	to	create	and	to	affirm	the	subject	as	both	giver	and	receiver,	as	
both	subject	(subjected	and	subjector)	and	object	(objected	and	objector).140	The	rioters’	
seizure	of	subjectivity	occurred	as	they	took	their	places	among	the	world	of	objects	to	be	
both	loved	and	destroyed,	as	they	demanded	to	be	loved	and	to	give	love.	The	self-exposure	
that	characterized	their	actions	and	their	refusal	to	look	away	from	the	pain	of	their	loved	
ones	reinforced	their	sense	of	self-affirmed	subjectivity.		
Two	men	involved	in	the	uprising	declared	selfhood	in	the	face	of	those	who	would	
deny	their	status	as	full	citizens	and	subjects.	They	did	so	through	a	language	of	concern	for	
others	in	their	community.	In	response	to	a	journalist’s	inquiry,	one	man	claimed	his	and	
his	community’s	right	to	speak	even	as	the	language	of	dominant	culture	denied	the	
humanness	of	their	words.	He	stated	“they	think	we	aint	human	cause	I	sell	drugs?	They	
think	we	aint	human	because	we	don’t	speak	the	King’s	English?	We	reject	that	shit!	And	
we	smart,	smarter	than	ever.	I	know	I’m	smart”	(Hazzard	2015).	The	man	affirmed	that	the	
members	of	his	community—while	white	society	could	only	recognize	their	speech	as	the	
																																																																				
140	Žižek	ties	agency	to	the	place	of	the	object,	noting	that	it	is	the	object	that	objects	and	disrupts	and	the	subject	that	is	
subjected	and	submits	(2006,	17).	
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unknowing	language	of	criminals,	as	the	language	of	non-citizens	and	non-subjects—were	
smart,	savvy,	and	aware,	perhaps	much	more	aware	than	white	society	about	the	injustices	
hidden	behind	American	fantasies	of	equality	and	meritocracy.	In	claiming	this	awareness	
and	intelligence	for	his	community,	he	speaks	his	self-affirmation.	He	states:	“I	know	I’m	
smart.”	Another	protester	joined	the	first	speaker.	He	said,	“Black	brothers	and	sisters…we	
together	out	here	against	these	police.	I’m	a	liberator,	I’m	a	revolutionary…I	know	my	
worth…”	(Hazzard	2015).	Expressing	first	a	commitment	to	his	companions,	he	ended	with	
an	utterance	of	self-worth:	“I	know	my	worth.”	These	statements	convey	that	for	some	
involved	in	the	uprising	their	actions	of	resistance	were	carried	out	with	a	sense	of	
responsibility	for	others.	Exposing	themselves	to	the	physical	threat	of	riot	police	and	the	
symbolic	threat	that	their	actions	would	be	seen	as	evil	or	unbounded,	those	who	were	
involved	in	the	uprising	took	a	risk	on	behalf	of	otherness,	a	risk	that	affirmed	their	“I”	
ness.	
In	suggesting	that	one	arrives	at	a	confirmation	of	“I-ness,”	a	loving	realization	of	an	
“auto”	a	self,	only	through	loving	another,	I	mean	to	unsettle	the	notion	of	autonomy	as	self-
enclosed	sovereignty.	Rather	than	a	liberal	vision	of	autonomy,	which	appears	to	demand	
an	indifference	to,	or	mastery	of,	otherness—the	otherness	of	emotionality	and	the	
otherness	of	the	“different”	from	me—,	receptive	autonomy	thrives	only	in	receptive	
proximity	to	the	emotive,	the	sensuous,	and	the	disruptive.		
George	Bataille’s	inversion	of	sovereignty,	his	notion	that	I	call	“erotic	sovereignty,”	
clarifies	how	receptive	autonomy	stands	as	a	comportment	of	self-disruption,	social-
dissent,	and	love.	Erotic	sovereignty	occurs	in	openness	to	the	“disorderliness	and	
randomness	of	love”	(Bataille	1986,	251).	The	pursuit	of	interconnection	leaves	behind	the	
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banality	of	work	and	the	imperative	to	self-interestedly	adjust	to	social	custom.	Bataille	
depicts	the	occurrence	of	erotic	sovereignty	as	“non-attachment	to	ordinary	life,	
indifference	to	its	needs,	anguish	felt	in	the	midst	of	this	until	the	being	reels,	and…the	
spontaneous	surge	of	life	that	is	usually	under	control…bursts	forth	in	freedom	and	infinite	
bliss”	(1986,	246-47).	The	disturbing	qualities	of	the	erotic,	the	giddiness	and	sometimes	
shock	these	qualities	bring,	shake	the	self	free	from	normative	constraints;	the	self	partially	
ruptures	but	through	this	rupture	becomes	“sovereign.”	This	vision	of	indifference	to	the	
ordinary,	a	post-anguish	embrace	of	previously	forbidden	pleasure,	and	a	widening	sense	
of	self-affirmation	describes	the	atmosphere	surrounding	the	riots.		
During	the	riots,	people	were	seen	dancing	and	singing	in	the	streets	(Hazzard	
2015;	Scharper	2015).	Liquor	and	food	previously	unavailable	to	many	people	in	these	
neighborhoods	were	taken	and	enjoyed.	The	actions	of	many	of	the	rioters	could	not	but	be	
described	as	suffused	with	a	kind	of	effusive	and	justified	pleasure.	This	exhilaration	
spread	through	Baltimore,	from	the	rioters	to	the	entire	city.	A	certain	giddiness	and	
excitement	of	something	to	come,	something	to	change,	simmered	below	rote	fears	of	
broken	windows	and	stolen	bikes.	The	rioters’	enjoyment,	their	pleasure,	and	their	
willingness	to	disregard	the	dangers	they	might	face	at	the	hands	of	the	police	created	an	
atmosphere	of	continuity	and	resilience	in	the	city.		
However,	the	context	of	the	riots	has	been	and	continues	to	be	a	source	of	
widespread	anxiety,	stress,	and	fear.	As	much	as	the	riots	unsettled	Baltimore,	the	
terrifying	and	nauseating	video	of	Gray’s	arrest	and	beating	as	well	as	the	presence	of	
police	helicopters,	the	National	Guard,	and	the	implementation	of	a	city-wide	curfew	
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contributed	greatly	to	the	prevalent	air	of	insecurity	and	apprehension.141	During	this	
period,	the	city	seemed	awash	with	emotions	of	both	pleasure	and	fear,	both	unity	and	
divisiveness.		
Queen,	a	woman	interviewed	during	the	days	following	the	riot,	spoke	about	the	
sense	of	both	brokenness	and	unity	generated	by	the	protesters	and	rioters’	actions.	She	
said:	“Baltimore	loves	Baltimore.	Get	that	straight.	You	know,	Baltimore	is	pulling	together.	
I	think	this—you	know	again,	I	say	this	even	has	transpired	a	new	unity	in	the	city…No	
more	anything,	just	coming—you	know,	coming	against	each	other.	Just	come	together.	
Some	things	had	to	fall	apart	to	fall	together”	(Maté	2015).	Perhaps	some	people	in	
Baltimore	like	Queen	are	well	aware	that	dissolution	and	convergence	tend	to	exist	in	
surprisingly	close	proximity	to	one	another.		
According	to	most	psychoanalytic	theorists,	such	forces	and	emotional	states—love	
and	hate,	harmony	and	division,	unity	and	separation—reinforce	and	require	one	
another.142	Eros	possesses	both	consolidative	and	dispersive	qualities.	The	mixed	qualities	
of	Eros	manifest	as	both	the	inclination	to	care	for	others	and	also	the	inclination	to	destroy	
the	self	and	the	others	whom	it	loves.143	
These	cohesive	and	disintegrative	forces	exist	together	in	a	comportment	of	
receptive	autonomy.	The	rioters,	in	enjoying	and	coming	together	at	the	expense	of	their	
own	social	integrity,	experienced	the	freedom	and	self-affirmation	brought	about	by	
																																																																				
141	This	of	course,	is	not	to	mention	the	police	surveillance,	impoverishment,	and	state-perpetrated	violence	experienced	
by	citizens	of	West	Baltimore	on	a	daily	basis.	
	
142	An	example	would	be	the	Kleinian	theory	of	love	as	a	form	of	reparation	for	feelings	of	aggression	and	hate	(Klein	
1964).	
	
143	In	her	work	on	feminism	and	its	relationship	to	biology,	Elizabeth	Wilson	argues	that	feminists,	for	ethical	and	political	
reasons,	must	come	to	terms	with	the	fact	that	repair	must	always	be	accompanied	by	harm	(Wilson	2015).		
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opening	to	contingency,	to	a	concern	for	otherness.	Explained	through	the	paradigm	of	
Bataille’s	concept	of	erotic	sovereignty,	the	rioters	exposed	themselves	to	the	dangers	of	
disintegration,	yet	in	this	exposure,	became	emboldened.	Facing	the	potential	for	social	and	
actual	death,	the	rioters	disrupted	the	very	coherence	of	their	own	social	positions,	but	in	
this	expressed	a	self-affirmative	refusal	of	social	dictates,	a	refusal	achieved	through	
opening	to	the	pleasures	and	dangers	of	continuity	with	others.		
	
Conclusion		
	
	
Throughout,	I	have	argued	that	an	open	stance	toward	disruption,	to	that	which	
shakes	us	from	our	adhesion	to	normative	social	patterns	and	routines,	enriches	our	
capacity	for	receptive	autonomy—our	ability	to	reconsider	and	reconfigure	the	orders	of	
meaning	that	structure	our	lives.	In	contrast,	a	denial	of	the	need	for	others	and	resistance	
to	and	fear	of	incursions	by	otherness	weaken	the	self’s	potential	to	embody	a	
comportment	of	autonomy.		
Holding	on	to	an	ideal	of	autonomy	as	non-dependence	only	serves	to	diminish	
autonomous	capacity.	As	Lacan	suggests,	in	presuming	self-mastery	we	submit	wholly	to	
the	order	of	the	Other.	For	Lacan,	it	is	precisely	in	the	moment	the	infant	misrecognizes	his	
reflection	in	the	mirror	as	a	confirmation	of	his	bodily	integrity	and	self-coherence—and	
thus	imagines	he	is	an	autonomous	agent,	free	from	otherness—that	he	enters	the	order	of	
the	imaginary,	an	order	in	which	all	identification	is	“mediated	by	the	other’s	desire”	
(Lacan	1966,	79).	Here,	Lacan	explains	that	the	ego,	this	primary	misrecognition,	serves	as	
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the	basis	for	the	subject’s	understanding	of	itself	as	like	others,	as	like	the	other	it	sees	in	
the	mirror.	From	this	point	on,	the	subject	conceives	of	itself	only	through	the	image	of	the	
other,	only	through	an	identification	with	the	other.	I	contend	that	this	misrecognition	of	
self-mastery	and	non-dependence,	which	is	ironically	an	adherence	to	an	identification	
with	the	other—if	it	is	hardened	by	narratives	of	autonomy	that	deny	the	social	conditions	
that	birth	and	sustain	the	self—increases	the	self’s	tendency	to	submit	to	the	terms	of	
normative	social	order.	Only	in	moments	that	disrupt	this	illusion	of	autonomy	does	the	
self	gain	the	capacity	for	actual	autonomy.		
Zupančič’s	reading	of	Kantian	ethics	echoes	the	connection	I	find	between	an	
affirmation	of	one’s	fundamental	otherness	and	one’s	capacity	for	receptive	autonomy.	
Zupančič	reads	Kant’s	emphasis	on	guilt,	on	the	idea	that	we	know	moral	law	only	through	
our	inevitable	failure	to	live	up	to	it,	as	the	true	indicator	of	our	potential	freedom.	As	Kant	
contends,	the	effect	of	moral	“law	on	freedom	is	humiliation	alone,	which	we	thus	see	a	
priori,	though	we	cannot	know	the	force	of	pure	practical	law	as	drive	but	only	the	
resistance	to	drives	of	our	sensuous	nature”	(1993,	82).	We	know	moral	law—the	reality	of	
our	intrinsic	freedom—only	when	we	sense	our	failure	to	live	up	to	its	demands.	When	we	
feel	guilty	and	frustrated	because	we	know	that	we	ought	to	act	differently,	that	we	do	in	
fact	have	the	ability	to	act	contrary	to	our	inclinations	and	habituated	beliefs,	only,	then	do	
we	recognize	the	possibility	of	freedom	(Zupančič	2000,	27).	Guilt	alerts	us	to	the	fact	that	
we	are	able	to	act	contrary	to	socialized	ways	of	being,	even	if	there	is	no	way	of	knowing	
when	we	do.	In	the	absence	of	guilt,	with	no	consciousness	of	a	radical	otherwise,	one	
misrecognizes	one’s	inclinations	as	autonomously	derived	motives	for	ethical	action.	
Zupančič	explains	that	“where	the	subject	believes	herself	autonomous,	Kant	insists	on	the	
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irreducibility	of	the	Other,	a	casual	order	beyond	her	control.	But	where	the	subject	
becomes	aware	of	her	dependence	on	the	Other	(such	and	such	laws,	inclinations,	hidden	
motives…)	and	is	ready	to	give	up,	saying	to	herself:	This	isn’t	worth	the	trouble,’	Kant	
indicates	a	‘crack’	in	the	Other,	a	crack	in	which	he	situates	the	autonomy	and	freedom	of	
the	subject”	(2000,	28).	Only	when	the	self	realizes	its	foundations	in	otherness,	its	
dependence	on	others	and	the	force	of	the	law	of	the	Other,	and	gives	up	its	pretentions	to	
self-sovereignty	does	it	begin	to	embody	a	comportment	of	actual	autonomy.				
The	rioters	gave	up	following	the	rules;	their	actions,	carried	out	with	an	awareness	
that	things	could	in	fact	be	otherwise,	that	things	ought	to	be	otherwise,	revealed	the	
absurdity	of	the	ideal	of	self-sovereignty.	In	attending	to	and	prying	open	the	crack	in	the	
Other,	the	incoherence	between	social	promises	and	their	own	realities,	the	rioters	
produced	an	excess,	an	unintelligible	demand	that	mainstream	American	society	has	been	
challenged	to	decipher.	The	rioters	pointed	out	the	illusory	nature	of	white	self-
sovereignty,	exposing	white	supremacy	as	white	dependency	on	the	dispossession	of	others.		
The	rioters	symbolically	spread	the	contingency	and	uncertainty	of	their	everyday	
lives	throughout	the	city,	and	from	the	perspective	of	mainstream	media	they	appeared	to	
place	the	self-sovereignty	of	the	privileged	in	jeopardy.	The	riots	have	productively	
awakened	much	of	American	society	to	the	falsity	of	their	assumed	security	and	
independence.	A	demand	has	been	made	for	an	acknowledgement	of	the	conditions	of	
white	wealth	and	for	white	society	to	affirm	the	contingency	inherent	in	sociality	and	
embody	a	reciprocal	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy.	
		 Although	it	remains	to	be	seen	if	those	who	profit	from	a	system	of	racially-based	
deprivation	and	violence	will	avow	their	reliance	on	others,	and	in	this	affirmation,	feel	
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fully	compelled	to	abandon	their	pretense	of	self-sovereignty,	there	are	telling	hints	that	
these	types	of	responses	have	already	begun	to	take	place.	Might	the	growing	presence	of	
movement-based	collectives	like	Black	Lives	Matter,144	Campaign	Zero,145	The	Black	
Liberation	Collective,146		We	The	Protesters,147	and	many	more	indicate	not	only	a	
mounting	awareness	about	the	violence	committed	against	Black	Americans	but	also	a	
growing	determination	to	end	this	violence?	Perhaps	we	are	seeing	the	beginnings	of	a	sea	
change	in	the	way	many	Americans	conceive	of	and	respond	to	the	violence	enacted	against	
Black	communities	in	this	country.		
How	could	one	encourage	and	deepen	this	response?	Judith	Butler	has	suggested	
that	experiences	of	mutual	vulnerability	and	grief	might	foster	a	more	receptive	stance	
toward	otherness,	opening	up	the	category	of	humanity	to	those	previously	denied	such	a	
designation	(2004a).	Butler	proposes	that	challenges	to	self-sovereignty,	occurrences	that	
invite	a	sense	of	common	vulnerability,	might	encourage	interconnectivity	and	the	spread	
of	justice.	Yet,	Butler	also	notes	that	experiences	of	vulnerability	just	as	often	tend	to	
produce	defensiveness	and	provoke	attempts	to	build	up	an	impossible-to-achieve	
sovereignty	over	the	conditions	of	human	existence.	The	United	States’	martial	response	to	
the	destruction	of	the	World	Trade	Towers	on	9/11	exemplifies	this	type	of	defensive	
																																																																				
144	http://blacklivesmatter.com/	
145	http://www.joincampaignzero.org/	
146	http://www.blackliberationcollective.org/	
147	http://www.wetheprotesters.org/	
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reaction	to	vulnerability	(Butler	2004a).148,	149	Accordingly,	experiences	of	vulnerability	in	
no	way	guarantee	a	subsequent	affirmation	of	social	responsibility.		
Why,	then,	should	we	expect	those	who	are	faced	with	the	falsity	of	their	
assumptions	and	the	hypocrisy	of	their	ideals	to	respond	in	an	overwhelmingly	ethical	way,	
with	recognition	of	shared	human	dependency?	While	we	have	certainly	seen	an	
outpouring	of	support	and	shared	sorrow	in	the	liberal	public	as	a	consequence	of	the	
uprising	and	surrounding	movements	proclaiming	the	value	of	Black	lives,	there	remains	a	
danger	that	such	responses	will	be	short-lived	and	ineffectual.	150,	151	To	prevent	the	
political	potentiality	produced	by	the	Baltimore	uprising	from	falling	away	from	view,	we	
must	look	to	the	sensibilities	we	cultivate	and	normalize	in	response	to	unsettling	political	
occurrences.		
As	Jane	Bennett	suggests,	ethics	involves	a	sensuous	and	energetic	dimension.	
Bennett	explains	that,	“regardless	of	whether	the	ethical	code	is	conceived	as	divine	
																																																																				
148	Naomi	Klein	points	out	that	neoliberal	politicians	and	policymakers	often	take	advantage	of	shocking	and	upsetting	
occurrences	to	push	through	exploitative	economic	agendas	(Klein	2007).		
	
149		Žižek	refers	to	9/11	as	an	explicit	opportunity	for	either	the	commencement	of	an	ethical	act	or	for	a	turning	away	
from	disturbance	toward	an	obedience	to	the	comforting	authority	of	the	super-ego:	“One	should	recall	that	there	are	two	
fundamental	ways	to	react	to	such	traumatic	events	which	cause	unbearable	anxiety:	the	way	of	superego	and	the	way	of	
the	act”	(2001b,	57-8).		
	
150	Mathew	Clair	explains	that	social	awareness	about	racial	injustice	does	not	always	lead	to	significant	social	change.	
Consequently,	more	attention	needs	to	be	focused	on	white	responses	to	racial	injustice	and	how	these	responses	might	
or	might	not	lead	to	change.	He	states,	“as	history	reveals,	sympathetic	attention	does	not	always	translate	into	policy.	
Even	when	it	does,	long-term	change	can	be	elusive…The	receptivity	of	particular	white	audiences	has	fluctuated	over	
time,	and	with	it—in	tandem,	arguably—various	indicators	of	racial	inequality.	Perhaps	just	as	pressing,	then,	as	
interpreting	blackness	for	white	audiences	is	interpreting	the	cause	and	consequences	of	white	attention	for	the	rest	of	
us”	(2016).	
	
151	As	Saidiya	Hartman	claims,	white	peoples’	empathetic	distress	might	actually	express	a	further	effacement	of	Black	
peoples’	subjectivity.	Hartman	explains,	“the	effort	to	counteract	the	commonplace	callousness	to	black	suffering	requires	
that	the	white	body	be	positioned	in	the	place	of	the	black	body	in	order	to	make	this	suffering	visible	and	intelligible.	Yet	
if	this	violence	can	become	palpable	and	indignation	can	be	fully	aroused	only	through	a	masochistic	fantasy,	then	it	
becomes	clear	that	empathy	is	double-edged,	for	in	making	the	other’s	suffering	one’s	own,	this	suffering	is	occluded	by	
the	other’s	obliteration”	(1997,	19).			
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command	or	pragmatic	rule,	if	it	is	to	be	transformed	into	acts,	affects	must	be	engaged,	
orchestrated,	and	libidinally	bound	to	it—codes	alone	seem	unable	to	propel	their	own	
enactment,	at	least	for	many	people	under	most	circumstances”	(2001	131).	If	we	presume	
that	the	enactment	of	an	ethos	requires	a	motivating	affective	force,	we	cannot	expect	
emotions	evocative	of	stagnation	and	woe	to	encourage	ethical	comportments	of	
receptivity.	Tarrying	with	grief	is	unlikely	to	encourage	privileged	society	to	embody	a	
reciprocal	(in	response	to	the	protesters	and	rioters)	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy.	
Yet,	it	is	precisely	such	a	comportment	of	receptivity	that	would	allow	Americans,	in	
general,	to	reject	the	given	normative	order	and	create	a	new	nomos,	a	new	web	of	
meaning,	that	could	reshape	American	society.	
Bonnie	Honig,	Wendy	Brown,	and	Nancy	Luxon	warn	against	the	threat	of	“left	
melancholy”	that	can	result	from	settling	down	into	patterns	of	political	misery,	even	if	
they	are	justified	and	express	a	well-intentioned	empathy	for	others’	suffering.	Brown	
explains	that	“left	melancholy	is	Benjamin's	unambivalent	epithet	for	the	revolutionary	
hack	who	is,	finally,	attached	more	to	a	particular	political	analysis	or	idea—even	to	the	
failure	of	that	ideal—than	to	seizing	possibilities	for	radical	change	in	the	present”	(1999,	
20).	Here,	Brown	turns	to	Freud’s	account	of	melancholy	to	explain	the	dangers	of	refusing	
to	accept	loss	in	favor	of	nursing	failed	beliefs	and	old	sorrows.	Freud	recognized	that	there	
was	always	the	danger	that	an	unavowed	loss	of	a	loved	ideal	or	person	might	lead	to	an	
internalization	of	this	lost	entity,	which	would	then	become	the	target	of	vicious	self-
reproach	(Freud	1917).	This	self-beratement	would	weaken	the	self’s	resolve	and	desire	to	
make	new	loving	attachments.	In	the	Left	melancholic’s	case,	this	type	of	despondence	
dampens	any	desire	to	explore	new	modes	of	political	solidarity.		
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Luxon	reads	contemporary	political	theory’s	frequent	turn	to	concepts	of	mourning	
and	melancholy	as	a	means	to	explain	or	advocate	a	certain	political	posture,	as	possibly	
stifling	a	politics	invigorated	by	antagonism	or	anger	(Luxon	2016).	She	suggests	that	using	
the	framework	of	melancholia	and	mourning	to	think	about	political	life	could	result	in	an	
avoidance	or	pathologizing	of	anger,	the	kind	of	anger	that	might	stimulate	political	action	
and	significant	social	change	(Luxon	2016,	153).	Figuring	politics	through	the	lens	of	grief	
might	discourage	a	praxis	that	looks	creatively	and	passionately	to	a	new	political	future.152		
Honig	explores	the	limits	of	a	politics	of	mourning	as	it	is	presented	in	Butler’s	
reading	of	Antigone	in	Precarious	Life.	Butler	suggests	that	Creon’s	refusal	to	allow	
Antigone	to	mourn	for	her	brother	Polyneices,	an	enemy	of	the	state,	exemplifies	the	statist	
refusal	to	acknowledge	a	commonality	of	vulnerability	with	the	“other”	to	the	state	or	the	
community	(Butler	2004a,	36).	Honig	contends	that	Butler’s	“politics	or	ethics	premised	on	
human	commonalities	of	vulnerability	and	mortality”	(Honig	2013,	45)	leaves	little	
incentive	for	creative	political	action.	Honig	instead	advocates	for	a	different	reading	of	
Antigone,	one	that	“does	not	just	immerse	us	in	a	politics	of	lamentation	premised	on	
shared	finitude	but	also	inaugurates	an	insurgent	politics	of	lamentation	that	solicits	out	of	
us	a	potentially	shared	natality”	(2013,	85).	Honig	proposes	a	politics	of	vitality	and	
creativity	rather	than	one	of	finitude	and	mourning.		
While	I	agree	with	Honig’s	assessment	of	the	need	for	a	politics	of	creativity	and	
identify	with	her	wariness	of	a	politics	based	on	grief,	I	do	not	necessarily	see	creativity	as	
tied	only	to	natality	and	vitality.	Rather,	I	find	that	creative	force	comes	also	from	exposure	
																																																																				
152	In	Crisis	of	Authority:	Politics,	Trust,	and	Truth-telling	in	Freud	and	Foucault,	Luxon	suggests	that	Judith	Butler’s	
particular	emphasis	on	exposure,	because	it	seems	to	suggest	“that	empowerment	will	be	tempted	toward	command”	
(2013,	38),	works	against	the	conceptualization	of	socially	transformative	ethical-political	practices.	
	
	
239	
	
to	uncertainty,	loss,	and,	sometimes,	social	death.153	What	I	seek	to	emphasize,	however,	is	
that	these	occurrences	that	call	our	very	being	into	question,	that	shake	us	away	from	a	
sense	of	interiority	and	security,	do	not	solely	evoke	terror.	As	I	have	shown,	such	
encounters	are	closely	tied	to	the	unexpected	and	surprising	nature	of	love,	which	
generates	both	giddiness	and	pleasure.		
The	motivation	to	allow	disruption	to	enable	our	breaking-free	from	social	
circumscription	is	much	more	likely	to	come	from	lingering	with	the	erotic	affects	of	
longing,	pleasure,	and	love	than	from	settling	down	with	grief.	Erotic	sensations	generate	
energy,	both	unpleasant	and	pleasant	sensations	that	awaken	the	self	to	the	presence	of	its	
own	contours.	Instead	of	the	stagnancy	and	dejection	that	dwelling	in	grief	tends	to	
produce,	dwelling	in	love	encourages	attentiveness	to	the	excessive,	to	the	pleasures	and	
fears	that	await	those	willing	to	receive	otherness.	Erotic	affects,	neither	inherently	
positive	nor	negative	are	inherently	jarring.	Love	both	unravels	and	exalts	the	self,	and	it	is	
in	this	state	of	undoneness	that	a	sense	of	self-efficacy	emerges	and	vital	social	change	
becomes	a	possibility.	The	capacity	to	embody	a	comportment	of	receptive	autonomy	
depends	upon	the	self’s	readiness	to	welcome	the	disturbing,	satisfying,	and	nourishing	
powers	of	love.		
Those	who	took	part	in	the	West	Baltimore	uprising	attest	to	the	ethical	worth	of	
attending	to	social	dissonance	and	of	subscribing	to	creative	discontent.	An	openness	to	
what	unsettles	us	moves	us	away	from	comforting	fictions	of	autonomy	as	self-mastery	and	
self-determination.	Instead,	taking	a	receptive	approach	to	disruption	allows	us	attend	to	
																																																																				
153	Cecilia	Sjöholm	also	notes	the	interconnection	between	natality,	death,	and	creativity	in	Antigone.	She	interrogates	this	
interconnection	in	her	political	and	ethical	reevaluation	of	Lacan’s	reading	of	the	play	(Sjöholm	2002).		
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our	difference	and	dissonance	with	respect	to	potentially	harmful	social	norms.	We	find	
ourselves	at	odds	with	the	way	things	are,	or	have	been,	and	predisposed	to	create	modes	
of	political	engagement	more	faithful	to	the	parts	of	us	that	resist	social	determination.	In	
the	ability	to	be	troubled,	we	find	the	capacity	for	receptive	autonomy,	for	the	creation	of	
self-inspired	ways	of	living	in	the	world	with	others.		
Through	the	purview	of	psychoanalytic	theory,	I	have	re-characterized	the	concept	
of	autonomy	to	reflect	the	inherent	relationality	and	fragility	of	the	self,	while	insisting	that	
these	destabilizing	aspects	of	existence	bring	about	the	very	possibility	for	autonomous	
ethical	action.	Contributing	to	traditions	of	critical	theory	that	prize	autonomous	self-
capacity	for	the	interrogation	of	potentially	devitalizing	social	norms,	I	also	affirm	the	real	
fragility	of	the	human	condition.	Not	only	do	I	insist	on	this	fragility,	I	emphasize	that	this	
very	tenuousness	enables	critical	resistance	and	the	instantiation	of	creative	revisions	of	
social	existence	to	the	ends	of	a	more	just	society.		
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